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3Abstract
This thesis discusses the impacts of some policies associated with structural adjustment 
on the distribution of incomes. It consists of three parts. An institutional chapter surveys 
and assesses the evolution of views on international debt and adjustment in the economics 
profession in the late 1970s and in the 1980s, with a special focus on the World Bank's 
contribution. This chapter provides a general historical background to the more specific 
models and case studies that follow.
A theoretical part considers the long term implications for income distribution of the post­
adjustment permanent reduction in the role of government in the public provision of some 
important inputs, such as health care, education and infrastructure. Chapter 3 derives an 
endogenous steady-state wealth distribution which is used to investigate the consequences 
of changes in public investment for equality of opportunity in a world with imperfect 
capital markets. Chapter 4 considers various policy options for a benign government in 
that context and discusses comparative statics properties of its optimal size. Chapter 5 
extends the analysis into a context with steady-state growth in per-capita incomes and 
focuses on long-run behavioural consequences of a smaller government when the poor are 
more dependent on public investment than the rich. Saving behaviour and hence rates of 
capital accumulation are shown to differ, with persistent inequality-augmenting effects.
Finally, the empirical part describes the evolution of the distribution of income - and of 
some poverty indicators - in Brazil during the 1980s. Using a large repeated cross-section 
household survey data set, the final two chapters demonstrate the increases in inequality 
during this period of failed stabilization policies, by means of scalar measures and of a 
battery of stochastic dominance results. The sensitivity of the inequality (and poverty) 
measures to variations in the equivalence scale used to compare incomes is investigated. 
Possible explanations for the behaviour of inequality are suggested by means of static and 
dynamic decompositions by recipient subgroups, and by some simple but intuitively 
appealing correlations and regressions on basic macroeconomic variables.
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In the 1980s, stabilization and structural adjustment programmes, designed to restore 
internal and external macroeconomic equilibria and to improve the efficiency with which 
resources are allocated in an economy, were implemented in a large number of developing 
countries. These programmes arose as a response to a combination of severe external 
shocks and accumulated policy problems which afflicted these various countries, albeit to 
different extents.
The 1980s also saw a marked deterioration in a number of performance indicators in less 
developed countries (LDCs). Growth in per capita incomes was generally low: 1.7% for 
all LDCs, 0.7% for all low income countries except China and India, 0.8% for middle- 
income economies, and -0.5% for Latin America and the Caribbean, in the period 1980-89 
(see World Bank, 1981, 1991.). The ratio of investment to GNP fell in many countries 
and, in many cases where data is available, there was a deterioration in social indicators 
such as literacy rates, poverty and inequality measures (see e.g. Comia, Jolly and Stewart, 
1987). The question of whether adjustment programmes contributed to this deterioration 
or alleviated its severity has been the subject of a comprehensive debate, both in and out 
of academic circles.
This debate has benefitted from contributions of widely different natures, as some 
examples discussed below will illustrate. Nevertheless, from the viewpoint of economic 
theory, the complexity of the various mechanisms through which different policies can 
impact on incomes and living standards suggests that a general equilibrium model, tracing 
the joint effects of all policies combined on the incomes received by the chosen recipient 
units would be appropriate. Such an approach was indeed adopted by Bourguignon, de 
Melo and Suwa (1991), who based their analysis on a Computable General Equilibrium
11
(CGE) model and generated a number of interesting insights, some of which are discussed 
in this introduction.
Illuminating though they may be, however, CGE models have their shortcomings. The 
importance of parametric and functional form assumptions is not always transparent. In 
the study of income distribution, the level of disaggregation of income recipients is likely 
to be an issue. Dynamics are not easily incorporated, particularly long term 
intertemporally optimizing behaviour.1 Not all of the issues concerning the distributions 
of income and wealth in the context of economic reform could possibly have been solved 
by a CGE approach. In particular, there appears to be scope for further analysis of the 
long term dynamic implications of policy changes, as well as a continuing need for 
detailed empirical investigation of specific case studies.
This thesis is a collection of essays on the interplay between policies associated with 
structural adjustment and changes in the distributions of income and wealth. It seeks to 
contribute to the debate by focusing on exactly those two areas mentioned above: policy 
effects on the long-run, steady-state dynamics of the income distribution, on the theoretical 
side; and on the empirical side, a thorough investigation of inequality and poverty trends 
during a turbulent period of attempts at stabilization in a particular country. In particular, 
the chapters that follow consider the long-term implications of a key component of the 
policy package, namely expenditure reduction, and analyze new evidence from a large 
household survey data set for Brazil.
The remainder of this introduction is structured as follows. Section 2 defines some basic 
concepts and briefly surveys the causes of adjustment. Section 3 provides a stylized 
discussion of the nature of the process, based on a diagram due to Bourguignon, de Melo 
and Morrisson (1991), and lists the key policies that constitute a stabilization and 
adjustment package. Section 4 reports on the rising concern with their effects on the 
distribution of income and assets, i.e. on equity issues, and suggests five separate channels 
through which these effects take place. Section 5 contains a summary outline of the rest 
of the thesis.
1 See Stem (1989, pp 647-648) for a critical assessment of these models.
21 The Causes of Adjustment.
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The prominence of the terms stabilization and adjustment is less than two decades old 
and, possibly as a result, their usage has been fairly loose. In the early 1980s they were 
used somewhat interchangeably and the World Development Reports fWDRsl 1980 and 
1981 used adjustment to refer to the responses of the international financial system to the 
balance of payments disequilibria set in motion by the two oil price shocks of 1973/74 
and 1979/80. This involved recommendations for all countries facing increased current 
account deficits to shift resources to the production of tradeables (either exports or import 
substitutes), but it equally encompassed capital flows from the current account surplus 
countries (essentially the oil exporters) to those in deficit. The emphasis was on the macro 
variables, specifically the balance of payments, and on international rather than internal 
aspects.
At the same time, there was a dominant view amongst academics (see e.g. Dombusch,
1982) that balance of payments problems were often to be found alongside high inflation 
and that they had a common cause in large fiscal deficits. The programmes aimed to 
tackle these, also involving real exchange rate depreciations and hence the transfer of 
productive resources from the nontradeables to the tradeables sector, were referred to as 
stabilization programmes. Some then suggested that what needed stabilization was the 
price level, so that this term was to be understood as fighting inflation, while 
macroeconomic adjustment was a combined attempt at restoring both internal and external 
equilibria, i.e. some acceptable, low inflation "full employment" rate of unemployment, 
alongside an approximately balanced current account.
The view soon emerged, however, that to achieve such macroeconomic targets a great 
amount of change was necessary, at a micro level, in the structures of the economy. 
Adjustment had to focus, it was suggested, on property rights, the boundaries between 
private and public sector economic activity, trade policy, institutional efficiency, 
development of financial systems, management practices, and so on. This comprehensive 
reform of economic activity was termed "structural adjustment" and stabilization was then 
to be understood as the complementary efforts to achieve broad macroeconomic 
equilibrium through the normal macro policy instruments. This point was made explicitly 
in the WDR 1986 (p.40). Even more recently, it was suggested that stabilization policies
13
deal mainly with the demand side, whereas adjustment refers to reforms in the supply 
side. (WDR 1991,p.ll3)
Throughout this thesis I adopt the definitions which became consensual in the mid-1980s, 
namely that stabilization policies are those which aim to achieve broad macroeconomic 
equilibrium, i.e. to reduce inflation to acceptable levels, raise employment to levels 
compatible with non-accelerating inflation, and reduce current account deficits, by 
affecting the level and composition of aggregate demand. The term corresponds to the 
expression "macroeconomic adjustment", common in the earlier literature. Structural 
adjustment, on the other hand, aims to increase the efficiency with which agents perform 
their roles and allocate their resources, and thus has more of a supply-side focus. To use 
the textbook concepts, if stabilization tries to move the economy to the intersection of 
goods, labour and assets markets equilibria, as well as Balance of Payments, adjustment 
aims to move the economy from within the production possibility set to its boundary. In 
the following section I discuss in more detail the policies employed in each area, whereas 
I now turn to an account of how the disequilibria which required rectifying came to be 
so widespread in the early 1980s.
The experience of stabilization and adjustment can not be understood without reference 
to the oil price shocks of the 1970s, the period of international 'recycling' of funds that 
they set in motion, and the subsequent debt crisis. The oil shocks had a strong 
stagflationary impact on the world economy (see Bruno and Sachs, 1985), and Table 1 
traces the evolution of oil prices, alongside growth rates and current account surpluses for 
three categories of countries during the 1970s. Industrial countries grew at 4.5% per capita 
per annum on average between 1960 and 1970, but only 2.5% between 1970 and 1980. 
Developing countries per capita growth declined from 3.5% to 2.7% in the same period 
(WDR 1981, p.3). In addition, given the importance of oil in international trade, its price 
rise also caused significant changes in global terms of trade, giving rise to very large 
payments imbalances.
These imbalances lasted for a substantial period, because many non-oil exporting 
developing countries responded to the shocks differently from their industrial counterparts. 
Table 1 illustrates that whilst the latter tended to reduce their growth rates more sharply 
in response to dearer oil (and the subsequent inward shift of the factor price frontier),
14 
Table 1:
The Responses of Developed and Developing Countries to the Oil Shocks of the 1970s
1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982
Oil Prices® 2.70 9.76 10.72 11.51 12.40 12.70 16.97 28.67 32.57 33.49
Industrial Countries
- Growth Ratec 5.59 0.02 -1.07 4.40 3.42 5.52 2.51 0.97 1.49 -1.19
- Current Account Surplus'* 20 -11 20 1 -2 33 -6 -40 1 -1
Oil Exporting Developing Countries
- Growth Ratec 6.39 5.34 -1.29 5.93 1.50 -3.56 3.96 -4.66 -4.59 1.63
- Current Account Surplus'* 7 68 35 40 30 2 69 114 65 -2
Other Developing Countries
- Growth Ratec 4.34 3.75 2.85 3.22 4.02 3.09 2.16 3.31 1.54 -2.11
- Current Account Surplus'* -11 -37 -46 -31 -29 -41 -61 -89 -108 -87
Notes: aUS$/barrel, for Saudi Arabian crude at Ras Tanura;
bUS$ billion, in the IMF (1983) definitions;
c Weighted average growth rate of real GDP per capita (RGDP, Summers and Heston, 1988), with weights given by RGDPs as a share 
of group's RGDP.
Sources: IMF International Financial Statistics (Yearbook, 1981; December 1985)
IMF Balance of Payments Statistics Yearbook, 1983, Vol.34.
Summers and Heston (1988).
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restoring their current accounts to balance - or indeed surplus - relatively rapidly, the 
former registered a much less pronounced fall in growth rates in the immediate aftermath 
of a shock, but allowed their current account deficits to grow almost tenfold, on average, 
from 1973 to 1981. This was made possible by the availability of funds in the 
international financial system to finance those large and growing deficits. The funds 
originated from the large current account surpluses being run by the oil exporters and, 
although there was some increase in concessional flows, it was channelled predominantly 
through the Western commercial banking system.
These loans, often made at negative real interest rates, provided for the so-called 
'recycling' of funds which was seen by many policy makers, in the developing world as 
well as in the World Bank and many commercial banks, as a perfectly rational and 
appropriate response to the shocks, in that it enabled a much smaller reduction in domestic 
absorption, effectively cushioning countries from the need to adjust to sharply lower terms 
of trade. A smaller cut in absorption was supposed to allow for investment aimed at 
shifting productive resources to the tradeables sector, while avoiding the slowdown in 
growth and decline in living standards which would have been inevitable if such reforms 
were to have taken place in the absence of any external financing. For the commercial 
banks, this was seen as a safe portfolio option, following the credo of CITICORP 
Chairman Walter Wriston, who stated that "countries never go bankrupt” (see Sachs, 
1989).
A combination of abrupt changes in the external situation at the turn of the decade 
conspired to drastically alter that perception. After the second oil shock in 1979 conditions 
deteriorated sharply. A weighed index of real (non oil) commodity prices tumbled from 
121 in 1977 to 81 in 1982, (1980 = 100), heralding a further significant decline in the 
terms of trade for most developing countries. The industrial countries responded to the 
inflationary pressures with an unprecedented tightening of monetary policies, triggered by 
the accession of Paul Volker to the US Federal Reserve. Combined with the expansionary 
fiscal policy pursued by the Reagan Administration, this tight monetary policy led real 
interest rates to rise to historically high levels. The real US prime rate went from -0.6% 
in 1977 to 12.8% in 1981 (see Dombusch and Fischer, 1987).
In addition, the subsequent recession in the industrial countries - the sharpest since the
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1930s - curtailed demand for imports and triggered protectionist pressures. Developing 
countries faced the need to expand export earnings at a time when both the unit value of 
their export basket had declined (the terms of trade effect) and the volume demanded had 
stopped growing (the volume effect). Table 2 is drawn directly from the World 
Development Report 1985 [p.56] and contains estimates of the aggregated impacts of these 
two effects, as well as of the interest rate increase, on selected countries. A comparison 
of the 1974-75 figures to those of 1979-82 illustrate the greater seriousness of the second 
oil shock and its combined external effects, vis-a-vis those of the first oil shock.
To make matters worse, both the proportion of developing country debt owed to 
commercial banks, and that in Variable Interest Rate (VIR) arrangements, had been 
growing steadily, so that the sharp rise in interest rates increased the debt service burden 
very rapidly. As a result, combined current account deficits for non oil-exporting 
developing countries rose from U$40 billion in 1978 to U$115 billion in 1981 (WDR
1983). To keep payments up, borrowing in the thriving international financial markets 
accelerated even further.
Since demand for exports was so weak, many LDCs had only two ways to deal with these 
deficits: to sharply lower imports, through economic contraction, or to finance them by 
borrowing. Most countries chose the latter course, given the political resistance to cuts in 
the growth rate. Commercial banks, whose exposure to sovereign debt had steadily risen 
during the seventies, responded by a massive, albeit short-lived, increase in lending. As 
Jeffrey Sachs puts it: "What is truly remarkable about the bank behaviour is not the 
lending during 1973-79, but rather the outpouring of new lending during 1980-81, even 
after the world macroeconomic situation had soured markedly... In a mere two years, 1980 
and 1981, total bank exposure nearly doubled over the level of 1979 in the major debtor 
countries." (Sachs, 1989, p.9).
In August 1982, however, Mexico found it impossible to produce the necessary foreign 
exchange to make its service payments on time, and the ensuing rescheduling sent shock 
signals throughout the international financial system. Virtually overnight, voluntary 
lending to most LDCs all but ceased. The age of concerted lending, aimed only at "rolling 
over" existing debt, commenced. The huge current account deficits in many LDCs could 
no longer be financed by foreign capital inflows. Adjustment in the 1980s was to acquire
17
Table 2
Impact of External Shocks on the Balance of Payments in 
Selected Developing Countries 
(average annual percentage of GDP)
Country 1975-74 1979-80 1981-82
Reschedulersa
Argentina -0.6 -1.9 -6.4
Brazil -3.7 -2.8 -8.6
Chile -4.7 -1.2 -13.3
India -2.6 -1.6 -4.2
Ivory Coast 0.5 -5.6 -18.9
Jamaica -9.6 -13.3 -29.4
Mexico -1.0 -0.2 1.0
Peru -4.5 -1.5 -5.6
Nigeria 16.7 5.8 3.8
Morocco 0.2 -4.0 -9.7
Philippines -6.2 -2.4 -10.1
Yugoslavia -6.7 -2.0 -10.0
Non-reschedulers
Colombia -1.4 -3.6 -8.3
Kenya -8.1 -8.7 -19.0
Egypt -8.7 -0.8 -1.2
Tunisia -2.1 2.7 1.9
Korea -9.5 -8.1 -21.7
Indonesia 12.0 5.6 5.4
Tanzania -9.3 -6.0 -14.3
Thailand -3.7 -2.3 -10.1
Note: External shocks are defined as the impact on the balance of payments of
(a) changes in the terms of trade; (b) a decline in the growth rate of world demand for a 
country's exports; and (c) increases in interest rates. Data for 1974-75 show the change 
from 1971-73; data for 1979-80 and 1981-82 show the change from 1976-78.
* Countries that had rescheduled as of the end of 1984.
Source: World Development Report 1985, p.56.
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a new face. It was no longer a concerted global effort at responding to terms of trade 
changes that had originated in the oil price shocks, and recycling the resulting surpluses 
across the international economy, for which borrowing was seen as a legitimate 
instrument. The causation now ran from debt - and the 'Debt Crisis' - rather than oil 
prices, to adjustment, and the latter was to be seen fundamentally as an internal, country 
specific process.2
31 The Nature of Adjustment.
With recourse to foreign finance sharply curtailed for most debtors, countries had no 
choice but to bring expenditure in line with income. Figure 1, adapted from Figure 2 in 
Bourguignon, de Melo and Morrisson (1991, p.1489), captures the essence of the shock, 
and the necessary stabilization response. Let there be two economies, F (for flexible) and 
R (for rigid), both of which produce a tradeable good T and a non-tradeable good N. They 
have identical tastes, endowments and technologies, but different degrees of price rigidity. 
Their tastes are represented by an income-consumption curve (ICC), which maps the locus 
of tangencies between all isocost lines (for a fixed relative price) and indifference curves. 
I.e. there is one ICC for each relative price. Endowments and technology are represented 
by the (common) production possibility set. Now let each economy initially receive an 
identical foreign income transfer (measured in terms of tradeables: FCf°= RCr°). We can 
model an external shock straight-forwardly as the suspension of that transfer, which 
previously allowed both economies to consume in excess of their production. It can be 
interpreted as a cessation of foreign lending, or an increase in interest rates leading to 
much larger debt service outlays. F is an efficient economy with no price rigidities, and 
R is an economy whose policies and institutions lead to significant X-inefficiencies, and 
which thus produces at R, inside its PPF. This distinction is useful to highlight the role 
of structural adjustment, vis-a-vis that of stabilization. I return to this distinction below.
As the transfer stops (i.e. the current account deficit can no longer be financed), both 
countries are faced with the need to reduce expenditure in order to bring it into line with 
the income actually available to them. Furthermore, at ruling prices, there would be an
2 A brief survey comparing academic work on both the causes and possible solutions 
to the debt crisis with views expressed by the World Bank is included in Chapter 2.
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Figure 1: Flexible and rigid responses to an external shock.
excess demand (supply) for tradeables (non-tradeables), as F would wish to consume at 
I, which is not feasible. If prices adjust fully flexibly, ICC0 shifts to ICQ, as the real 
exchange rate depreciates to el5 and the economy reaches equilibrium at E. The cost of 
the shock then, if there are no rigidities and prices adjust costlessly and immediately, is 
the value of the transfer that is lost to the economy. But there are no secondary costs, no 
costs of the adjustment process itself.
This is not the case if rigidities exist in the goods, assets or factor markets. In the 
simplified framework of Figure 1, this is represented by a rigid real exchange rate. If e 
stays fixed at e0, consumption must take place somewhere along ICC0. But the external 
constraint must now be met out of the country's own resources. If a devaluation is
20
precluded by rigidities, income must come down further to lower imports. Given the 
prices implied by the slope of e0, production would take place at F, and consumption at 
I. In the absence of a capital account surplus, this is infeasible. If e0 will not adjust - 
which is how the authors proxy for rigidities in the economy, and which derives empirical 
relevance from the large number of adjusting countries maintaining overvalued currencies 
- income must be brought further down. In other words, if expenditure switching won't 
occur, expenditure reduction must be even greater than would have otherwise been the 
case. This happens through a contraction of the sector for whose output there is excess 
supply, N. The factors thereby released remain unemployed, as price signals do not induce 
producers in the tradeable sector to expand. This corresponds to a horizontal leftward 
movement from F. External equilibrium is reached at BF. If there is partial relative price 
adjustment, the economy will end up somewhere along line BFE. Some costs of 
adjustment, measured in terms of lower or negative income per capita growth rates, 
reductions in the investment/GNP ratio, etc, can be captured by this move inwards in the 
production possibility set. They depend crucially on the existence of rigidities and market 
imperfections that preclude an immediate adjustment.
For the inefficient economy R, apart from stabilization policies similar to those used by 
F, such as a real devaluation and expenditure reduction, structural reforms are necessary 
to improve X-efficiency. These policies, which are described below, come under the guise 
of structural adjustment, and are designed to improve resource allocation and use in a 
distorted economy. If R is successful in removing these distortions, and allows relative 
prices (here proxied solely by the real exchange rate) to adjust smoothly to reflect relative 
scarcities, it too could resume equilibrium at E. Otherwise, it will be somewhere between 
Br and E.
This picture and the story it tells suggest a schematic understanding of the processes of 
stabilization and structural adjustment, and of the differences and complementarities 
between them. Stabilization policies aim "to achieve sustainable fiscal and balance of 
payments current account deficits and to reduce the rate of inflation".3 They generally 
involve two components: expenditure reduction, usually through contractionary fiscal or 
monetary policies, and expenditure switching, through policies aimed at producing a
3 World Bank (1990c, p.8), as cited in Thomas (1992).
21
devaluation of the real exchange rate. These policies are macroeconomic in nature, and 
focus on the demand side.
Structural adjustment, on the other hand, has come to be seen as encompassing a large 
range of policy reforms - macroeconomic, microeconomic and sectoral in nature - aimed 
at improving resource allocation and increasing economic efficiency. They are concerned 
with the performance of the supply-side of the economy, and include:
- trade reform, whereby systems of protection are reformed to bring about equal incentives 
to produce for sale in the domestic and foreign markets, by bringing prices closer to their 
shadow values;
- price reform, related principally to rationalizing public sector pricing;
- tax reform, aimed both at increasing the efficiency (and equity?) of revenue raising, as 
well as often raising revenue itself;
- financial liberalization, aimed at improving the functioning and completeness of domestic 
capital markets;
- privatization, aimed at redrawing the borders between the public and private sectors in 
accordance with new views as to their comparative advantages;
- labour market reforms, aimed at increasing flexibility and integration in and among these 
markets;
- institution building, aimed to increase the administrative capacity of government.4
Naturally, there is a great deal of interaction between stabilization policies and structural 
adjustment reforms. There is a growing literature on complementarities, conflicts, and 
timing and sequencing issues between them, but they are not our main concern here. It 
is also true that, although I have presented a schematic list of policies, adjustment 
packages must be devised with careful consideration to the conditions of each specific 
economy, including different structural and sectoral make-ups as well as different 
parameter values in any underlying models. Our main concern, however, is with the 
impact that different stabilization and adjustment policies have on the distribution of 
income and assets in an economy. By affecting those distributions, the policies will 
inevitably impact upon poverty and inequality indicators, as well as on the future asset 
accumulation path for different agents. Below, I look briefly at the current state of the
4 Each of these seven headings is discussed in more detail in Chapter 2-5.
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literature on equity effects of adjustment.
41 Adjustment and Equity.
The change in the value of the effective exchange rate, increasing the price of tradeable 
goods relative to that of non-tradeables, the reduction in aggregate demand as a result of 
expenditure reduction, and the system-wide reforms implemented under structural 
adjustment must - and indeed some are explicitly designed to - affect the rewards to 
factors in different sectors and activities in the economy. Government expenditure cuts, 
and changes in its overall composition, must also affect secondary incomes (e.g. transfers) 
and entitlements. In the presence of any price rigidities - as suggested in the preceding 
section - the expenditure reduction policies can also affect the level of employment, both 
formal and informal. These and other effects virtually guarantee that income distribution 
is affected by structural adjustment.
Nevertheless, when these programmes were first designed, say under Structural 
Adjustment Lending (SAL) by the World Bank, which was launched in 1980, little 
attention was paid to distributional impacts. The view was that, provided external finance 
was available to soften the expenditure reduction and spread it over time, adjustment 
could be expected to reduce poverty over the medium to long-term. This was because it 
intended to remove distortions that impeded faster growth, and because there was a 
general perception that poor people produced mostly tradeables (as in agriculture), and
would hence benefit from an increase in their relative prices.5
Concern with negative distributional impacts grew as evidence from countries undergoing 
adjustment became more plentiful. The works of Addison and Demery (1985), Comia, 
Jolly and Stewart (1987) and Demery and Addison (1987) contributed greatly to raising 
the profile of distributional issues in connection with adjustment programmes in the 
academic sphere.6 After Adjustment with a Human Face (by Comia et al, 1987), in
5 Noteworthy exceptions to this cavalier attitude are to be found in Johnson and Salop 
(1980) and in McNamara's speech to the Board of the World Bank in September 1980 
(see McNamara, 1981).
6 It has to be said that among political parties in adjusting countries, the debate had
been raging for some time by the mid-1980s.
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particular, there was a considerable increase in the attention paid to these issues. Heller 
et al (1988), Comia and Stewart (1990), Kanbur (1990) and others have focused on them.7 
A number of channels through which stabilization and adjustment policies impact upon 
the distribution of welfare may be identified from a reading of this literature. Below, I list 
five interrelated - but conceptually distinct - types of effects:
I) Relative price effects: The following policies are likely directly or indirectly to alter 
relative goods and services prices, thus changing consumption patterns, incentives for 
production and real incomes: changes in the real exchange rate (normally devaluations); 
trade reforms, by abolishing quotas, lowering tariffs, creating or altering export subsidies 
and so on; price reforms, by raising public sector prices and often farmgate prices paid 
to agricultural producers; and tax reforms, in particular by redesigning subsidies and 
indirect taxes. For the moment we do not consider factor prices. These are also likely to 
be affected, and are clearly of great importance, but are best considered under other 
headings below.
II) Labour Market Effects: These are impacts upon a crucial set of factor prices, the wage 
rates in different sectors or for different types of labour (i.e, formal or informal, skilled 
or unskilled), as well as any effects on the level of employment itself. The evidence on 
unemployment and informal sector employment during adjustment is sufficiently strong 
to warrant abandoning the extreme assumption that there are no nominal rigidities, and 
it may be useful to allow for models where the labour market (or at least its formal 
segment) does not clear at all times.8 The policies which affect it most directly are 
expenditure reduction, in all its varieties, by affecting the level of activity and the demand 
for labour. However, if factor mobility is not perfect, or if price rigidities exist, as shown 
in figure 1, expenditure switching policies will also affect employment levels and/or wage 
rates. From the supply-side, privatization and labour market reforms are also obviously 
likely to affect wages and employment.
7 Chapter 2-6 examines this literature in greater detail.
8 Blejer and Guerrero (1990) found that in the Philippines, for example, 
"...macroeconomic adjustment negatively affected the poorer sectors mainly through the 
increase in underemployment that followed the stabilization programme." (p. 418).
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III) Asset Prices and Capital Gains and Losses: Bourguignon, Branson and de Melo (1991) 
noted that an important channel for impact of structural adjustment upon the distribution 
of wealth is through changes in asset prices. Portfolio shifts in response to expected asset 
price changes can generate capital gains and losses which redistribute wealth. The authors 
suggest shifts toward foreign currency denominated assets (e.g. capital flight) as one 
example. Another is the differentiated ability to hedge against inflation. If there are 
barriers to enter the markets for some interest bearing assets, so that the poor have less 
ability to protect their wealth against the inflation tax, inflation will have a strong 
redistributive impact. That becomes important when choosing between different adjustment 
packages that yield different rates of inflation (see table 4, p.24, in Bourguignon, Branson 
and de Melo, 1991). The evidence for Brazil presented in Chapters 6,7 and 8 underscores 
the importance of this effect.
IV) Public Expenditure Effects on Entitlements: Expenditure reduction policies have 
microeconomic effects, as well as contractionary macro consequences. Governments do 
not normally cut all elements of their expenditure equiproportionately, and different 
programmes benefit different groups or classes. Hence, cuts in food subsidies or basic 
health care are likely to affect the poor more heavily than the rich. The difference between 
the former and the latter, when public health care is provided free of charge and seen as 
a highly inferior good, is that the cut in subsidies is captured as a price effect, under (I) 
above. But the latter, although it will surely affect welfare, by increasing queues, lowering 
the standard of service and, indeed, its value to the consumer, will not be captured by 
price changes.
This is one example of a broader category of "entitlements", the value of which can not 
be captured by conventional income measures. This is not to say that they could not be 
’priced'. It is simply to say that some expenditure cuts, particularly in the areas of 
education, health services and infrastructure (irrigation schemes, rural roads, etc), affect 
the level and distribution of welfare in ways which are not captured by the conventional 
budget constraint, in terms of prices or income changes.9 Much of the emphasis on the 
effects of public expenditure cuts on the welfare of the poor, such as in Comia and
9 This observation draws on A.K. Sen's so-called "entitlement approach", which is 
discussed, inter alia, in Sen (1981).
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Stewart (1990), is of this type, and has to be estimated or measured beyond the effects of 
relative price changes, asset price changes, or labour market effects. Nevertheless, there 
has so far been no attempt to model these effects formally, as far as I am aware.
V) Long Term Effects on the Accumulation of Capital: Many authors have noted that the 
decline in the Investment/GNP ratio during adjustment may have detrimental effects on 
the intertemporal distribution of income, by lowering the growth rate. Evidence on the 
effect of a 'pause' in investment on long term growth trends is scarce, partly because 
adjustment is still a relatively recent experience. But another long term impact is that on 
the future (intra-temporal, cross-section) distributions of income and assets, as a result of 
different rates of capital accumulation, both physical and human. It is now widely 
accepted that human capital, or skills, should be seen as an important input and 
determinant of growth (see Lucas, 1988). There is also evidence of declines in government 
expenditures on health and education during adjustment, with a measurable impact on 
enrolment rates and health standards.
If, as suggested above, publicly provided health and education services are inferior goods, 
then these cuts are likely to be affecting the rates of human capital accumulation among 
the poor especially severely. Similarly, if capital market imperfections preclude the access 
of the poor to some assets, then the rates of physical capital accumulation will also differ. 
This is an effect separate from that on their current welfare, under (IV), as it will lower 
their future wealth and the return on their human assets in the future. If the poor are more 
affected than other social groups, this may have an inequality augmenting effect over time. 
The models presented in Chapters 3, 4 and 5 are designed to explore a possible setting 
in which the combination of effects (IV) and (V) above may lead to both a reduction in 
the economy's overall growth rate and to an increase in income, wealth and consumption 
dispersion within the society.
51 A Plan of the Thesis.
Two things should be clear from this introductory discussion. The first is that structural 
adjustment is a name used to describe a complex set of policies aimed at system-wide 
economic reform. While it may have arisen in response to specific historical 
circumstances, affecting many countries, its theoretical study is in principle as complex
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as the study of economic transformation anywhere else. Policies and impacts that are 
system-wide require analysis from many branches and through many approaches in 
economics. The second thing is that an analysis of its impacts on the distributions of 
income and wealth poses particularly complex issues, due both to the systemic nature of 
the reform and to the level of data disaggregation that its empirical study requires.
It follows from these two observations that no single thesis or volume could do justice to 
the whole theme of the distributional effects of structural adjustment. This introductory 
chapter has provided brief general discussions of the causes and nature of the reforms 
known as structural adjustment, and suggested five conceptual channels through which 
they impact on individual or household incomes across any country’s distribution. The 
remainder of the thesis must narrow the focus, and will concentrate on two aspects: a 
theoretical analysis of the two last channels discussed above - namely public expenditure 
effects on entitlements and the long term effects on the accumulation of capital - and the 
application of best-practice distributional analysis techniques to an actual household level 
data-set, where some impacts of economic reform can be identified.
The thesis is divided in three parts. An institutional chapter surveys the evolution of the 
World Bank's views on international debt and adjustment during the 1980s, often 
comparing it to ideas being generated elsewhere. The twin objectives are to gain insight 
into the thought processes of an institution so important in urging the process forward in 
many countries, and to simultaneously review the main arguments relating to the policies 
whose impacts we turn to next. A theoretical part considers the long term implications for 
income distribution of the post-adjustment permanent reduction in the role of the state in 
the public provision of some important inputs, such as health care, education and 
infrastructure. This part focuses on channels (IV) and (V) in the above list, which have 
been comparatively understudied in the literature. The modelling techniques employed, 
which are not commonly associated with the study of structural adjustment, are suitable 
for the long-run dynamic issues involved and, in my view, add powerful insights to the 
subject under study. Finally, the empirical part describes the evolution of the distribution 
of income - and of some poverty indicators - in Brazil during the 1980s. Below, I provide 
a brief summary of each of the seven remaining chapters.
Chapter 2 provides an insight into the evolution of thinking on the causes of and solutions
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to the international debt crisis, which in so many cases triggered the need for adjustment, 
and on the process of structural adjustment itself, within one of the most influential 
international institutions involved in the process. Careful surveying of World Bank 
publications, such as the World Development Reports, the World Debt Tables, Operations 
Evaluation Department reports, working papers, etc, reveals that views changed 
considerably during the decade. A comparative assessment is also made, with reference 
to leading work being published concurrently elsewhere. Although an understanding of 
the intellectual dynamics regarding adjustment in an institution such as the World Bank 
is the principal objective of the chapter, it is hoped that the survey complements the 
discussion of the policies and their impacts on welfare and the distribution of income 
contained in this introduction.
Chapters 3, 4 and 5 constitute the theoretical part of the thesis. It is concerned with one 
of the basic pillars of the adjustment package: the need for expenditure reduction. Whilst 
in the short run this may be seen as a temporary policy of demand management, the 
predominant view in structural adjustment packages has been that a contraction in the role 
of the government in the economy in the long run was also desirable. But if many services 
provided free-of-charge by the public sector can easily be replaced by private alternatives 
by richer people, this may not be so easy for the poor. In particular, if the services can 
be seen as productive inputs, a reduction in their supply may bring about a permanent 
increase in inequality of opportunity.
Chapter 3 addresses this issue by proposing a model of wealth distribution dynamics with 
a capital market imperfection and a production function where public capital is 
complementary to private capital. A unique invariant steady-state distribution is derived, 
with three social classes: subsistence workers, 'government-dependent' middle-class 
entrepreneurs and 'private-infrastructure-owning' upper-class entrepreneurs. It is shown that 
there is a minimum level of public investment below which the middle class disappears, 
and that increases in non-targeted public investment over some range lead to 
unambiguously less inequality of opportunity, as well as to greater output. This provides 
an additional rationale for an active role for the government in infrastructure, health and 
education provision, and has implications for foreign aid.
Chapter 4 explores some of the determinants of the optimal income tax rate in a model
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such as that presented in chapter 3. There is a brief conceptual discussion of wider policy 
options, with both tax and expenditure as more general functions of household wealth 
levels, and for varying government objectives. But the formal treatment is restricted to the 
case of non-targeted expenditures and a proportional income tax, as assumed in the 
previous chapter. The optimal tax is shown to depend on a number of factors, including 
the limiting wealth distribution. Conditions are derived for the optimal tax rate to be 
positive, and some of its properties are discussed. The chapter both provides support for 
some of the assumptions underlying the analysis in chapter 3, and suggests a number of 
questions for future research.
Chapter 5 extends the analysis of chapter 3 to a framework compatible with positive 
steady-state per-capita income growth. It uses a model of the endogenous growth variety, 
but the focus is on the duality of the economy: one group with access to a private 
technology that can be used to replace public investment, and one without. These groups 
were derived endogenously in chapter 3, and here their intertemporally optimizing 
behaviour leads to ever-increasing divergence, if public investment falls below a certain 
threshold. Different modelling techniques capture a flavour similar to that of the previous 
chapter, but interesting differences arise with a more satisfactory characterization of the 
choice of intertemporal consumption path. The role of public infrastructure, health and 
education spending as a 'social cement' comes starkly out of the model.
Chapters 6, 7 and 8 constitute the empirical part of the thesis. Chapter 6 provides a brief 
account of the macroeconomic history of Brazil during the 1980s - a decade characterized 
by high inflation, stagnation and instability - as a background to the changes in income 
distribution that are reported in the subsequent chapters.
Chapter 7 begins with a brief survey of the basic concepts and techniques used in the 
distributional analysis that follows. It also describes the PNAD data set, an annual 
repeated cross-section household survey from 1981 to 1990. Summary statistics, decile 
means and decile shares are then presented for every year, as well as scalar inequality and 
poverty measures. But the focus of the chapter is on welfare and inequality ordering. First 
and second order stochastic dominance results are reported for a number of distributions 
at the percentile level of aggregation, and statistical tests are performed to infer population 
dominance. Sensitivity of the trends to the equivalence scale used is investigated. Poverty
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mixed dominance results are also presented, for a range of plausible poverty lines. The 
basic finding is that inequality worsened during the 1980s, although not monotonically. 
Poverty also grew, despite some growth in the mean of reported incomes, but its 
behaviour was more cyclical than that of inequality.
Chapter 8 seeks to explain the structure of and the changes in the picture of inequality 
described in the previous chapter. A standard static decomposition technique is applied 
to three members of the Generalised Entropy class of inequality measures for Brazil, to 
account for the role played by geographic location, age, gender, race and education in 
explaining levels of inequality at different times in the 1980s. A dynamic decomposition 
of one of the measures is carried out to apportion total change in inequality to changes 
in the composition and mean incomes of the various partition groupings. Finally, the 
chapter investigates the relationships between some macroeconomic variables, such as 
inflation, and the poverty and inequality measures presented. This is done by means of a 
set of simple OLS time-series regressions, supported by diagrams and bivariate correlation 
coefficients.
The thesis is closed by a short concluding chapter, which briefly brings together the main 
findings reported in the various preceding chapters.
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CHAPTER 2
DEBT AND ADJUSTMENT IN THE 1980s: VIEWS FROM THE
WORLD BANK1
Abstract: This chapter surveys the dominant views of the World Bank on international 
debt and structural afjustment in the 1980s. Where possible, it sets those views in the 
context of the wider debate in the economics profession. The analysis is organized around 
five main themes: the wisdom of large-scale borrowing in the pre-1982 'recycling' period; 
the search for solutions to the debt crisis after 1982, with particular reference to 
forgiveness mechanisms; the design of macroeconomic stabilization; the design of 
microeconomic reforms intended to increase the efficiency of resource allocation and use 
in adjusting economies; and the monitoring of the effects of these policies and processes 
on poverty and the distribution of income.
1 This chapter brings together in a revised form two previously circulated papers: "The 
World Bank and the Study of Stabilization and Structural Adjustment in LDCs", circulated 
as STICERD DEP No.41 in October 1992; and "The World Bank and the Analysis of the 
International Debt Crisis", written jointly with Beatriz Armendariz de Aghion, circulated 
as STICERD DEP No.51 in November 1993 and forthcoming as a chapter in J. Harriss, 
J. Hunter and C. Lewis (eds): The New Institutional Economics and Third World 
Development. (London: Routledge). Both were produced as part of a project aimed at 
forming an assessment of the World Bank's intellectual contribution to development 
economics, for a Brookings volume marking the 50th anniversary of the Bank. The final 
product was Stem and Ferreira (forthcoming). I am very grateful to Beatriz Armendariz 
de Aghion, co-author of one of the papers used for this chapter, for permission to use the 
material in this thesis.
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11 In troduction .
This chapter surveys the evolution of the dominant views held at the World Bank 
concerning the international debt crisis of the 1980s and the subsequent processes of 
stabilization and structural adjustment. Whenever possible, it takes a comparative 
perspective by placing the Bank's analysis side by side with views held elsewhere. 
Because of the centrality of the World Bank to both thinking and policy-making on these 
issues during the 1980s, the survey is intended to provide further general insight into the 
nature of adjustment, prior to the more detailed analysis contained in subsequent chapters.
Five main economic themes pervade the survey. The first is the wisdom (or otherwise) of 
the large capital flows that followed the terms of trade shocks of the 1970s, and which 
eventually led to a problem of excessive indebtedness for many countries. The second is 
the search for solutions to the 'debt crisis' that followed and, in particular, the debate on 
whether a reduction in present value of debts (i.e. forgiveness) was required. The three 
remaining themes relate to the nature and design of internal reform policies being 
suggested by the Bank and pursued in a number of countries to adjust to the new 
international circumstances. The third is the nature of macroeconomic stabilization, of the 
constraints facing it and of the policies designed to overcome them. The fourth is the 
evolution of a complex, system-wide array of structural and microeconomic reforms, 
designed to improve the efficiency of resource allocation in the adjusting economies. The 
fifth and final theme is the impact of these policies on poverty and inequality.
These themes are approached in this order, section by section, with the discussion within 
each of them following a roughly chronological order. The first part of the chapter deals 
with the 'debt crisis'. It focuses on the first two main areas: the macroeconomic 
management of developing countries in the run up to the debt crisis in the 1970s ('the 
origins'), and the proposals of mechanisms to address the problem of chronic indebtedness 
in the 1980s ('the solutions'). It concentrates on the Bank's intellectual contributions to the 
main issues, and does not address applied operational work with specific countries.
A cautionary note is in order, regarding the complementarity between the Bank and the 
IMF. It has generally been the case that, whereas the Bank specializes on internal - mostly 
project or sectoral - microeconomic work, the Fund deals with balance of payments
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difficulties and, by implication, with issues of macroeconomic management. In the 1980s, 
therefore, division of labour between the two institutions might entail the Bank dedicating 
itself to internal problems of structural adjustment, while the Fund handled the 
international aspects of managing the debt problem.
Nevertheless, as has been argued elsewhere (see Stem and Ferreira, forthcoming), 
structural adjustment and stabilization are so closely related to the debt crisis, that an 
international institution of the size and importance of the World Bank can not afford to 
rely entirely on others to respond to events and ideas, or indeed to generate those ideas, 
on debt. There are two major tasks one might reasonably have expected the World Bank 
to fulfil, in its role as the leading international development agency, with respect to the 
LDC debt crisis. First, during the run up to the crisis in the 1970s, one would have 
expected the Bank to have monitored the LDCs' debt build-up and macroeconomic policy 
as part of its role in country policy assessment. I will argue that more cautious advice on 
the scale of borrowing in the late 1970s and up to 1982 might have helped avoid - or at 
least alleviate the severity of -the belated adjustment process that followed in most LDCs.
The second task relates to the period since 1982, when the search for mechanisms to 
resolve the crisis became crucial to determine how and when growth, poverty alleviation 
and development in general might resume in a large number of LDCs. The evidence we 
will discuss suggests that the Bank was overoptimistic before 1982, sometimes 
disseminating assessments and advice which they would directly contradict later, with the 
benefit of hindsight. During the crisis, it was slow to come to terms with the need for 
more imaginative solutions and, indeed, for an element of debt forgiveness. This first part 
of the chapter is divided into two sections: Section 2 discusses the origins of the crisis and 
Section 3 looks at proposed solutions.
The second part of the chapter deals with the remaining three main themes, and traces the 
evolution of the Bank's ideas regarding stabilization and structural adjustment proper, from 
1980 to 1990. I will argue that the Bank played a central role in the emergence of 
structural adjustment as a major issue for developing countries, and that its main 
contribution was in applying standard microeconomic theory to the design of structural 
reform packages. Its contributions to the design of macroeconomic stabilization were less 
substantial, and there were shortcomings in its monitoring of the impact of the policies
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it advocated on poverty and income distribution, at least until around 1987.
Naturally, the Bank is not and has never been an intellectual monolith. Dissenting views 
can probably always be found, and I have concentrated on "dominant" views - i.e. those 
expressed by senior officers or in publications such as the World Development Reports.2 
While these are not necessarily the 'views of the Board', they do represent the prevalent 
thoughts of the staff. But even these views were clearly not constant, and changes took 
place reflecting new evidence, outside pressure or indeed changes in personnel. These 
changes of opinion are an important part of the story that follows and, as a piece of 
background information, Table 1 lists some key senior officers of the Bank, from its 
inception to 1992.
This part of the chapter is divided into three sections. Section 4 examines the Bank's ideas 
on stabilization; Section 5 looks at the microeconomic issues of allocative efficiency 
involved in the reforms of the supply side; and Section 6 is concerned with the Bank's 
attitudes towards the equity implications of adjustment. Section 7 draws some conclusions.
Origins of the D ebt Crisis.
Historically we have come to mark the onset of the debt crisis in August 1982, when 
Mexico declared a moratorium on the servicing of its external obligations. But this 
announcement was only the beginning of a decade of crisis, the causes of which date 
considerably further back. The medium and short-term process since the oil price shocks 
was discussed in Chapter 1. A more comprehensive historical discussion is beyond our 
scope, but see Cuddington and Smith (1985), Dombusch and Fischer (1987) and Sachs
(1989).
Basically, the causes fall into three categories. Long term causes have to do with 
inappropriate policies in borrowing countries, often in the context of an import substitution 
development strategy. It has been suggested (e.g. by Berg and Sachs, 1988) that such
2 As background information and for reference purposes, a list of themes and key 
figures associated with all WDRs from 1980 to 1990, as well as a brief comment on each 
volume, is included in Table A2-1, in the Appendix to Chapter 2.
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TABLE 1 : World Bank President and Officers Responsible for Research and Economics
Senior Research Positions
Date President Date Title Holder
1946 (June-Dee) Eugene Meyer 1946-1952 Director, Research Department Leonard B. Rist
1947-1949 John J. McCloy 1952-1961 Director, Economic Staff Leonard B. Rist
1962-1963 Acting Director, Economic Staff John C. de Wilde
1949-1962 Eugene R. Black
1963-1964 Acting Director, Economic Staff Dragoslav Avramovic
1964-1970 Economic Advisor to the President. Chairman, 
Economic Committee
Irving S. Friedman
1965-1970 Director, Economics Department Andrew M. Kamarck
1963-1968 George D. Woods
1970-1972 Economic Advisor to the President. Chairman, 
Economic Committee
Hollis B. Chenery
1968-1981 Robert S. McNamara 1972-1982 Vice President, Research Hollis B. Chenery
1982-1987 A. W. Clausen 1982-1987 Vice President, Economics Research Staff Anne Krueger
1987-1991 Barber Conable Vice President, Operations Policy Staff Shahid Hussain
1991-1995 Lewis Preston 1987-1989









1987-1992 Vice President, PRS (now OPS) Visvanatan Rajagopalan
Sources: Stern with Ferreira (forthcoming).
Mason and Asher (1973): The World Bank since Bretton Woods (Washington, DC: Brookings).
World Bank (1990b): "Setting Research Priorities at the World Bank: An Historical Review", PRE mimeo.
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strategies may have considerably lessened a country's ability to service its (foreign 
currency denominated) debts, by reducing its flexibility to respond to balance of payments 
crises through a sufficiently rapid export expansion. Medium term causes arise out of the 
oil shocks of the 1970s, and the short-term causes were provided by the sudden changes 
in the world macroeconomy in the early 1980s, as discussed in Chapter 1.
The large build-up of external debt in the 1970s did not appear to trouble most academic 
economists at the time. The consensus, according to Cohen (1993), reflected the view that 
foreign borrowing by LDCs to finance current account deficits was an equilibrium 
phenomenon, in the sense that such deficits would allow LDCs to augment productive 
capacity and repay their debts. Such a view, particularly among development economists, 
dates back to the two-gap models associated with Chenery and Bruno (1962) and 
McKinnon (1964). The fixed coefficients that underlie these models implied that 
developing countries faced two separate constraints to growth: a savings constraint on 
investment and a foreign exchange constraint on the ability to import (the inputs required 
for expanding production).
Despite the fact that "two-gap theory fell into disrepute during the later 1960s and 1970s" 
(Krugman, 1993, p. 16), a sense that alleviating the scarcity of foreign exchange would 
contribute to growth probably lay behind the tacit approval the Bank and most academics 
gave to the large scale borrowing of the 1970s. In addition, these flows clearly were 
external savings, which could be used to finance domestic investment. They therefore 
contributed to relaxing both constraints and, if the investment took place in the tradeables 
sector, it could be expected to generate returns to repay the debts and lead to growth 
capable - in time - of compensating for the terms of trade losses of the oil price shocks.
2.D The Willingness to Pav Approach
Whilst this was perhaps the widespread view in the 1970s, when the absence of headline 
news kept many in the profession from worrying about sovereign borrowing, there were 
some notable exceptions. The distinctive feature of international debt contracts is that they 
cannot be legally enforced. This was highlighted by Eaton and Gersovitz (1981), in a 
paper which pioneered what later came to be known as the "willingness to pay" approach. 
It contains a theoretical model and an empirical analysis for the case of sovereign debt
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contracted abroad by poor countries. They argue that since such debt cannot be legally 
enforced, the default penalty from the country's standpoint is the impossibility of re- 
accessing the international capital markets. They analyze the case where a country derives 
utility from consumption out of both output and foreign debt, which is assumed to be 
contracted exclusively for consumption smoothing reasons. Their principal concern is with 
understanding whether quantities borrowed are determined by demand (in the presence of 
an upward sloping supply curve for credit) or, given the absence of repayment enforcing, 
by credit ceilings imposed by the lenders. They are also interested in the comparative 
statics of changes in the rate of growth or in the income variability on the quantities 
demanded and credit ceilings.
A key result from their analysis is that: "the probability of default in period t increases 
monotonically with debt service obligations d(t) in period t." (p.291). Since, in their 
model:
d(t+l) = R b(t)
it would follow that very sharp increases in the effective interest rate (R), combined with 
an explosion of new lending (b(t)), such as was observed from 1979 to 1981, should cause 
the default risk to be increasing quite rapidly.3
It also followed from their analysis that lenders would be willing to make risky loans, in 
a stochastic setting, if interest rates were high enough to induce them to it, so that under 
uncertainty, default was a possible outcome of the rational actions of optimising agents. 
Apart from that possibility, they also explicitly allowed for: "misperception by lenders of 
borrowers' characteristics [which] could lead to default and may, in reality, pose a threat 
to the stability of the market." (p.299). They also found that both demand for loans and 
credit ceilings on them increased with the variability of income (denoted by a)4. As a  
would be rising as a consequence of the external shocks - other than on the interest rate,
3 Eaton and Gersovitz (1981) have one period maturities; b(t) denotes new lending and 
d(t) denotes repayment obligations at period t.
4 Under uncertainty, a positive relationship between credit ceilings and the variability 
of income requires certain parametric restrictions, notably on the discount rate. But they 
maintain that it is still the likeliest case. It exists unambiguously in the deterministic case. 
The intuition for it is that a greater variability of income increases the value the debtor 
places on future access to international capital markets, and hence its willingness to repay 
the amounts due today.
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which enters the framework explicitly - which affected most highly indebted LDCs in the 
turn of the decade, this would explain a large part of the increase in borrowing after 1979. 
Whilst this argument accounts for that increase, it also suggests that it would go hand in 
hand with a significant increase in the risk of system-wide defaults. This is underlined by 
their empirical analysis, where sixty-five countries in a sample of eighty-one observations 
appeared more likely to already be supply constrained in their credit from international 
markets.
This sort of argument might have encouraged a more cautious attitude towards very high 
levels of borrowing, in the World Bank or elsewhere, prior to the collapse of voluntary 
lending in 1982. This is not to claim that Eaton and Gersovitz 'predicted' the debt crisis, 
such as it came to pass. But their paper does provide an interesting benchmark for 
comparison with the general tone and some specific statements emanating from the Bank 
around the same time - and later. They will be the subject of the next sub-section.
2.2  ^The Bank
Between 1974 and 1982, the Bank's view of LDC borrowing was influenced by the need 
of the global economy to respond to the large current account imbalances which originated 
with the terms of trade changes of the oil price rise of 1973/4, and were exacerbated by 
the second shock, in 1979. The Bank's views in this regard did not differ much from those 
of the majority of academics, who saw the balance of payments disequilibria in LDCs as 
a natural phenomenon which should translate into an expanded productive capacity in the 
countries. In particular, while the growth of debt indicators for many countries was noted, 
borrowing was seen as an essentially beneficial component of the global adjustment 
process. The domestic dimension of the adjustment process was, in this early phase, seen 
as secondary to a coordinated international response: "...the world faces the need to adjust 
- to payments imbalance and expensive energy - on a scale comparable to 1974-75." 
(WDR 1980, p.3, my emphasis).
The scale of the subsequent adjustment was, of course, much greater than that of 1974-75, 
but the optimism was partly based on the perception that the large payments imbalances 
of the late 1970s were something the world had to respond to globally. This was to take 
place through recycling funds from current account surplus countries to those in deficit.
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It would allow adjustment to proceed with relatively little reduction in absorption (as 
compared to the alternative without borrowing), and thus with a lower cost in terms of 
'human development'.5 It is thus that the WDR 1981 states that: ''There is nothing 
inherently undesirable about external deficits, since deficits implied resource transfer... 
These effects... provide a rationale for external borrowing to contribute to structural 
adjustment." (p.54). The WDRs of the day advocated a 'high growth' mode of adjustment; 
of central importance to this was the availability of external finance to allow a smoothing 
of import reduction over time and cushion its impact on both consumption and investment.
In his 1975 Presidential Address, McNamara regarded the need of middle-income 
countries for greater access to external capital as the "...most immediate and pressing 
problem in the global development scene..." (McNamara, 1981; p.297) In 1977, he felt 
that "the major lending banks and major borrowing countries are operating on assumptions 
which are broadly consistent with one another..." He concluded that: "...we are even more 
confident today than we were a year ago that the debt problem is indeed manageable, and 
need not stand in the way of desirable rates of growth for the developing countries..." 
(McNamara, 1981, p.456; see also Gazdar, 1990).
Whilst the second shock in 1979 induced some changes in the Bank's position, these were 
not sufficient to reverse its 'pro-recycling' emphasis. The most significant change was 
indeed a greater focus on the need for countries to use external finance to adjust to what 
was now seen as a permanent change in the world economy, rather than as a substitute 
for that adjustment: "The point I want to stress here is the necessity of using external 
finance in support of structural adjustments, and not as a substitute for them." 
(McNamara's 1980 Address to the Board, in McNamara, 1981, p.620).
The main factors conspiring to make many borrowers' positions unsustainable by 1982 
were clearly identified by the WDR (1981): the tightening of monetary conditions globally 
in 1979, the contemporaneous fall in the terms of trade for most LDCs, the world
5 Human development, broadly understood to mean poverty reduction and an 
improvement in the social indicators and living standards of all - but principally the 
poorest - segments of developing country populations, was then and had been since 
McNamara's Nairobi speech in 1973, the paramount articulated policy objective of the 
Bank.
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recession, the rising proportion of debt owed to commercial lenders, the rising proportion 
of loans contracted in variable interest rate (VIR) agreements, and the rise in commercial 
bank exposure to LDCs (measured in terms of outstanding loans to LDC customers as 
share of total portfolio) from 49.6% in 1975 to 61.5% in 1978. In light of the Bank's 
awareness of these phenomena, it is remarkable that they continued to make the optimistic 
predictions about the availability of voluntary capital flows in the 1980s which can be 
seen in Table 2. This table lists predictions for the behaviour of a number of 
macroeconomic variables during the 1980s, made in the WDR (1981), side by side with 
the actual realizations. It reveals a picture of consistent overoptimism, which appears to 
have been strongly related to the assumption that voluntary capital flows would be 
sustained throughout the decade. In other words, to their failure to foresee the coming of 
the debt crisis.
So, while the WDR 1981 predicted that middle-income oil-importers would grow by 5%- 
6% p.a. in the 1980s, their actual average growth between 1980 and 1989 was 2.9% p.a. 
(WDR 1991). Latin America, which had been expected to grow in the region from 2.3% 
to 3.2%, had by 1990 averaged negative 0.5% p.a. since 1980. This is clearly not 
unrelated to the fact that whilst they had predicted net capital transfers to developing 
countries to have reached US$ 177.9 billion in 1990 (WDR 1980)6, the World Debt Tables 
1991/92 registered a net capital inflow of only US$ 16.0 billion to all developing 
countries in 1990 (see Table 2). And this followed a period (from 1984 to 1988) of 
actually negative net transfers.
Their unwillingness to read the signs that they themselves had just laid out, or at least to 
publicly acknowledge their implications, is made quite plain in the same WDR 1981: 
"While [the above] trends indicate that the developing countries will face more serious 
debt-management difficulties in the future, they do not signal a generalized debt problem 
for the developing countries." (p.61, my emphasis)
The importance of external finance to enable most of these countries to manage the high- 
growth mode of adjustment advocated in this WDR - and generally by the Bank at this 
stage - was obvious, so any vestige of doubt as regards its availability was quite
6 This was revised downwards to US$ 56.7 - 96.0 billion in the WDR (1981).
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Table 2








Average Annual % Growth of GNP 
per capita, 1980-1990 in:
Industrial Countries 2.3 3.1 2.5
All Developing Countries 2.2 3.3 1.2
Low Income Countries 1.5 2.6 4.1
(1.3)b
Middle Income Countries 2.2 3.4 0.5
Latin America and Caribbean 2.3 3.2 -0.5
Oil Exporting Countries 0 2.9 4.0 -2.5
Average Annual % Growth in 
Exports for all LDCs, 1980-1990
3.9 7.6 4.1
Official Development Assistance 
Receipts, 1985d
35.5 40.9 25.7
Official Development Assistance 
Receipts, 1990d
53.6 65.7 47.2
Direct Private Investment, 1985d 13.6 15.7 4.5
Aggregate Net Transfers, 1985d,c 36.3 54.3 -4.6
Aggregate Net Transfers, 1990*** 56.7 96 16.0
Notes: a made in the World Development Report, 1981.
b figure in brackets excludes China and India 
c excludes the USSR 
d in US$ billions at current prices
c defined, as in World Debt Tables, as the difference between aggregate net 
flows and interest payments on all debt.
Sources: World Development Report, 1981, 1992. 
World Debt Tables, 1989/90, 1991/92.
uncomfortable:
"However, given the profitability of lending to developing countries, their 
exemplary records (with few exceptions) in meeting their obligations and their 
continuing need for foreign finance, it seems unlikely that financial intermediaries 
will discriminate against developing countries as a group."...
Hence:
"Summing up these various influences on commercial banks, it seems highly 
probable that both borrowers and lenders will adapt to changing conditions without 
precipitating any general crisis of confidence." (p.61).
These quotes and predictions reveal an institution publicly unable or unwilling to foresee 
the impending collapse of voluntary lending, or any of its severe consequences to 
developing countries, despite the existence of contemporaneous research which pointed 
to a significant and increasing risk of system-wide default.7 Admittedly, Eaton and 
Gersovitz (1981) was an exception to the prevalent view among academics that the 
amounts of borrowing were appropriate, as noted in section 2.1. Nevertheless, given its 
unique position in terms both of access to data (on country performances as well as on 
capital flows) and of its responsibility to provide technical advice and assistance to policy 
makers in the interests of long-term growth and development, the Bank's endorsement of 
and emphasis on increased borrowing to facilitate adjustment and create resource transfers, 
as late as 1981, can not be seen in a very positive light in retrospect.
31 Solutions to the Crisis
The academic debate after 1982 turned to the best ways to remedy the crisis in the LDCs 
and to prevent the international financial system from collapsing. Agreement on a solution, 
however, required a consensus about the nature of the problem. The academic profession 
seemed to be divided in this regard, between those who viewed it as a short-term liquidity 
problem and those who saw it as a more serious solvency issue.
7 It could be argued that other institutions, not least commercial banks and borrowing 
governments, ought to be singled out for criticism before the Bank. I take no issue with 
that view. This chapter has chosen to focus on the Bank because of its importance as a 
provider of development finance and advice to developing countries, and of its original 
role in the design of structural adjustment programmes.
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3.11 The Liquidity versus Solvency Debate and the Rescheduling Strategy
In the first three years (1982-1985), the debate centred on whether LDCs were 
experiencing a liquidity or a solvency problem. Let TSt denote the value of a country's 
trade surplus at time t; the debt financing obligations due in the current period; r the 
appropriate discount rate, and j some suitably small integer, representing the market's 
understanding of the short-run. Denote the expectation operator conditional on information 
available at time t by Et. A debtor country was defined as illiquid if the expected present 
discounted value of its trade surpluses in the short run was not high enough to service its 
external debt, but when such surpluses in the longer run were. Le:
< O ,.0< E ,.0 Y;a*r)-Ts,
*=o
Advocates of the liquidity view argued that the crisis was a short-run phenomenon. In 
particular, Sachs (1984) suggested that the amount borrowed was decided by an LDC 
government so as to maximize the growth rate, with investment as the control variable. 
He admitted the possibility that some of the external borrowing did not materialize into 
higher capital accumulation, particularly because of political reasons, but he did not 
perceive that as a danger to the ability of LDCs to repay, albeit after some "adjustment 
period". The policy implications of this view were rather clear: countries should be 
granted greater access to external financing until they adjusted to the sudden changes in 
the international macroeconomy. Since their long-term ability to repay was not in 
question, this was also in the interest of lenders as a group.
Advocates of the solvency view, on the other hand, emphasised that: (a) the debt 
accumulation of the 1970s came about as a result of LDCs wanting to maintain 
consumption levels, often at the expense of investment, after a negative terms of trade 
shock, and (b) the way consumption was being maintained in the short run was through 
an overvaluation of the real exchange rate (see, in particular, Dombusch, 1985). Both the 
framework and the empirical evidence Dombusch presented suggest the possibility that 
highly indebted countries were not going to repay their debts, at least not out of the 
returns on investment, because a large portion of the money borrowed had not been
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invested but consumed8. Moreover, a large volume of such debt had taken the form of 
capital flight, as in Argentina and Venezuela9. Dombusch's paper suggested that the whole 
financial strategy of the 1970s had been a failure and that ways should be found to share 
the costs, as had been the case in the aftermath of the defaults of the 1930s.10
This view was shared by Peter Kenen who, as early as 1983, suggested the creation of an 
"International Debt Discount Corporation" which would buy the debt from the commercial 
banks at a 10% discount. It would then be able, because of the discount from which it 
benefited on purchase, to lower the interest rate charged to debtors and to extend loan 
maturities.11
But those early proposals containing a debt-relief element, although important from a 
historical viewpoint, were not very influential at the time. The predominant view among 
academics in the first half of the eighties appears to have had two distinctive features: (a) 
countries are illiquid, and (b) countries may be unwilling to repay if they are not given 
the "right incentives". Accordingly, the provision of 'new' lending (or debt rescheduling) 
was perceived as key to resolving the crisis.
Sachs (1984) modelled the relationship between a debtor country and its foreign creditors
8 Dombusch reports that due to overvalued exchange rates, a large portion of the 
money borrowed abroad took the form of capital flight in the case of Argentina, 
consumption of durable imports in the case of Chile, and of large government subsidies 
to inefficient public sector enterprises in Brazil.
9 On evidence of capital flight from Latin America in the 1980s, see also Pastor
(1990).
10 Dombusch often emphasized that in the aftermath of the defaults of the 1930s the 
creditors had negotiated substantial write downs in the face value of their claims with the 
LDCs. For more on historical experiences of debt settlements, see Eichengreen and Portes 
(1989).
11 Kenen was not the only person to have anticipated in the early eighties the direction 
the debate would take a few years later. Felix Rohatyn proposed to die US Senate that 
LDC debt could be stretched out to longer maturities (15 to 30 years) and interest reduced 
to something like 6%. Norman Bailey, of the US National Security Council, suggested 
that the debt be swapped for a form of equity asset that would entitle the holder to a 
fraction of the country's export earnings. (See Cline, 1983, for a more complete survey 
of these early proposals).
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as a Repeated Prisoner's Dilemma in which, as long as both parties sufficiently valued 
their future relationship, it was in their own interest to play cooperatively12. Accordingly, 
we should expect creditors to be willing to extend new lending to a debtor experiencing 
financial distress. New lending or, more specifically, the re-lending of the due interest, 
principal, or both, was in practice seen as the strategy that would prevent widespread 
defaults and protect the international financial system. The argument for rescheduling 
became even more forceful in the context of the historical evidence on sovereign defaults. 
Past defaults, the argument went, could have been avoided if creditors had provided more 
lending.
The first problem with such a strategy, however, was that there was a multiplicity of 
creditors involved (see Cline, 1983; Sachs, 1984; and Krugman, 1985 and 1988). In 
particular, it was argued that the following free-rider, or "moral hazard in team", problem 
would inevitably arise: because the benefits from new lending are collective, i.e. each 
individual creditor captures only part of the benefit, it will not be in the interest of a 
single creditor to extend new loans unless other creditors do so too. Typically, the small 
(less exposed) banks will be the ones attempting to ffee-ride on the large ones. To 
overcome this problem it was thought that a key role as coordinating agencies could be 
played by international organizations like the Bank and the IMF. In practice, the debt 
rescheduling strategy gained the support of the US Treasury Secretary in 1985, and thus 
came to be known as the Baker Plan.
3.21 Debt Overhang and Debt Relief
No sooner did policy makers the world over commit to the Baker Plan than the debate 
moved on, with a more refined version of the solvency argument. Sachs (1986) and 
Krugman (1988) noted that some LDCs had accumulated so much debt that some creditors 
no longer expected to be repaid in full. Hence the high discounts in the secondary market. 
At such high levels of debt, it was no longer possible for indebted LDCs to obtain 
voluntary lending. Therefore, they suggested, existing creditors faced the following trade­
off (see Krugman, 1988): new lending (or rescheduling) could avert defaults, but would 
at the same time trigger disincentives to invest in adjustment, as LDCs at such high levels
12 Le. the Folk Theorem would hold for a sufficiently high discount factor.
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of indebtedness would be discouraged by the awareness that future benefits from 
investment (or economic adjustment) would accrue largely to their creditors. One way out 
of this dilemma, Krugman argued, was by forgiving portions of the debt instead. This 








Figure 1: The Debt Relief Laffer Curve
As we move from left to right on the Laffer curve in the above figure, we are first on the 
45 degree line. The market value of the debt is then identical to its face value. As the face 
value of the debt continues growing, say, through rescheduling repayments, the 
disincentives to invest (or to undertake adjustment policies) come into play. Such 
disincentive effects will be reflected in the market value of the debt, which will rise less 
than proportionally to the face value. To the right of point A, the market value of the debt 
will actually start declining. Creditors may then find it in their interest to forgive portions 
of their claims.
13 Figure 1 is drawn from Krugman (1989).
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The above incentive argument, known as the debt overhang hypothesis, stands as the most 
widely accepted rationale for Pareto-improving forgiveness. It gained official support from 
the US Treasury in March 1989, with the so-called Brady Plan, which called for debt 
write-downs in the case of heavily indebted middle-income countries. Its counterpart for 
low income countries was the Toronto agreement14.
In practice, the adoption of the Brady Plan by the US, and its subsequent acceptance by 
most other creditor governments, meant that debt reduction became a feasible option, 
albeit generally in fairly restricted conditions. Due to the large discounts in the secondary 
market, some LDCs began to engage in a number of transactions involving debt 
retirement. The simplest of all was straightforward buybacks. However, because debtors 
were officially banned from undertaking buybacks15, more sophisticated ways of taking 
advantage of low market prices for debt were found. Among the most common types of 
market transactions were debt for equity swaps, debt securization, and debt for nature 
swaps.16 Because debt retirement triggers positive incentive effects, these market 
transactions are generally viewed as a mutually beneficial (i.e. Pareto improving) way out 
of the crisis. In reality, such transactions have not been substantial.17
In sharp contrast with the above framework, Bulow and Rogoff (1988) assume away 
efficiency gains. In particular, they develop a framework where debt repayments from an 
LDC to its creditors do not depend on the LDC's economic performance.18 Then, an 
exogenous increase in the size of such repayments will benefit the creditors only, by
14 The terms of the Toronto Agreement apply to official debt (Paris Club debt), owed 
by low income, predominantly African, countries. See §3.3 below for more on Toronto.
15 For both adverse selection and moral hazard reasons: first, they would encourage 
'good' debtors to buy themselves out of the market, leaving creditors holding liabilities of 
'bad' debtors only and, second, countries might be encouraged to default in order to lower 
the price of their debt to then undertake the buyback (see Krugman, 1988).
16 See Armendariz de Aghion (1993).
17 One exception is Chile, where the debt-for-equity swaps have been large and where 
their contribution to economic growth and debt repayment has been important (see 
Armendariz de Aghion, 1991).
18 In fact, debt repayments are determined ex-ante, in a bargaining model of Bulow 
and Rogoff (1989).
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raising the market price of the debt related assets they hold. One such exogenous increase 
in the fraction of repayment obligations which is actually met by debtor countries would 
be brought about by the introduction of foreign aid earmarked for debt retirement. 
Although the authors illustrate their results for the case of Bolivian debt retirement (or 
buyback)19, their analysis can easily be extended to any type of debt relief involving an 
industrialized country government and/or a multilateral institution like the World Bank. 
The message, as the authors themselves put it in their concluding remarks, is: "that a well 
intentioned donor government can help the debtor country more by giving it aid directly 
than by earmarking the same funds for a buyback" (pp.715).
This framework raised questions regarding the role the World Bank should play in the 
negotiations for debt relief. Van Wijnbergen (1991) justifies the role of the World Bank 
in the case of the Mexican debt relief package. He does not deny that some of the benefits 
from the Bank aid accrued to Mexico's creditors but argues that most of the benefits did 
accrue to Mexico itself.
3.31 The Bank's Approaches to Solving the Crisis
Having traced the principal ideas in the debate on solutions to the debt crisis since 1982 
in §3.1 and §3.2, I now attempt to place the Bank's views and contributions into that 
context. At the onset of the crisis, the Bank, now under Clausen and Krueger20, took a 
very cautious line, changing the focus from the macroeconomic concern with the 
availability of foreign finance, so prominent under McNamara and Chenery, to 
microeconomic advice on "getting prices right". External causes were de-emphasized, and 
the crisis was blamed predominantly on domestic policy errors, notably the use of 
borrowed funds for consumption or inadequate investment purposes, due to distorted 
prices. In 1986, an Operations Evaluation Department report stated that: "The flexibility 
provided by access to foreign borrowing will have been lost because of past policy 
errors." (World Bank, 1986a).
19 Although countries are generally not allowed to buy their debts directly in the 
secondary market, Bolivia was an exception. In 1987, the Bolivian government was 
allowed to engage in a buyback experiment carried out with aid from industrialized 
countries.
20 As President and Vice-President for the Economics Research Staff, respectively.
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The Bank adhered closely to the view, espoused publicly by the governments of its major 
shareholders, that a 'solution' to the crisis must be based on a 'restoration of 
creditworthiness', and that the way for countries to achieve this was to maintain debt 
service up to date and avoid the need for rescheduling loans as long as possible. These 
objectives could best be secured through prompt efforts at internal adjustment aimed at 
switching production toward tradeable, through the familiar combination of expenditure- 
reduction and expenditure-switching policies:
"Despite the many problems they have had recently, developing countries need a 
continuing flow of bank lending to regain their growth momentum. For this to 
happen, however, developing countries must restore their creditworthiness - and 
that depends on their own policies and on the strength and stability of world 
economic growth." (WDR 1985, p. 124).
The role envisaged for the international financial system was merely to provide some 
rescheduling when there were no other alternatives. In other words, the Bank adhered 
firmly to the liquidity view of the debt problem, and gave little serious consideration to 
the more radical early proposals mentioned above, such as that by Kenen.
This view was qualified, rather than rejected, by conclusions arising from the 
"International Debt and the Developing Countries" conference, held by the Economics 
Research Staff of the Bank in April 198421. Participants generally emphasized two 
shortcomings of the current approach. It was felt that the positive externalities created by 
involuntary sovereign lending by a private bank and the ensuing free-rider problem 
provided scope for greater coordination of the process by the IMF, the Bank and even 
creditor governments. This followed the views expressed by Cline (1983) and Sachs 
(1984). Second, short-term reschedulings (generally of one year) which were then the rule, 
were seen as collectively inefficient, even if a single lender had an incentive to keep a 
problem debtor on a "short leash". A number of authors, and notably Krugman, suggested 
expanding the scope of rescheduling to provide multi-year restructuring of a country's 
foreign debt. This again followed from the standard policy implications of the liquidity 
view in the academic debate, and the suggestion had already been made by, for instance,
21 The papers presented at this conference were compiled in a volume edited by 
Cuddington and Smith (1985), and included contributions by Cooper and Sachs, Gersovitz, 
Krugman, Simonsen, Dombusch and Harberger.
Cline (1983).
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Although Cuddington and Smith (1985) found that: "...many participants agreed with the 
notion that some form of debt relief (in effect, forgiveness) may now be necessary." 
(p. 17), the balance of opinion seemed to be that in most countries ultimate ability to 
generate the necessary stream of foreign exchange - i.e. solvency - existed. In his 
restructuring proposal, Krugman recognized that if it were to be seen as a final settlement 
of the crisis, "the present value of debt service would have to be written down sharply." 
(p.97). But he preferred to see it "as a bridge to a future period of normalcy, rather than 
a way to ramp down countries' debt." (ibid) This allowed him to disregard serious debt 
forgiveness in his proposed 'guidelines'. In fact, he plainly admitted that "in the current 
context...it is clear that any debt restructuring will fall well short of reversing the direction 
of resource transfer [back towards debtors]." (ibid). Gersovitz agrees that, with the 
exception of special 'problem debtors' - he mentions North Korea, Sudan and Zaire - 
countries could be expected to service their debts in "a way that preserves their present 
values" (p.76).
Thus, whilst there were indeed suggestions that some due interest should be capitalized, 
and the loan maturities extended (Simonsen), as well as that banks ought perhaps to 
charge interest rates below market rates on some of their loans (Krugman) - justifying the 
organizers’ claim that debt relief was suggested - this was on a very modest scale. This 
was in contrast to the more radical proposals mentioned earlier, as well as to the tone of 
the academic debate a few years down the road, and to the views expressed in the Bank's 
own subsequent conference in 1989.
In terms of policy implementation, there was some response to the concerns expressed at 
the 1984 conference, both with the short-term nature of rescheduling, and with the need 
for greater coordination of involuntary lending, to combat the free-rider problem. The 
Baker Strategy, proposed by the then US Treasury Secretary in March 1985, was intended 
to address exactly these issues. Longer periods for rescheduling became more common, 
starting with a $49 billion multi-year package for Mexico. The Conference also appears 
to have played a catalytic role in disseminating academic ideas to a broader audience, and 
this is in line with the perception that the Bank was stronger as a communicator than as
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a generator of ideas in this area.22
But if the Bank's official positions were not radical or innovative in the 1982-1985 period, 
from 1986 to 1988 they appeared to lag further behind the rapidly evolving debate. In a 
paper written before joining the Bank, Fischer (1987) emphasizes the severe decline in 
income per capita in the Baker fifteen heavily indebted countries, the massive resource 
transfers from these countries and the resulting collapse in their domestic investment rates. 
The focus had changed substantially from the liquidity view, towards a concern with the 
seriousness of the effects of the crisis on the debtor countries, and the proposed solutions 
reflect that change. In this, as well as in most other papers devoted to possible solutions 
to the crisis in Sachs (1989), the possible desirability of debt relief, and a variety of 
mechanisms through which to achieve it efficiently are discussed. There is no contention 
to Sachs's claim - based on the debt overhang argument sketched above - that "partial debt 
relief can therefore be Pareto improving (i.e. to the benefit of both creditors and debtors)." 
(p.28). Yet, years after the debt overhang hypothesis had been proposed, the role of the 
Bank continued to be that of a supporter of the Baker strategy, with its response to the 
concerns so widely voiced in 1984/5 still based on concerted lending and loan 
rescheduling.
An indictment of this role appears in the paper by Diwan and Husain (1989)23 which 
introduces their volume on Dealing with the Debt Crisis, a report on the Bank's 1989 
Conference on Debt. There they acknowledge, in so many words, that the strategy was 
unsuccessful, that it had modest targets for new money ($13 billion annually), that even 
those targets were never achieved (net annual flow was only about $4 billion), that "the 
official sector had only moral suasion to ensure that the private sector met the plan's 
targets" (p.4) and, fundamentally, that: "controversies, even of a few billion dollars, miss 
the point: the transfer of resources from the highly indebted countries to the industrial 
countries for external debt was more than $100 billion during 1986-88." (ibid).
An admission of the reasons behind the Bank's position was given by the Chief Economist
22 See Stem and Ferreira (forthcoming).
23 Both were economists at the Debt and International Finance Division of the 
International Economics Department of the World Bank.
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in 1989:
"...the record shows that frank and open debate does not take place in official and 
banking circles. It was clear to the participants in this conference at the beginning 
of 1989, as it had been clear to many much earlier, that growth in the debtor 
countries would not return without debt relief. But the official agencies operate on 
the basis of an agreed upon strategy, and none of them could openly confront the 
existing strategy without having an alternative to put in place. And to propose such 
an alternative would have required agreement among the major shareholders of 
these institutions. So long as the United States was not willing to move, the IFIs 
were not free to speak..." (S. Fischer, p.v. in Diwan and Husain, 1989).24
In 1988, a willingness to contemplate some element of debt reduction began to manifest 
itself among those "major shareholders". K. Miyazawa, then Japan's finance minister, used 
the IMF - World Bank meetings in Berlin that year to propose officially sponsored debt 
reduction schemes. President Mitterrand of France followed suit later that year, in Toronto, 
where official creditors agreed on a set of guidelines for concessional relief for low- 
income severely indebted countries, thereafter known as the Toronto terms. The WDR 
1988, the first entirely under Fischer as Chief Economist, marks the Bank's official jump 
from the Baker bandwagon, by including suggestions that some debt relief, and a 
"reduction of the debt overhang" could be important elements to facilitate the transition 
from adjustment to growth. It was just in time to claim marginal precedence over the 
change in the US official position, which came with the Brady Plan in 1989, aimed at 
middle-income severely indebted countries.
From then on, there appears to have been an increase in the liveliness of the debate on 
debt in the Bank, as well as in its sponsorship of research on the topic. The Debt and 
International Finance Department issued papers quite frequently, often focusing on issues 
connected with voluntary, market-based debt reduction schemes and the related incentive 
problems (e.g. Claessens, S. (1988): "The Debt Laffer Curve: Some Estimates").
24 It is quite likely that the reasons for the Bank's lack of enthusiasm for debt 
forgiveness were not entirely political. It has been privately suggested by a senior Bank 
official that, as an intermediary that raises finance from the market, and whose ability to 
do so is affected by its credit rating, the Bank was naturally hesitant to propose policies 
which, if applied to its own loans to developing countries, might lead to asset write-offs.
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To this improvement in the Bank's record as a follower of the theoretical debate since 
1988, it must be added that one sphere of intellectual activity where the Bank had long 
been making a significant contribution to the study of LDC debt was the publication of 
comprehensive data on the direction, magnitude and effects of the debt flows. This was 
mostly through the World Debt Tables which, complemented by the World Development 
Indicators, provided the basis for much academic and policy work on the subject. Within 
the framework of the Brady Initiative, furthermore, the Bank's role in helping countries 
to design and negotiate the menus for debt reduction with their creditors provided new 
scope for application of the ideas being researched and debated throughout the profession. 
By the end of 1990, Brady deals had been concluded with Costa Rica, Mexico and the 
Philippines, and other countries were negotiating their own packages. The Mexican 
example, besides being the earliest, is also probably the most studied (See van 
Wijnbergen, 1991; and Armendariz de Aghion and Armendariz de Hinestrosa, 1993). The 
deal covered some US$49 billion in commercial loans and, according to some estimates, 
involved US$12 billion of relief. Net external transfers from Mexico were reduced by 
US$4 billion per year for some six years from 1989. This was accomplished by allowing 
participating commercial creditors to choose from a menu of facilities including exchange 
of debt for a discount bond (at 65% of par), or for a par bond with fixed interest at 
6.25%, all with 30-year maturities. The Bank and the IMF were involved in financing the 
required collateral for these bonds, and creditor banks were also given the option to swap 
debt for equity in a privatization programme.
But the general weakness in the Bank's overall contribution to understanding and resolving 
the financial flows aspect of the debt crisis must be seen in the context of its leadership 
in the construction of what came to be the standard LDC domestic response to the crisis. 
This is the structural adjustment package, to which I turn in the next three sections.
41 Stabilization Policies
The first mention of "adjustment” as a topic in its own right in the Bank's flagship 
publication, the World Development Report, is to be found in 1980. In February of the 
same year, the Bank's new Structural Adjustment Lending (SAL) programme was 
launched, and on 30 September President McNamara chose adjustment as the central 
subject of his annual address to the Board. Two years prior to the outbreak of the debt
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crisis, the Bank was leading development economists into questions about the domestic 
policy response to the external shocks. The remainder of this chapter describes how its 
own ideas about stabilization and adjustment evolved over the decade.
The Bank's approach to stabilization in the first three years of the decade was that 
countries should devalue and reduce fiscal deficits in an orderly fashion. To avoid a 
collapse of domestic absorption, they should rely on foreign financing to allow for a 
gradual reduction in current account deficits. This finance should be allocated to 
productive investment in the tradeable goods sector, thus providing the basis for the "high 
investment" mode of adjustment they advocated.
This was based on three elements: outward orientation and real exchange rate 
depreciation; increased savings; and "increas[ing] the share of investment without 
detriment to its efficiency" (WDR 1981, p.71). The intended purpose of high levels of 
investment during adjustment was to implement the transfer of resources from the 
nontradeables to the tradeables sector, just as the purpose of real depreciations was to 
provide the incentives for private agents to carry it out. This 'high investment' mode of 
adjustment was recommended by the Bank in all WDRs from 1980 to 1982, and was also 
important in making the necessary changes compatible with McNamara's chief concern, 
progress - or at least preservation of recent gains - in the sphere of human development.
But the reduction of fiscal deficits and the temporary output deflation resulting from the 
lags involved in transferring resources across sectors of the economy could only have been 
compatible with higher investment and the maintenance of minimum levels of 
consumption for the majority of the population if substantial capital inflows had continued 
to be available to finance adjustment: "If the necessary finance could not be obtained - 
because of concern about creditworthiness, for example - growth could slip even lower 
than the Low Case, and the number of countries in serious debt difficulties would 
increase." (WDR 1980, p. 10). As we know from Table 2 and Section 2.2, however, the 
Bank did not at this time anticipate the scale of the forthcoming reduction in voluntary 
capital flows to LDCs. This meant that it underestimated the scale of the reduction in 
absorption that was required, and explains some of the optimism about high levels of 
investment during adjustment.
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Coupled with this misunderstanding of the magnitudes involved in the coming adjustment 
process, and also stemming from the bias towards the global dimension, was a tendency 
to overlook the importance of domestic disequilibria. Little attention was given to 
inflation, although it was widespread and detrimental to both long-term investment and 
the welfare of the poor, both of which were important for the Bank's proposed adjustment 
mechanism. The view of the macroeconomic strategy was simplistic - possibly because 
the availability of abundant foreign finance had the same effect on Bank economists as 
on governments, namely to make the need for radical policy reform appear less urgent.
So, while the Bank played an important and original role in raising the profile of 
stabilization issues in those early years, there were still lessons to be learned. In a 1986 
"Review of Experience" with the Structural Adjustment Lending strategy, the Operations 
Evaluation Department (OED) concluded that while many of the microeconomic reforms 
were quite successful, there were widespread problems with devaluations that failed to be 
implemented (either because the nominal devaluation itself just never took place or 
because the rate of inflation exceeded expectations and the nominal devaluation translated 
into a real appreciation) and with the speed of budget deficit reductions. These formed the 
backbone of the macro stabilization programme and, in their absence, positive results 
elsewhere might be short lived. The study reviews nine countries to which SALs were 
made between 1980 and 1983, namely Turkey, Kenya, Bolivia, the Philippines, Senegal, 
Guyana, Ivory Coast, Thailand and Jamaica. "Except for Turkey, no other country 
significantly improved the competitiveness of its exchange rate at the start of its structural 
adjustment program. Real exchange rates appreciated in Jamaica, the Philippines and 
Thailand in the year following approval of their first SALs." (World Bank, 1986a, p.xv). 
As for fiscal restraint, "only the Ivory Coast achieved a dramatic improvement in its 
budget. The relatively poor performance in other countries appears to have partly reflected 
an underestimation of the time required for such reforms, and difficulties in maintaining 
revenue shares in weak economies experiencing inflation." (World Bank, 1986a, p.xv).
When Anne Krueger became Chief Economist and Clausen replaced McNamara as 
President, in 1982, there were some noticeable changes in the dominant views held at the 
World Bank. The most important one of these with respect to adjustment was that the 
emphasis on macro aspects was replaced with a more detailed look at the structures of the 
economy. Long-term microeconomic reforms of the supply-side, i.e. of the institutions and
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ways in which markets operate in developing countries, became a central focus of 
discussion at the Bank. These will be discussed in section 5.
There were changes within the macroeconomic sphere too. August 1982 had come and 
gone, and the WDR 1983 was the first one to use the expression 'Debt Crisis'. Statistics 
on indebtedness gradually replaced in prominence those related to oil consumption and 
energy production. The balance between external (or global) causes and domestic policy 
errors in the Bank's 'allocation of blame' was sharply reversed. Whereas in 1982 it used 
to be the case that ''The developing countries, despite the rise in their current account 
deficits from U$40 billion in 1979 to U$115 billion in 1981, have been much more 
successful than the industrialized countries in adjusting to the new situation." (WDR 1982, 
p.7), in 1986 it was thought that "at the root of the poor performance and debt problems 
of developing countries lies their failure to adjust to the external developments that have 
taken place since the early 1970s, coupled with the magnitude of the external shocks." 
(WDR 1986, p.33). I.e. while a few months before the Mexican default the Bank thought 
not only that LDCs had adjusted, but in fact that they had done so better than others, a 
few years on, despite many impressive reversals of current account deficits by countries 
willing to sacrifice the standards of living of their present and future populations for 
external equilibrium, they had "failed" to adjust.
On the other hand, the accumulation of practical experience of adjustment programmes, 
not least from the SALs, led to a greater understanding of the complexities involved. The 
key recommended policies were still devaluation aimed at a single, market determined 
exchange rate which was compatible with current account balance; fiscal restraint aimed 
at a budget balanced over the medium term; financial liberalisation aimed at market 
determined interest rates, which reflected the real opportunity cost of capital, and overall 
market liberalisation (details of which are the subject of section 5). But awareness grew 
of the various reasons why the implementation of these policies could be very difficult. 
In 1984 inflation was raised to a higher profile within the group of targets for adjustment. 
The role of the 'inflation tax' in financing the budget deficit as an 'easy alternative' to 
raising taxes or cutting expenditure was discussed, and analysis of the political economy 
led to the view that the 'inflation tax' was superficially attractive because it is less easily 
identifiable as a tax, and because those it affects most tend to have the least political 
clout.
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In 1987, Barber Conable takes over from Clausen as President, and Krueger is briefly 
replaced by Benjamin King, before Stanley Fischer becomes Chief Economist. The Bank's 
emphasis on the overriding importance of "getting prices right" is not reversed, but 
progressively more attention is paid to distributional issues and the effects of adjustment 
on the poor, recapturing some of the elements of the concern with human development 
of the late 1970s and early 1980s. This process culminates on the WDR 1990, which was 
entirely devoted to poverty and included much on the effects of stabilization and 
adjustment.
On the analysis of macroeconomic stabilization itself, the Bank continued to seek a deeper 
understanding of the short-term dynamics of the interaction of different policies. From 
the outset, it had been clear that the comparative statics of adjusting to a reduction in 
large external transfers, manifested through a large current account deficit, were not 
complex. The required policies were a devaluation and a reduction in fiscal deficits. But 
the experience from SAL countries suggested that implementation was politically difficult, 
and that the dynamics of transition might not be so simple. Some issues to receive 
increased attention were therefore the importance of expectations and credibility, as well 
as timing and sequencing of policies.
The importance of expectations was raised in connection with the problem of stimulating 
the reflow of flight capital to adjusting countries. Although the discussion in the WDRs 
did not use this terminology, it was concerned with the existence of Pareto-rankable 
multiple equilibria in a game where strategies were amounts of flight capital to be re­
invested in an LDC and payoffs were returns that depended, inter alia, on the general 
macroeconomic climate and the aggregate level of investment in the country. This game 
displays externalities and strategic complementarities and hence has potential for 
coordination failures (see Cooper and John, 1988, for the general properties of such 
models, and Dombusch, 1990, for a specific application). The Bank's aim of affecting 
expectations could be seen as an attempt to overcome those failures and move to a high- 
investment Pareto-superior equilibrium. While the Bank's own research did not contribute 
to the theory of coordination failures, it certainly contributed to the dissemination of the 
issue amongst both the general public and many policy makers. This dissemination drew 
particularly on the experience of Mexico, which received significant repatriations of funds 
shortly after the Brady deal in early 1990.
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The importance of government credibility was illustrated by the increasing difficulty 
encountered by the Argentine and Brazilian governments in their fight against inflation 
in the late 1980s. As public confidence on the government's ability to reduce inflation fell 
with each unsuccessful plan, the economy became more comprehensively indexed, 
expectations of future inflation led to higher interest rates and these pushed up costs for 
borrowing firms. In addition, consumers increasingly attempted to convert wages into 
goods as soon as they earned them, so as to protect their value. Both cost and demand 
effects combined to lead to faster price rises than would otherwise have been the case.
Issues of sequencing gained in importance partly as a result of the competition of 
instruments problem. Because it was understood that different policies - intended to affect 
distinct target variables - often have contradictory side effects on the targets, the order in 
which they are implemented matters. The official position was to recognise that parameter 
values vary widely across different countries so that, even if the basic structure of the 
model relating instruments to target variables were applicable to all, the quantitative 
responses would still vary and the timing and sequencing of programmes must be decided 
in view of each particular circumstance. Nevertheless, "the importance of this sequence 
of reforms - reforms to reduce severe macroeconomic imbalances first and to improve 
resource allocation and restore growth later - has become increasingly clear with 
experience." (Corbo and Fischer, 1990, p.3) The main reason for this is that the thrust of 
the microeconomic reforms of the supply-side is to encourage greater efficiency of 
investment through adequate relative prices. Under high and unstable inflation, however, 
or unpredictable exchange rates, relative prices are unclear. This underscored the 
importance of sustained macroeconomic stability.
5) A djustm ent and the Efficiency of Resource Allocation.
This section deals with the World Bank's contribution to the analysis of allocative 
efficiency in the context of adjustment. From the outset the third key policy 
recommendation of the WDR (1981), namely to increase the efficiency of investment, 
already revealed a concern with microeconomic issues. Indeed, even the two basic 
components of the macroeconomic programme led to a progressive deepening of this 
interest in the microeconomics of the supply-side. The first was the need to permanently 
reduce the current account deficit, which required a transfer of resources from the
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production of non-tradeables to that of tradeables. In order for resources to move into 
those activities where they could be most productive, it was necessary that the structure 
of incentives facing investors, producers, consumers and workers should reflect 
opportunity costs. In other words, prices should move towards their shadow values. In the 
context of highly distorted economies, many of whom had altered incentives purposefully 
to encourage the development of domestic industry, this perspective was translated in 
practice into the encouragement of price and trade reforms.
The second macro feature was the need to reduce fiscal deficits. This not only led to a 
move towards higher prices in the public sector (many of which had been below marginal 
costs), an element of price reform, but also to the realisation that both sides of the budget 
- collection of revenue and control and allocation of expenditure - were often inefficient. 
The revenue side was to be dealt with by tax reform, whereas the expenditure side could 
be tackled by reforming institutions and management practices throughout the public 
sector. The need for these reforms had been widely recognised, partly due to the short run 
macro pressures, but it was also argued that the reforms would be fundamental in laying 
the foundations for more stable long-run growth in the future. Structural adjustment, the 
business of reforming the microeconomic structure of developing societies to encourage 
the efficient use of resources over the long term, became an integral part of any 
stabilization programme and was, in time, to overtake it in perceived importance, so that 
the latter would be seen primarily as a prerequisite for the former. Given its longer-run 
nature and its effect on the 'supply side’, it was perceived as closer to the remit of the 
Bank than short-term stabilization.
Although this process was not completed until later in the decade, under Clausen and 
Krueger, its roots can be found in the earliest attempts at implementation of the SALs. 
They were designed around four key components, namely trade reform; "resource 
mobilization", an euphemism for fiscal reform; reforms aimed to increase the 
"effectiveness of resource use"; and "institution building". The fist two components 
involved macro policy elements, such as devaluations and fiscal contractions, but trade 
reform very much focused on the effects of existing trade policies and legislation on the 
efficiency of resource allocation and of production. "Resource mobilization" explicitly 
targeted public sector pricing and public enterprise efficiency as means to reduce the fiscal 
deficit.
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The last two elements are entirely aimed at greater allocative and productive efficiency 
throughout the economy. Given the problems with the implementation of the 
macroeconomic components of these early SALs, mentioned in the last section, it is not 
surprising that the Operations Evaluation Department found that the most successful 
elements of most programmes were the last two. The main areas where "effectiveness of 
resource use" was fostered were agriculture and energy conservation. In Turkey and 
Senegal, significant increases in producer prices of food crops were encouraged, to place 
them in line with international prices and compensate for the abolition of subsidies on 
fertilizers and other inputs. Attempts to reduce the effect of these policies on the urban 
poor involved projects for greater marketing and transporting efficiency, aimed to reduce 
the spread between producer and market prices. The effects on the efficiency and level of 
domestic supply were deemed satisfactory by the OED. It must be noted, however, that 
raising prices can only provide the incentives for the reallocation of resources towards 
greater efficiency. Empirical evidence of the greater efficiency itself must be found in the 
actual movement of factors of production to the relevant sectors, where their productivity 
valued at shadow prices must be greater than that which they previously displayed. Whilst 
there is evidence that movement into agriculture took place in Turkey and Senegal (see 
World Bank, 1986a), it is not obvious that careful studies to value their productivity have 
been carried out.
Institutional reform was perhaps the element of the programmes with the longest lag 
before returns could be measured. It was recognised that "there is an obvious mismatch 
between the time frame of SALs and the number of years that may be necessary to 
complete institutional reforms." (World Bank, 1986a, p.xviii). Nevertheless, a positive 
assessment of these reforms was based on the view that progress was being made on 
various fronts. Subsidies to higher education were lowered in Ivory Coast (see Fields, 
1975, for an early theoretical justification), government employment was rationalized in 
Jamaica and there were "improvements in budgeting, management control systems and the 
efficiency of public investment in most SAL countries." (World Bank, 1986a, p.xxv). The 
main difficulties identified by the OED Review were insufficient time frames and poor 
policy coordination across the various elements. For example, failure to devalue meant 
that tariff reforms could not proceed at the desired pace, at the risk of increasing trade 
deficits; deflations led to shrinking government revenues at the same time as tax collectors 
underwent extensive training (as in Jamaica, prior to the introduction of new domestic
60
taxes in 1985). These examples reinforce the importance of careful timing and sequencing 
of the reforms. If tax collector training had preceded the macroeconomic deflation, the 
effects on revenue might have been less severe, thus enabling greater government ability 
to proceed with other aspects of the adjustment programme. Nevertheless, valuable 
learning in the design and implementation of these programmes was taking place and there 
is no doubt that the shift of emphasis towards the efficiency aspects that were to 
characterise the next five years, both at the Bank and elsewhere, owed a great deal to the 
evidence from these practical experiences.
This greater emphasis in 1983-87 is evident even from the choice of WDR themes. Of the 
five WDRs from 1983 to 1987, three were devoted to issues directly related to 
microeconomic or institutional reforms: in 1983, the topic was "Management in 
Development"; in 1986, "Trade and Pricing Policies in World Agriculture" and in 1987, 
"Barriers to Adjustment and Growth in the World Economy" as well as "Industrialization 
and Foreign Trade". Although the 1985 issue was dedicated to "International Capital and 
Economic Development", the approach adopted emphasised strengthening capital and 
securities markets in developing countries and allocating resources from borrowing in an 
efficient manner, so as to equate the expected present value of the stream of returns from 
investing the marginal dollar borrowed to the expected present value of its servicing 
requirements. The collapse of lending and the stark reality of investment cuts and GDP 
declines across the adjusting developing world became clear during this period, destroying 
earlier hopes that the quantity of resources available for growth would continue to 
increase, albeit at a slower rate. This perceived scarcity imposed even greater urgency 
upon improving the efficiency with which available resources were used. The emphasis 
was on microeconomic reforms and on "getting prices right".
Naturally, the Bank did not itself produce the theory on which the policies it was 
recommending were based. Indeed most of the reforms advocated by the Bank at this 
stage had been proposed much earlier. Little, Scitovsky and Scott (1970) already 
suggested "...that developing countries would benefit from adopting, in general, a more 
decentralized approach with greater use of the price mechanism; and, in particular, given 
that there are good prospects for exports, a more open approach for foreign trade, with 
less protection and use of controls." (p.21). Bela Balassa and his associates had also been 
pointing to the need for trade and price reform to increase the efficiency of the supply-
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side for almost two decades, often as consultants to the World Bank. Balassa et al (1971) 
already discuss static and dynamic costs of an import substitution strategy, and suggest 
mechanisms for reform employing a specific sequence of devaluation and tariff reductions.
Whilst there are differences in the end-state advocated by Balassa and that favoured by 
Krueger’s team at the Bank in the mid-1980s, there is little doubt that the direction of the 
reforms outlined below had been developed earlier. And both Little et al (1970) and 
Balassa et al (1971) point further back to the influence of others, such as Harberger (1958) 
and Johnson (1965). The microeconomic theories now summoned to support the reform 
proposals were firmly established. The Bank's innovations were, first: applying them in 
the context of structural adjustment, thereby changing its nature from an essentially 
macroeconomic process to one of more fundamental economic reform. Second, the Bank 
helped disseminate a number of basic principles from existing theory, in a form helpful 
to policy makers and implementing institutions which may have previously been less than 
fully acquainted with them. Whilst, as we will see, there were cases in which theory and 
Bank advice diverged, these divergences were generally less serious than those between 
theory and the existing practice that the Bank was trying to change. Its advice could, in 
many of those cases, be considered a move in the right direction.
Advice from the Bank on policies to increase efficiency in the adjusting economies in the 
1980s can be grouped into seven interrelated areas: trade reform, price reform, tax reform, 
financial liberalization, privatization, labour market reform and institution building.
Trade reform was essentially aimed at strengthening or creating an environment of prices, 
regulations, tariffs and other signals such that the incentive to produce commodities for 
export was no less than that for producing them for the domestic market. Three stages 
were envisaged: first a replacement of quantitative restrictions by tariffs. This increases 
revenue, diminishes rent-seeking and corruption opportunities and should be possible to 
implement at the outset. On stage two, the variance across tariff rates would be brought 
down, in an attempt to prevent the Effective Rate of Protection on certain goods to be 
disproportionately high. Lobbying groups might make implementation politically difficult. 
Stage three would proceed to a gradual downward movement in the general level of 
tariffs, exposing domestic industry to competition. Simultaneously, export incentives 
would be created to compensate for the bias in favour of import competitors arising from
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the remaining tariffs, (see World Bank, 1986a)
The implementation of this strategy ran into a number of problems in different countries. 
As mentioned in Section 4, a failure to devalue threatens the later stages of the reform, 
and this was common in a number of African and Latin American countries in the early 
1980s. Political pressure was an obstacle in certain cases, as in Brazil. But there are 
success stories too, both old and more recent. South Korea adopted a strategy very similar 
to the one outlined above and its experience was influential in prompting the Bank and 
other analysts to suggest it to others. More recently, Malaysia, Indonesia and Thailand 
have embarked on a similar course with apparent success. The long-term benefits of an 
outward oriented growth strategy had also been the subject of a lively debate, and reviews 
of the evidence were decidedly coming to favour it (note the change between Chenery, 
1979 and Chenery et al, 1986, where in the former, judgement between strategies was 
deliberately reserved, whilst in the latter trade orientation was more explicitly given 'high 
marks').
One point on which the theory might differ from the scheme above is the uniformity of 
ERPs. The efficiency criterion sought is essentially efficiency in production, in terms of 
the allocation of factors to meet domestic and foreign demand sources. The inadequacy 
of ERPs as indicators of divergence from opportunity costs25 means that uniformity of 
ERPs is not a valid objective from the perspective of efficiency (see, e.g. Ahmad and 
Stem, 1989, p.1059). However, as with other areas where the Bank did not fully absorb 
existing theory in its suggestions, it seems likely that the policies emerging from this 
criterion represent moves in the right direction.
Price reform was aimed predominantly at public sector prices and agricultural prices. The 
Bank recommended that the former should be raised to equate marginal costs, from their 
levels so commonly below them. This is in line with theory for intermediate goods, but 
not for final goods (see Stem, 1987). In the absence of perfect lump sum taxation, there 
is no reason why there should not be an element of indirect taxation in the price of 
publicly supplied final goods, equivalent to that imposed on goods supplied by the private
25 Essentially because effective rates of protection are calculated on the basis of 
market, rather than shadow, prices.
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sector. But again, given the existing distortions and their importance for public sector 
deficits, the suggested moves were in the right direction. Agricultural prices should be 
brought to their world levels, as a proxy for their shadow values. These adjustments were 
tried in a number of countries, with positive supply responses, but with some unattractive 
equity effects in the cities (see World Bank, 1986a).
As for tax reform, the Bank's full public statement came with the WDR (1988), under the 
title "Public Finance in Development". Here, the Bank elaborated on what it thought were 
the four key elements for tax reform, namely greater reliance on user charges for services 
provided by public enterprises; more decentralised spending decisions at state/province or 
city levels; taking budgetary constraints more seriously in order to acquire a keener sense 
of priorities in determining spending; and the potential importance of taxation as a means 
to influence the distribution of income and hence to relieve poverty. In light of this last 
point, it is curious that some of the other recommendations appear to ignore precisely that 
concern with equity. This is the case, for instance, with reliance on user fees for all public 
services, as we will see in the next three chapters. It is also true of the suggested 
desirability of uniform indirect taxation. As Burgess and Stem (1993, p.790) point out, the 
argument is valid only if strong redistributive tools are available and optimally used.
The general direction, however, is again correct. For direct taxation, tax bases should be 
expanded and marginal rates, often very high by international standards, should be brought 
down, with likely benefits in both revenue and efficiency. Indirect taxation should move 
towards the adoption of a final goods tax such as a VAT (see Tait, 1988) - and 
exemptions and loopholes should be eliminated to increase simplicity, administrative ease 
and collection levels.
Among the countries to receive advice and/or lending for the implementation of tax 
reforms from the World Bank, were Mexico and Turkey in the early 1980s, Jamaica in 
1984-6 and Malawi in the late 1980s. The results generally included an increase in 
revenue (except for Mexico), a reduction of evasion and a simplification of the tax 
structures and payment procedures. They generally involved staff training and better 
administrative equipment. For a discussion of these and other reforms, see Burgess and 
Stem (1993).
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Financial liberalization included policies to allow the domestic interest rate to be 
determined in a suitably developed set of capital markets, so that the real interest rate 
would reflect the opportunity cost of capital. Under standard conditions, with some capital 
mobility and flexible exchange rates, this should be determined by the world interest rate 
and the domestic rate of inflation. Most of the evidence has tended to confirm that, while 
very high real interest rates discourage investment, policies which artificially maintained 
negative real rates to encourage investment effectively required capital to be rationed, 
often in a corrupt manner, and ended up allocating capital inefficiently, i.e. to projects 
with internal rates of return below both the shadow real interest rate and that of alternative 
projects unable to gain access to loans.
The WDR (1989) elaborated further on reforming financial systems. Their importance as 
intermediaries between savers and investors was highlighted, and was the main reason 
why their efficiency was particularly crucial. The Bank's advice went beyond the 
restructuring of some of the commercial banks which were in financial distress in the late 
1980s, and included the creation of a range of other institutions, such as securities and 
insurance markets, pension funds, and futures markets, all of which would compete with 
and complement the services provided by the older institutions. They also acknowledged 
the role of informal financial intermediaries, such as personal acquaintances, pawnbrokers, 
curb markets and Rotating Savings and Credit Associations (ROSCAs)26 in reaching and 
providing valuable services to agents normally outside the scope of the formal financial 
system. There was some concern with the high real interest rates prevalent in this informal 
financial sector, although the hypothesis that these could be explained by risk 
considerations was raised. On balance, the assessment of its role is sympathetic and not 
entirely out of line with contemporaneous analysis outside the Bank (see for example 
Chandavarkar, 1989, and Thomas, 1990).
This WDR also included a more detailed analysis of the monetarist experiment of the 
Southern Cone in the early 1980s. The lessons from its failure led to more cautious advice 
on the dynamics of liberalizing financial markets. There was now backing for a more 
gradualistic process, intended to avoid sharp swings in interest rates and the resulting
26 The WDR (1989) looked, for instance, at the best known example of a successful 
ROSCA, namely the Grameen Bank of Bangladesh.
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instability of capital flows and the exchange rate.
In the 1980s, privatization probably was the most politically contentious of these reforms 
and, possibly as a result, the Bank was never as forceful in recommending it as in other 
areas. It suggested that some enterprises would probably be more efficient if managed in 
the private sector, subject to the discipline of a hard budget constraint. But it was not an 
advocate of the minimalist public sector. In fact, even in the WDR 1987, which has come 
to be seen as something of a manifesto, an active role for public sector investment is 
defended for a number of areas, not very different from the 'traditional' ones recently re­
emphasised in the literature (see Stem, 1991a). The Report pointed to the lack of more 
widespread education as the main barrier to industrialization, and considered the infant 
industry argument for protection valid in some cases - though not in most. It states that 
"the important question is often not whether to intervene, but how." (WDR 1987, p.7). 
Little explicit attention, however, seems to have been paid to linking the desirability of 
privatization to the degree of competition the firm is likely to face (see Vickers and 
Yarrow, 1988, and Stem, 1991a).
Labour market liberalization was somewhat less well worked out in theoretical terms. 
There was an emphasis on allowing real wages to be flexible, which had as its main target 
the practice - particularly common in Latin America - of indexing nominal wages to some 
measure of inflation. The objective was to allow for smaller falls in employment by 
permitting real wages to be cut and hence lowering the marginal cost of labour. The Bank 
also urged reductions in non-wage labour costs, which in many countries accounted for 
a large share of total labour costs, by international standards.
While these may be sensible practical suggestions, the underlying issues are conceptually 
complex, both because labour markets function in peculiar ways and because of the 
obvious welfare implications. Policy recommendations can vary quite starkly depending 
on the underlying model one believes in. Minimum wages, for instance, are both 
inefficient and detrimental to the poor in a classical model of the labour market with no 
frictional unemployment, but may be both efficient (in the constrained sense of 
maximizing output) and beneficial to (all) workers in models with unemployment arising 
from a mismatch between workers and vacancies, and where wages are determined by
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bargaining (see Pissarides, 1990).27 The interplay of formal and informal sector labour 
markets would also have to be considered, as well as the non-financial benefits of formal 
sector employment, such as work and safety conditions.
Institution building was discussed earlier in this section. During the 1982-90 period, work 
continued on those initiatives perceived to be successful, and longer time scales were 
allowed.
61 A djustm ent and Equity.
I now turn to the Bank's analysis of the distributional impacts of adjustment, and 
particularly of its effects on the poor. Until 1987, its contribution was mostly in terms of 
improving the quality and coverage of data collection, principally through the Living 
Standards Measurements Study (LSMS) programme. The data sets collected then enabled 
researchers at the Bank and elsewhere to gain substantial insights into the distribution of 
incomes in a number of countries for which little reliable empirical work had previously 
been done. But this period saw little evidence of analytical work at the Bank on the 
channels through which the policies discussed in the two previous sections would affect 
the living standards of the poor.
From 1979 to 1982, there was interest in the repercussions adjustment might have on 
human development. The text of the WDRs revealed awareness of the basic impacts, such 
as that cutting subsidies and other forms of expenditure would harm those who previously 
benefitted from them; or that raising farm gate prices in agriculture would probably have 
a beneficial effect on poor farmers (and rich farmers, for that matter), provided they were 
net sellers. But the optimism which pervaded their projections of the adjustment 
experience at the time also had implications here. If growth rates had been as high in the 
1980s as they had predicted (see Table 2), and capital inflows had continued at the 
expected rate, then the necessary internal adjustment programmes would have been less 
severe, and their effects on output, employment and poverty less dramatic.
27 In Pissarides's model, a minimum wage is not necessarily efficient. But the market- 
determined wage rate may be below the efficient wage, which allows scope for a 
competent and well-informed government to act.
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In chapter 7 of the WDR 1981, entitled "Human Development: a Continuing Imperative", 
they note that cuts in social spending had already been implemented in Brazil, India and 
Turkey, with a negative effect on the living standards of the populations concerned.28 They 
urge governments to realise that human capital formation is fundamental for the future 
growth prospects of their countries, and hence to continue funding social expenditure on 
education, basic health, nutrition and training.
There was, however, no conceptual discussion of the different mechanisms through which 
stabilization could affect income distribution, such as that by Johnson and Salop (1980) 
who, although themselves also optimistic, had identified many channels for impact. These 
included: relative price effects on producers in the traded and nontraded sectors; fiscal 
restraint, which would affect people differently depending on how they benefitted from 
expenditure and on the incidence of tax increases; the effect of liberalization on relative 
prices; reduction in total domestic credit and capital market imperfections, which might 
combine to lead to lower credit to smaller investors; and the effects on employment. 
Judging from the discussions in the World Development Reports - including the 1981 
volume, whose main theme was adjustment - or in the public pronouncements of the 
President, this kind of analysis was not going on at the Bank at this time.
The distributional changes associated with the implementation of the early SAL 
programmes may, in part, have been connected with this absence of serious ex-ante 
analysis. The decline in real wages for the duration of the programme in Turkey - which 
was presented as a good performer on this count - was of 28%. Declines were also 
recorded in Jamaica and Senegal. For most other countries, data weaknesses prevented 
analysis. In general, the Bank postulated ex-post that "the income distribution effects of 
the changes these countries have experienced have tended to be in favour of the owners 
of capital and, at least in the Ivory Coast, Senegal, Jamaica and Thailand, in favour of the 
farmers and the rural sector." (World Bank, 1986a, p.xxvii).
Meanwhile though, on the empirical front, LSMS Working Papers were first published in 
1980 and around ninety were made available until 1992, in a significant contribution to
28 Quantification of these effects would have generally been unreliable, due to the 
scarcity of sufficiently recent data.
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work in and outside the Bank. Nevertheless, the fact that twenty papers were published 
between 1980 and 1982, none between November 1982 and March 1985, only seven 
between March 1985 and March 1987, fifteen in 1987 alone and thirty-seven between 
May 1988 and 1990 can be seen as indicative of the evolution of the importance given 
to equity issues which took place within the Bank during the decade.29 (Source: World 
Bank, "LSMS Working Paper Series List", 4 November 1991; updated August 1992).
Unlike the analysis of allocative efficiency issues, there was little progress within the 
Bank in this area from 1982 to 1987. There was, of course, a correction of the 
overoptimistic predictions made before the onset of the debt crisis in 1982. The WDR 
1984 notes the decline in per capita income occurring in a number of countries, as well 
as the cuts in investment in general and expenditure on social programmes such as 
education and health in particular. It warns that these will have negative long-run effects 
on growth prospects (pp. 32/3). But as regards remedies, it limits itself to the hope that 
efficient pricing and outward orientation would suffice, in due course, to raise incomes 
and hence diminish the level - or reverse the growth - of poverty: "With a continuation 
of slow growth, millions of people in many developing countries will become 
progressively poorer; with faster growth, almost everybody in the world will enjoy some 
increase in real income." (p.38). This marked a shift from the view - prevalent under 
McNamara - that growth was instrumental to reduce, but not sufficient to eradicate, 
poverty: "The pursuit of growth without a reasonable concern for equity is ultimately 
socially destabilizing." (McNamara, 1981, p.656).
Possibly because the issue was no longer regarded as a priority, there was also not much 
effort to update the concepts involved in their appraisals of equity. Their measurement of 
poverty was the headcount index, i.e. the share of the population with incomes below a 
given poverty line, and there is little evidence in the WDRs of attempts to incorporate 
insights from the debate on poverty measurement that was taking place 
contemporaneously. For two examples of comprehensive criticisms of the headcount and
29 A counter-argument which has been presented verbally to the author by persons 
closely associated with LSMS at the time is that the fall in the frequency of publication 
in 1982 was due to a move from theorizing about data collection to actually performing 
it on the ground, thus providing a more valuable service to measuring the living standards 
of the poor.
69
suggestions of alternatives, see Sen (1983) and Atkinson (1987). Academic economists 
were very productive during the 1980s on the intricacies of measuring poverty and 
inequality. Despite the high value the Bank usually gives to having reliable data, it was 
not clear from its leading publications that the Bank's researchers had incorporated these 
advances in measurement at the time.
The Bank concedes to having been a belated follower on questions of policy remedies as 
well. As the WDR 1990 puts it: "it was UNICEF that first brought the issue [the effects 
of adjustment on the poor] into the centre of the debate on the design and effects of 
adjustment." (p. 103). A collection of some of the work that was being done at UNICEF 
during the middle of the decade is Adjustment with a Human Face, by Comia, Jolly and 
Stewart (1987). The two volumes include ten detailed case studies, supplying valuable 
empirical evidence. It is a long and complex treatment of the problems involved, and can 
not be done justice here. Its main merit was to highlight the very significant 
transformations that were occurring in the lives of millions of people, as a somewhat 
ignored side effect of the adjustment medicine, and to earn widespread acceptance - over 
a period of time - that direct intervention to protect the more vulnerable was warranted. 
It proposed a menu of policies aimed at relieving poverty under adjustment. This included: 
more expansionary macro policies; the use of sectoral or meso policies to target scarce 
resources to those most in need, e.g. credit schemes for the informal sector; restructuring 
public expenditure towards an increase - not only a maintenance - of the social 
programmes and investment in the human capital of the poor; compensatory programmes 
such as public employment schemes and nutrition projects, essentially to work as 
temporary direct government transfers; and the careful monitoring of the nutrition, health 
and education situations across the relevant country, to provide for speedy action if critical 
levels were to be reached.
The macroeconomic component of the programme was based, like the pre-1982 Bank 
predictions, on the resumption of external financing to the adjusting countries. In the 
absence of increased external finance, which would allow for a current account deficit 
greater than previously expected, an increase in the fiscal deficit - which must be what 
is implied by a 'more expansionary macro policy' - can only come if it is financed by 
domestic borrowing in the capital markets, which crowds out private investment, or by 
borrowing from the Central Bank, increasing the inflation tax and thus reducing
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consumption, particularly of the poor. The real challenge of adjusting to lower current 
account deficits did not lie in hoping for an impossible macro expansion, but instead in 
facing the task of restructuring expenditure and taxation in order to allocate the scarce 
resources to those - if the concern is equity - who need it most. This is a criticism to 
which the manner in which Comia, Jolly and Stewart treat both the level and allocation 
of resources at a macro level is vulnerable. Other elements of their programme, however, 
were soon accepted by many outside UNICEF, including the Bank.
Even if it was a follower in terms of its own views, the Bank nevertheless played a 
constructive role in facilitating some important research into the distributional aspects of 
adjustment. Demery and Addison's (1987) thematic study of the possible mechanisms for 
"the alleviation of poverty under structural adjustment" was published by the Bank. They 
were more realistic in their views of the macroeconomic scenario than Comia, Jolly and 
Stewart (1987), and presented an interesting 'menu' of approaches to relieving hardship 
under adjustment. It was based on the distinction between 'primary' and 'secondary claims' 
on resources (see Stewart, 1983), i.e. between income from productive activities and 
income from transfers. The latter is seen as a 'last resort' and they focus on means to 
increase the primary claims of the poor in the context of the adjustment policies, through 
a combination of: (i) increasing their access to assets (e.g. land and credit reforms); (ii) 
raising returns on assets held by them (e.g. agricultural price reforms); (iii) improving their 
employment opportunities; and (iv) investing in health and education. They also consider 
the experience with transfers, as a last resort, and in particular nutrition programmes. Their 
emphasis throughout is firmly on the need for careful targeting of scarce resources.
Much of the evidence on which Demery and Addison (1987) draw, originates from 
programmes in which the Bank had been involved in the mid-1980s, such as the Thai 
SALs of 1982-84, the Chilean SAL of October 1985, assistance to employment and 
training programmes in Senegal in 1986/7, and others. It could be argued that a pattern 
emerges, of empirical evidence from the monitoring of Bank programmes becoming highly 
instrumental to the formulation of ideas by researchers sponsored by or associated with 
the Bank, which are then absorbed by the 'official view' with a lag.30
30 It should also be mentioned that Demery and Addison's preliminary research into 
this topic was carried out earlier, with ODI support, (see Addison and Demery, 1985.)
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Thus, with fifteen LSMS working papers issued, Demery and Addison's work and the 
public response to Adjustment with a Human Face. 1987 marked a revival of the interest 
in distributional and equity issues within the World Bank. This continued during the last 
years of the decade, and into 1990. The World Development Report (1990) was devoted 
to Poverty and marked a return to the Bank's earlier emphasis on distributional and 
standard of living issues.
Dealing specifically with the effects of adjustment on poverty, Chapter 7 of the WDR 
1990 recommends a mix of policies based on two key elements: "(1) swift action on 
certain fundamental policies that are designed to provide the context for future growth and 
(2) macroeconomic policies that can moderate reductions in private consumption in the 
transition period." (pi04). Structural adjustment is seen as compatible with the reduction 
of poverty in the long-run, for two basic reasons: (i) it will allow faster growth and (ii) 
the restructuring of production generally involves an increase in the relative price of 
tradeables. In many cases, particularly in Africa and Asia, agricultural exports are 
produced by the rural poor, who hence benefit.
In the short-run, it was argued that deregulation and liberalisation can also help the poor. 
In particular, raising farm gate prices to world levels, besides reducing a source of 
allocative inefficiency in the incentive structure, helps the poor producers of the goods. 
This has been documented in Malawi (maize) and Nigeria (cocoa) for example. Even then, 
however, there may be losers amongst the very worst off. Farmers who are net consumers 
of food often comprise the poorest rural stratum, and they stand to lose from price 
liberalisation. This points to the need for very careful targeting of social expenditure and 
transfers, even in the areas where adjustment might have been expected to aid the poor 
immediately.
But, as the Report readily concedes, there are still grounds for serious concern with the 
short and medium runs, for at least two reasons. First, following expenditure-switching 
policies, industries and markets take time to respond to permanent changes in relative 
prices (so that, essentially, the shift of labour and capital from the previously protected 
nontradeables to the tradeables sector is a slow and possibly difficult process). 
Unemployment and informal sector employment may grow as a result, and wages in both 
sectors may fall. Second, the expenditure reduction policies threaten social programmes,
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such as expenditure on health, education or basic infrastructure, which are essential to 
provide the poor with income earning opportunities. And it also threatens expenditure 
aimed directly at supplementing the income of the poor, such as food subsidies and/or 
direct transfers.
Their policy recommendations for dealing with these problems were based on the three 
following basic points:
(i) Cushioning the fall in consumption for the poorest. Macroeconomically, this could be 
achieved by allowing for a "pause” in investment, provided the basis for its recovery exist.
(ii) "Maintaining physical and human capital", by keeping programmes on human and 
basic infrastructure going.31
(iii) "Preparing the way for a recovery in investment".
Finally, the merits of raising transfer levels during adjustment were discussed. Even if 
social programmes are maintained and rural incomes rise as a result of farm produce price 
liberalisation, it is likely that the overall reduction in expenditure and hence in economic 
activity will harm the poorest people in society. The Report argued that the principal 
channel for that is the reduction in demand for labour, and that this is likely to be 
particularly severe in the cities, where industry could suffer both in the short-run and as 
a result of permanent changes in the incentive structure. Hence, there may be a case for 
an increase in transfers. This can take three forms: subsidies, public employment schemes 
and compensation for laid-off workers.
Although the general emphasis throughout the Report is on means to increase 'primary 
claims', rather than on providing transfers, some interesting evidence is presented in 
support of employment schemes which, having very low wages, embody a self-selection 
mechanism. Examples of where these schemes also contributed to labour intensive projects 
to upgrade local infrastructure include ESF in Bolivia and PAMSCAD in Ghana. But 
design must be very careful, in particular as regards targeting. Bolivia's ESF, because it 
paid market wages, was assessed to have no more than half of its workers drawn from the
31 Indonesia and Chile were cited as examples of adjustment experiences in which 
reductions of public deficits were achieved without compromising expenditure on basic 
social programmes.
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bottom 40% of the income distribution. In contrast, Chile's programme was thought to 
have 2/3 of its workers coming from the poorest 20% of society in 1986/7. Given a very 
tight public budget constraint, the question of targeting is central not only to employment 
schemes, but to any government expenditure aimed at relieving hardship for the very poor.
Although the WDR is not rigorous on the incidence of the inflation tax, simply stating 
that: "The 'inflation tax' is probably much more regressive than traditional tax 
instruments", systematic analysis of the evidence for particular countries has been done 
at the Bank or in Bank sponsored studies. "Peru: Policies to Stop Hyperinflation and 
Initiate Economic Recovery" (World Bank, 1989a) is an example of an internal Country 
Study that does this and Gil Diaz (1987) presented, in a World Bank sponsored 
publication, estimates of the incidence of that 'tax’ in Mexico.
All in all, the Bank's contribution to the analysis of the distributional consequences of 
adjustment was not particularly original. Until 1987, it mostly provided useful empirical 
evidence. This was of two distinct types: case study material from tracing the effects of 
its own SAL programmes in countries like Chile, Ivory Coast, Jamaica, Thailand and 
Turkey; and detailed household survey data in a different but overlapping set of countries, 
which were the object of LSMS studies. After 1987, responding to works sponsored by 
UNICEF and by themselves, the Bank focused more closely on the impacts of the policies 
on the poor, and the dedication of the WDR (1990) to Poverty epitomized that concern.
71 Conclusions.
In this chapter, I have examined five important analytical themes relating to international 
debt and structural adjustment during the 1980s, and reviewed the World Bank's views on 
them. In so doing, I have tried to form an assessment of the importance and originality 
of these views in light of the wider debate. Whereas it appears that the Bank was not 
particularly original in its approach to the debt crisis, it did play an important leadership 
role in the design of structural adjustment programmes.
Regarding the debt crisis, three main conclusions can be drawn from our discussion. First, 
it appears that the Bank's attitude towards the rapid growth in the level of the external 
obligations of many developing countries in the late 1970s was misguided. Their view that
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deficits implied resource transfers, while definitionally correct, neglected that repayments 
meant that these transfers would in future be reversed, and that whether this was on the 
whole advantageous depended on what was done to the resources in the meantime. It 
effectively constituted an endorsement of the high borrowing strategy which led so many 
countries to be viewed as financial pariahs in the 1980s. Furthermore, the Bank's views 
on the wisdom of borrowing and using the borrowed funds to smooth absorption 
(consumption as well as investment) suffered quite a change sometime around 1982-83.
Second, from 1982 to their Conference on Debt in 1984 and the advent of the Baker 
strategy in March 1985, the Bank was unoriginal in terms of proposing solutions to what 
had by then become the greatest immediate obstruction to a resumption of growth and 
development in a large number of countries. It shared the concerns of most of the 
profession with insufficient levels of lending, due to free-riding in a multi-lender 
framework, and with the short-term nature of most rescheduling deals.
Finally, from 1985 to around 1988, there was a further worsening of the Bank's record as 
a follower of the debate. This was a time when the balance of academic opinion was 
changing towards recognizing the necessity of some debt relief, or forgiveness. This was 
influenced by Dombusch's (1985) suggestion that the crisis did, in a sense, reflect a 
solvency problem, and even more so by Sachs (1986), which contained an early discussion 
of the debt overhang hypothesis. As we have seen, very senior officers at the Bank were 
quite prepared to recognise, at the 1989 Conference, that the institution had been 
constrained to the role of supporting the Baker strategy at a time when it was becoming 
clear to the informed public that debt reduction was an urgent necessity. As Stanley 
Fischer admitted from the Bank:
"...academic research, writing and opinion have been far more influential on the 
debt issue than the academics may believe, or than officials like to pretend, for the 
academics are unencumbered by the official need to support the official strategy. 
It was academics who were first to point out that the stabilization focus of the 
programs imposed on debtors to deal with the debt crisis from 1982 to 1985, while 
necessary, was not sufficient for growth." (Fischer, op.cit, in Diwan and Husain, 
1989).
As for structural adjustment, the Bank's contribution was different in three different areas.
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On stabilization policies, the Bank concurred with the general advice: a real devaluation 
was required to bring about expenditure switching from non-tradeables to tradeables, and 
a fiscal contraction was needed to bring about the expenditure reduction required by the 
reduction in external transfers to the countries. But until 1982/3, the Bank maintained 
predictions about availability of voluntary capital flows to developing countries which in 
the event turned out to be wildly optimistic. Because of this, it advised a 'high investment' 
mode of adjustment which in retrospect sounds somewhat farfetched.
From 1982 onwards, two things became evident: that large trade surpluses were necessary, 
so that adjustment would have to take place with developing countries exporting capital; 
and that although the comparative statics of stabilization may be simple, the dynamics of 
its implementation were not. The Bank became increasingly aware of issues of timing and 
sequencing of policies, and of the importance of political constraints and intangibles such 
as expectations and government credibility.
The area in which its contribution was most important was the design of structural 
adjustment policies aimed at increasing the efficiency of resource allocation. These were 
microeconomic reforms of the supply side, and in time came to be seen as the main 
components of the package, for which macroeconomic stabilization was essentially a pre­
requisite. Based on its experience with the implementation of various SALs, the Bank's 
advice after 1982 emphasized 'getting prices right', through a combination of trade, price 
and tax reforms, labour and capital markets liberalization, privatization and institution 
building. These became regular features of all programmes the Bank backed, and indeed 
of the general perception of what adjustment was about. The theory used was standard 
material, and even its application to policy reform in developing countries had been 
suggested earlier by Balassa et al (1971) and by Little, Scitovsky and Scott (1970). 
Nevertheless, the initiative to put these reforms into practice in the context of the 
economic overhaul required by the shocks of the 1970s and 1980s was largely taken by 
the World Bank, and the shape of reform of the supply side in many countries was heavily 
influenced by its advice.
In the field of the distributional impacts of all these policies, the Bank was not a leader. 
Despite a genuine commitment to the idea of 'human development' in the McNamara 
years, the misguided belief in continued foreign capital inflows and the absence of a clear
76
analytical understanding of the large potential for distributional effects of the policies 
already being considered caused concern with the poverty impact of adjustment to be 
rather muted in those early years. No significant improvements were made until 1987, and 
when they were, it was in response to work done elsewhere, particularly at UNICEF. The 
last three or four years of the decade did see much more attention being paid to 
distributional issues, culminating in the Poverty WDR of 1990. Separately from what was 
happening to its dominant views, though, the Bank did sponsor a major empirical initiative 
on this issue, through the Living Standards Measurement Study programme.
These concluding observations summarize a brief investigation into the intellectual history 
of a large institution at the centre of structural adjustment in the 1980s. Most of what we 
have learned is about analytical strengths and weaknesses of that institution as it faced the 
debt crisis and the process of adjustment that followed. But in doing so, I have also 
sought to gain an insight into the complexity of structural adjustment and of the myriad 
ways in which it affects the living standards of the poor. The next three chapters in this 
thesis are different in nature from this one, but they focus on one possibly important 
channel through which a revision of the role of the state, undertaken in the context of 





WEALTH DISTRIBUTION DYNAMICS WITH PUBLIC-PRIVATE CAPITAL
COMPLEMENTARITY1
Abstract: This chapter proposes a model of wealth distribution dynamics with a capital 
market imperfection and a production function where public capital is complementary to 
private capital. A unique invariant steady-state distribution is derived, with three social 
classes: subsistence workers, 'government dependent' middle-class entrepreneurs and 
'private infrastructure owning' upper-class entrepreneurs. It is shown that there is a 
minimum level of public investment below which the middle class disappears, and that 
increases in non-targeted public investment over some range lead to unambiguously less 
inequality of opportunity, as well as to greater output. This provides an additional 
rationale for an active role for the government in infrastructure, health and education 
provision, and has implications for foreign aid.




Should the state be an active player in economic development, or should governments aim 
instead for a continued reduction in the share of their expenditure to GNP? In particular, 
how will changes in the 'size' of government affect the distributions of wealth and 
income? Can public investment projects which are not targeted specifically at the poor 
nevertheless contribute to alleviating inequality and poverty?
In the 1980s, the experience of structural adjustment discussed in the last two chapters led 
a large number of developing countries to reduce government intervention and seek a 
greater role for the private sector, even in the production of goods and services which had 
previously been the preserve of the state. This tendency may have originated from the 
macroeconomic need for expenditure reduction (see Chapter 1-3), but it often evolved into 
a long-run development strategy, based on a greater role for private agents interacting 
through markets and a less active government. It was part of a rising trend of thought in 
development economics, which has been described as follows: "More recently, the 
pendulum has swung the other way with a sizeable fraction of the herd of both politicians 
and economists charging in the direction of minimalist government, privatisation, and so 
on." (Stem, 1991a; p.250).
There were substantial reductions in government expenditures in many countries, and 
because personnel and debt financing costs proved remarkably resilient, the brunt of cuts 
was borne by infrastructure, health, education and welfare spending. While 24% of Brazil's 
total government expenditure was allotted to economic services2 in 1980, only 9.3% was 
in 1992. In Mexico, the education share of expenditure fell from 18% to 13.9% over the 
same period, and health from 2.4% to 1.9%. Economic services collapsed from 31.2% to 
13.4%. In Pakistan, that share fell from 37.2% to 11.6%, and health and education shares 
fell as well. Economic services as a share of total expenditure by the Filipino government 
more than halved from 56.9% to 26.8% (World Bank, 1994).
2 Among the expenditure categories used by the IMF Government Finance Statistics 
Yearbooks and reported in the World Bank's World Development Reports, "economic 
services" is the one which most closely approximates the general concept of 
'infrastructure'.
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As policy-makers now ponder the wisdom of building upon these changes, brought about 
by structural adjustment experiences, with a development strategy more permanently based 
upon privatization and low levels of public investment, questions have been raised as to 
the impacts of this on poverty and inequality (see e.g. Comia, Jolly and Stewart, 1987, 
and Dreze and Sen, 1989). These concerns with negative impacts of government 
expenditure reduction on social welfare have often centred around short-term, Keynesian 
effects on the demand for labour, or on direct effects from changes in cash transfers or 
subsidies to the poor (see Chapter 2-6 and the WDR 1990).
Nevertheless, as suggested in Chapter 1-4, there are at least another two separate 
mechanisms through which expenditure reduction can impact upon the poor, and affect 
the distribution of income more generally. One is an effect on the set of non-marketed 
entitlements which contributes to current welfare, and the other is an impact on the rates 
of capital accumulation which will determine future welfare levels. Both can work through 
the reduction in the free-of-charge provision by the government of inputs into production, 
such as infrastructure, education, or indeed health care. This chapter investigates how 
these mechanisms work, by means of a dynamic model which suggests that this reduction 
may have damaging effects on the long-run distribution of income, even when the inputs 
are made available equally to rich and poor, and there is no targeting to the worst-off.
To understand the nature of these "public inputs" into private production, it is best to take 
a broad view of the aggregate production process. The output of private firms depends not 
only on how much labour and private capital they employ, but also on the quality of the 
environment in which they operate. Many dimensions of this environment, such as the 
legal framework; the security services; the quality of public telecommunications; the 
transport network; the average nutritional and educational quality of the labour force; or 
the reliability of the power supply are either exclusively or partly supplied by the 
government. The idea that public capital (and investment) are important determinants of 
private output (and growth) is therefore both reasonable and familiar (see Stem, 1991b for 
a discussion and Barro, 1990 for an aggregated model).
While some of the output of the public sector consists of public goods, many others are 
rivalrous and excludable in their consumption, and can thus also be supplied privately 
(e.g. education, health services, power generation, telephone services). This paper will
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focus on the effects of changes in the public provision of these services, when ability to 
purchase the private substitutes differs along the distribution of wealth. It addresses 
theoretically the question of the impact of changes in public investment on the long-run 
distribution of wealth, and is concerned in particular with the long-run effects of this 
massive redeployment of productive activity away from the public sector, in an 
environment of imperfect capital markets.
To do so it draws on the recent literature on wealth distribution dynamics in the presence 
of capital market imperfections. This was pioneered by Galor and Zeira (1993)3 and 
Banerjee and Newman (1991). Other prominent contributions were made by Aghion and 
Bolton (1993), Baneijee and Newman (1993) and Piketty (1992); a survey of the incipient 
literature was carried out by Aghion and Bolton (1992).4 These works suggest plausible 
specific causes for the persistence of wealth inequality, even in the absence of talent or 
skill differences. All of these causes are capital market failures. They establish the 
existence of (unique or multiple) steady state distributions, and generally derive 
interventionist policy implications. Usually it is the case that "by redistributing wealth 
towards the poor or the middle-class borrowers the government can improve productive 
efficiency." (Aghion and Bolton, 1993, p.34). But this purely redistributive activity is a 
remarkably simplistic view of the role of the government in development. This chapter 
suggests that more traditional activities, such as the provision of infrastructure, health and 
education, may also help to reduce long-run inequality, in addition to the well known 
microeconomic efficiency arguments for them, based on externalities and transaction costs.
The government portrayed in other papers in this literature is not involved in any 
productive activity. Its only policy option is to transfer wealth from rich to poor agents, 
and even though this is supposed to be a permanent policy, no incentive effects on 
rational recipients are considered. This picture of the government is naturally 
oversimplified, and at odds with most current views on the role of the state in the process 
of development, which encompass active participation in the production of certain goods 
and services in which, for some reason, it has a comparative advantage. These include at
3 A widely cited mimeo version dates to 1988.
4 A more detailed discussion of this literature and of how it bears on the present 
model is the subject of § 2.
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least the provision of some infrastructural services, education and health, besides pure 
public goods. The reasons why the government may have a social cost-benefit advantage 
in the supply of these particular commodities has to do with the relative importance of 
market failures (eg. externalities; natural monopolies) vis-a-vis government failures (eg. 
rent-seeking) in their markets. But they have been well studied elsewhere (see Stem, 
1991a, and his references) and need not concern us here.
In this paper, the active role of the government arises from the existence of a public 
capital input into production (g), which is complementary to private capital (k). This g is 
efficiently produced by the government and distributed free of charge, in identical 
amounts, to every household-firm in the economy. The quantity each receives at any time 
t is gg. Households can also purchase g privately through markets, albeit at a high fixed 
cost. The amount bought in this way is denoted gp for that household, and the fixed cost 
is gp. Allowing for this private alternative to the supply of some public services reflects 
a very real recent tendency in many developing countries, particularly in Latin America. 
As The Economist has reported: "In Montevideo and Mexico City, businessmen fed up 
with inefficient public telephones have embraced cellular technology. In Buenos Aires and 
Caracas, private courier systems compete vigorously with the state-run postal system. In 
Cartagena and Lima many put their faith not in the national energy system but in private 
power generators. Across Latin America, consumers and businesses have been turning to 
private suppliers for services that had long been available only from the state." (The 
Economist. 1993, p.50).
This model describes the circumstances under which this sort of competition to the public 
sector arises, and who its customers are. It also shows why a replacement of state 
provisions by private ones may increase inequality and reduce output. It explains why "the 
result generally hits the poor hardest" (The Economist. 1993, p.50). Just as some agents 
are too poor to be given credit to invest in private capital, others turn out to be 
sufficiently wealthy to invest in private capital, but still unable to buy public capital.
The remainder of this introduction summarises the basic story. Section 2 discusses some 
of the related literature. Section 3 presents the model; Section 4 describes the static 
equilibrium; Section 5 discusses the dynamics of the system and derives the steady-state 
distribution, and Section 6 performs some comparative static exercises on i t  Section 7 concludes.
1.1. The Basic Storv:
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The model described in section 3 shows how reductions in the level of public investment 
can lead to an increase in inequality, because the poor are more dependent on the 
government than the rich. It assumes a large population of risk-neutral households, 
identical in every respect except their initial wealth. These households are also production 
units, and their size is normalised to one. No pooling of households is allowed. Each 
household maximises a utility function (of consumption and bequests), and may choose 
between a risky (entrepreneurial) production function and a deterministic subsistence one.
Expected returns on the entrepreneurial production function are high enough that everyone 
would prefer to invest in it if they could. But to do so they must purchase private capital, 
and there is a fixed start up cost, without which it is impossible to produce. Capital 
markets do exist, but are imperfect: banks require collateral, on which the maximum size 
of any loan depends. This means that the poorest households are unable to gather the 
minimum amount required to invest in the risky production function. They become 
subsistence farmers and artisans. Richer people, who can buy enough private capital to 
start up, find their probability of success depending on the amount of public capital 
(infrastructure, health care, education services) available to them.
Public capital is partly provided by the government, free of charge, in identical amounts 
to all household-firms. But it is also available from markets, at a price and subject to 
another fixed start up cost. The middle-class finds that, whilst it can afford to buy private 
capital, its collateral is not large enough to buy both the minimum outlays of private 
capital and of private infrastructure. They are hence constrained to operate with the 
amount of infrastructure made available by the government, whilst their richer competitors 
can top it up with private power generators, private health insurance, private schooling, 
etc. The richest households therefore choose an optimal combination of both types of 
capital, and are able to allocate their investments more efficiently than the credit 
constrained middle-classes. As a result, they face a higher ex-ante expected rate of return.
The model is set up so that the transition process of wealth across generations is a linear 
Markov process, which means that no matter what the initial distribution of wealth was 
like, it will converge to a unique, invariant distribution in the steady state. Furthermore,
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for a plausible set of parameter values, all of the three classes described above will exist 
in that distribution. Increases in government investment will reduce the inequality of 
opportunity between the richer and the poorer entrepreneurs in that distribution, by 
reducing the disadvantage to the poorer ones from being unable to buy private 
infrastructure. It will bring the mix of inputs with which they operate closer to the optimal 
mix, and thus closer to the one employed by their richer counterparts.
Because this is an open economy, with an integrated capital market, there is an exogenous 
world interest rate. The capital account is equilibrated by net lending to or net borrowing 
from abroad, as required. But this exogenous interest rate means that, for very low levels 
of government investment, the credit-constrained entrepreneurs will face expected returns 
from investing at home which are so low, that they will prefer to lend all of their wealth 
in the open market. Hence, there will be a threshold level of public investment below 
which the middle-class disappears, and domestic investment becomes the exclusive 
preserve of the very rich, who can buy enough private infrastructure to make it worthwhile 
operating in the country. Increases in public investment from below that threshold have 
the additional effect of increasing the number of domestic entrepreneurs, by making it 
worthwhile for increasingly poorer people to invest at home.
21 A Survey of the L iterature.
This section reviews the recent literature on wealth distribution dynamics in the presence 
of capital market imperfections, following a thematic approach. Below, I comment briefly 
on two features which are common to all of the models in the literature: the causal role 
of capital market imperfections and the absence of steady state output growth. I also 
comment on some features which differ across the models, principally: the type of market 
imperfection and the specific market where it occurs; the investors' attitude to risk; the 
nature of the production set; the endo or exogeneity of aggregate variables, such as the 
interest rate and the wage rate; and finally the uniqueness or multiplicity of steady states.
As Galor and Zeira (1993) pointed out, one way of obtaining a long run persistence of 
income inequality is to assume that some people are more talented, or able, than others. 
In the simplest possible scenario, if capital markets are perfect and production sets are 





individuals. Whether lineages would have different discounted incomes would depend on 
whether ability is serially correlated or iid across generations. But virtually all 
contributions to this literature have chosen to assume that agents are identical in abilities 
and tastes, and differ only in inherited wealth. In this case, capital market imperfections 
are necessary to obtain long run persistent wealth inequality. Piketty (1992) has shown 
that in the first best case, with no capital market imperfection of any sort (in his model, 
this meant effort supply was verifiable) and a convex production set, any initial wealth 
distribution converged to a degenerate distribution.
What has differed across the various papers has been the specific nature of the capital 
market imperfection. In general, two classes can be identified: those where the 
incompleteness of contracts leads to moral hazard in repayment, and those where it leads 
to moral hazard in effort supply. The former class comprises Galor and Zeira (1993) and 
Baneijee and Newman (1993). Galor and Zeira have the lender incur some monitoring 
cost z, which then creates a cost of evasion for the borrower of Pz, p > 1. An incentive 
compatibility constraint on the borrower (d(l+i) = Pz) and a zero profit condition on the 
lender (di = dr + z) ensure that the borrowing interest rate i exceed the lending rate r.5 
This and the existence of a non-convexity in the accumulation of human capital (a fixed 
cost h) ensure that only those agents receiving a bequest above a certain level f (i, r, h, 
...) will choose to invest in acquiring the human capital (skill) required for participation 
in the 'advanced' sector. The limiting distributions depend on the initial distribution and 
on the parameter values, but some cases can be shown to yield a two spike distribution. 
Poor people stay poor because they are forced to borrow at high interest rates to acquire 
skills. It is therefore in their best interest to lend their little wealth and work at a (low) 
unskilled wage instead. Rich people stay rich as their investments generate greater wealth, 
leading to greater bequests, leading to lower borrowing at high rates, and so on.6
Baneijee and Newman (1993), on the other hand, have a collateral requirement rather than 
a higher borrowing rate keeping the poorest away from credit. This stems from the same
5 d denotes the size of the loan.
6 Not all people who initially invest in human capital see their lineages converge to 
the 'rich' equilibrium. The cut-off wealth level g exceeds f in the example that generates 
two spikes.
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moral hazard in repayment problem: loan contracts are not costlessly enforceable. But 
whereas Galor and Zeira have a price adjustment ensuring that the borrower's incentive 
compatibility constraint holds (i adjusts), this model has a fixed interest rate r. In a loan 
(L) market where default is costless, but may be detected with probability 7C, in which 
case a penalty F is imposed, and where all borrowers must leave their full wealth (w) as 
collateral, the incentive compatibility constraint is (w -L)r > -rcF, i.e L < w + 7tF/r. This 
is to say that no agent will be granted credit in excess of their collateral, augmented by 
the expected discounted penalty they would incur if caught defaulting. This quantity 
adjustment mechanism is borrowed in the model to be presented in section 3, and will be 
derived more extensively there. The upshot is similar to that in Galor and Zeira: the 
poorest individuals in society are barred from access to capital markets. Then there is a 
middle class of borrowers, followed by an upper class of agents whose wealth is sufficient 
to finance their own projects and to lend. Note that this lending in the upper tail is a 
consequence of an extreme non-convexity of production: projects are of a strictly fixed 
size. I return to the implications of this common assumption below.
The other class of models is based on moral hazard in effort supply. The simplest case 
of this is that of a continuum of risk averse agents who wish to diversify their risk by 
issuing shares in their own projects and purchasing shares in other people's. With 
correlated risk assumed away, this is the heart of Banerjee and Newman (1991). But if 
there is an effort cost e, the marginal disutility of which increases with wealth, complete 
insurance in the stock market is not an incentive compatible option, as no effort will be 
supplied by each agent, since the return to it would accrue to other shareholders. The 
contract incompleteness arises from the non-enforceability of effort, and requires a share 
P(w) of the project to be held by the entrepreneur. Because leisure is normal, p is always 
increasing in w7, and so there exists some critical wealth level above which the incentive 
compatible share of risk to be borne by the entrepreneur is so high that the utility of 
investing in the project is less than that of lending at the lower but safe rate of interest. 
Clearly, risk aversion is a pre-requisite for this story. The upshot is an ergodic distribution 
which may well (or not) include a class of pure rentiers, and must include a class of 
entrepreneurs, all of which have access to credit and are actively investing. In fact, the 
poorest agents borrow the most and put in the most effort. Their wealth tends to grow
7 p'(w) > 0 throughout.
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over generations, until they become rentiers, and it starts declining again. All lineages 
experience every wealth level over the infinite horizon, with positive probability. For the 
result that the poorest do borrow and invest, it is crucial that die utility of bequests is 
unbounded below, and that the market for loans is perfect.
Aghion and Bolton (1993) and Piketty (1992) also belong to this class of models. The 
former have the moral hazard of effort supply embodied in the probability of project 
success monotonically increasing with wealth. The rationale presented for this is that the 
larger the loan, the greater the share of the return which the entrepreneur must divide with 
his creditors, and hence the lower the incentives to put effort in. Although agents are risk- 
neutral in this model, this debt overhang performs a very similar role to Baneijee and 
Newman's (1991) risk sharing effect on effort: by lowering the share of the return accruing 
to the effort supplier, they reduce the credible effort levels and hence prevent some agents 
from obtaining any credit. The difference is that whereas Baneijee and Newman's 'effort 
as an inferior good' means the rich are insurance constrained, Aghion and Bolton's debt 
overhang is greatest for those who have to borrow most, i.e. the poor. There is therefore 
a minimum (positive) level of wealth below which all agents are credit constrained.8
Piketty, like Baneijee and Newman (1991), has risk averse agents seeking insurance 
against project risk and non-contractible effort supply. Unlike them, utility from bequests 
is bounded below. By introducing a 'limited liability' constraint, which is also used by 
Aghion and Bolton (1993) and which essentially rules out negative consumptions or 
bequests, he effectively prevents the poorest agents from being able to credibly commit 
to exert the effort level required for them to qualify to receive loans. Because Piketty 
innovates by having the first instance in this literature of a fully convex production set, 
it is no longer a question of investing or not, but of project size. We now turn to this 
issue.
8 These agents may, however, not in fact want to borrow. Regardless, the crucial point 
is that there is a continuum of poor agents with mass greater than zero which does not 
borrow to invest, and whose income comes from a subsistence activity and from lending 
their wealth at the riskless interest rate. The modelling reason for the introduction of this 
subsistence activity is to avoid collapse of the entire distribution to zero wealth with 
probability one over the infinite horizon.
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In all of the papers cited so far, with the exception of Piketty (1992), there is a most 
severe production non-convexity. Furthermore, this is of essentially the same form: 
projects are of a unique size: human capital costs h to acquire in Galor and Zeira, and 
there is only that fixed level of skill to be had; in both papers by Banerjee and Newman 
the investment project is of fixed size I9; and in Aghion and Bolton the fixed capital used 
in each project is normalised to l 10. It is intuitively easy to understand why these non­
convexities, unusual in most conventional production functions, are so common here: most 
capital market failures result in the poor being denied access to - or choosing to abstain 
from - borrowing. If their wealth levels are insufficient and they have no access to credit, 
a minimum capital outlay guarantees they will not be able to invest. Since the expected 
return on the investment project is assumed higher than the riskless return (otherwise no 
one would invest), this leads to inequality of opportunity. The investment opportunities 
faced by agents with different levels of wealth may be different. In the simplest of cases 
(Galor and Zeira), this leads to a non-ergodic two spike distribution, where the poor are 
always poor, and the rich always rich. The ergodic distributions derived by Aghion and 
Bolton, and Baneijee and Newman follow from the stochastic nature of returns to 
entrepreneurs. Their expected return is higher than the riskless return, but a fixed 
proportion of them will be unlucky at every period, thus bequeathing less than they 
received. This stochasticity provides the key mechanism for downward social mobility.
What about upward social mobility? If the poor are constrained to be lenders at the 
riskless rate, how can they ever make it up to the wealth ranges where they will be able 
to borrow and invest in high yield returns? Well, they would not unless some other 
assumptions were brought in to prevent poverty traps similar to Galor and Zeira's. In 
Aghion and Bolton (as well as in the model in section 3) this is done by allocating these 
idle lenders a sufficiently high return n to a ’subsistence activity'. In Baneijee and 
Newman (1991), they are allowed to borrow any amount at the lowest wealth, because
baneijee and Newman (1993) introduce a monitoring technology which allows for 
some entrepreneurs to hire workers. Although this leads to different scales of production, 
the monitoring technology is linear and discrete, and there still is no convex subset of the 
production set.
10 That is presented as a minimum capital outlay, but the marginal product of capital 
above k=l is zero.
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utility is unbounded below, and hence effort commitments are credible.11 In Baneijee and 
Newman (1993), it is by working for the richer entrepreneurs and earning wages that they 
accumulate sufficient wealth to make the transition to entrepreneurs, if the wage is high 
enough. For wages below a critical level, there will exist a poverty trap analogous to that 
in Galor and Zeira, even though the specific mechanisms which determine them are 
distinct.
As we can see, the production non-convexities play an important role in most of these 
stories. Piketty derives an ergodic distribution by replacing the unbounded below utility 
of bequests of Banerjee and Newman, or the wages or subsistence payments to those 
unable to invest, and allowing for a perfectly convex production set. The intuitive flavour 
of this story is one of credit constrained small business people crawling out of poverty 
over countless generations by bequeathing their offspring progressively larger wealth 
levels than they themselves started with. Upward mobility follows from successful projects 
leading to larger bequests. The wealth distribution is bounded above because of the 
normality of leisure: although the problem for poor people is that they can not commit to 
exert their optimal effort level, the rich put in less and less effort as their wealth increases. 
After a certain point, the bequests of successful agents are no longer greater than the level 
with which they themselves started.
Downward mobility follows from failed projects. The lower bound of the wealth 
distribution is zero, and poverty traps are impossible because of the convexity of the 
production set. No exogenous payments are needed to prevent them. People work for 
themselves, dragging themselves out of poverty by their intergenerational bootstraps, so 
to speak...
I now turn to the related issues of endogeneity of aggregate variables and the uniqueness 
of the invariant steady state distribution. The models can again be divided into two 
groups: those with a unique invariant steady state distribution (Baneijee and Newman, 
1991; Aghion and Bolton, 1993) and those with multiple steady states, characterised by 
permanent hysteresis, i.e: the final outcome depends on the initial conditions. These
11 Recall that here there is no loan market failure. It is an insurance moral hazard 
problem to the rich that drives the model.
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include Galor and Zeira (1993), Baneijee and Newman (1993) and Piketty (1992). It turns 
out that all of these have an endogenously determined aggregate variable: ws for Galor and 
Zeira, the wage rate for Baneijee and Newman (1993) and the interest rate for Piketty. 
Conversely, Baneijee and Newman (1991) have no endogenous aggregate variable, and 
hence a unique ergodic distribution. Aghion and Bolton have an endogenous interest rate, 
and derive a unique long run distribution, but this depends crucially on a parametric 
assumption which imposes a lower bound on the rate of capital accumulation (A3). If this 
is violated, as they point out, uniqueness would no longer attain. Formally, this is because 
endogeneity of aggregate variables which influence the transition rule for wealth may 
destroy the stationarity of the Markov process. Non-linearity in turn entails that 
uniqueness (along with global stability and other such nice properties) is not guaranteed. 
In general there will be hysteresis: by affecting the wage or interest rate, initial 
distributions generate different transition rules, and may converge to different steady 
states.
Whether the steady state distributions are unique or multiple, they are always invariant. 
In other words, the continuing intra-distributional mobility does not affect the density at 
any point on the support of the distribution. It follows rather directly from this 
observation, that this is not a literature about long term growth and distribution. Growth 
takes place only (and even then, not necessarily) in the transition to the steady state. Once 
the distribution converges to one ergodic distribution, there is no growth in per capita 
income. In fact, in the cases where there is a unique steady state distribution, it is clear 
that convergence to it will take place from initial distributions with a greater, as well as 
a smaller, mean. From a situation where economic dynamics paid no attention to intra- 
distributional mobility, and all that seemed to matter was growth of the mean, we seem 
to have reverted to the other extreme: all long run movement is around a stationary mean, 
which never grows. If we looked only at the mean, this would be no different from Solow 
(1956), except for the fact that he at least had population growth.
It is, of course, not surprising that there is no long run per capita growth in these stories: 
there is no technical progress, endogenous or exogenous. There is no population growth 
and, as with any steady state, the capital -output ratio must eventually converge to a 
constant, so that - unless the marginal product of capital is constant as a function of 
output - capital accumulation must also cease at the steady state.
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This section has focused on some of the central features of the recent literature on 
imperfect capital markets and wealth distribution dynamics. Which of these are most 
desirable, and which can be improved upon? I believe that the reliance on (capital) market 
failures to explain persistent inequality is a positive feature. Biologists and psychologists 
will probably suggest that there is evidence that the distribution of talents is non- 
degenerate. Nevertheless, in so far as credit markets are imperfect, it is important to 
highlight the implications of these imperfections for equality of opportunity and, indeed, 
for efficiency. The empirical implication would be that, while some of the observed 
inequality is due to heterogeneous abilities, some is due to market failures, and that there 
are various grounds for intervention to reduce it.
The inexistence of steady-state growth seems to be an undesirable property of these 
models. Long run growth in per capita output is now a well established stylized fact of 
development economics (see Reynolds, 1983; Chenery et al, 1986) and any theory which 
purports to call itself a theory of growth must deal with it. The obvious first step would 
seem to be to combine some of the insights of the endogenous (aggregated) growth theory 
with the distributional insights of this literature. This chapter and Chapter 5 attempt to 
make a small inroad in that direction, in the specific context of the role of public 
investment.
As regards the type of market failure, I find the diversity a positive feature of the 
literature. It is intrinsically interesting that risk averse agents with unbounded utility 
functions below and normal leisure will have the rich being credit constrained (Baneijee 
and Newman, 1991), whereas a similar effort moral hazard with a limited liability 
constraint will lead the poor to have no access to credit (Piketty, 1992). If instead agents 
are risk neutral, it is not in the insurance market that we must look for causes for 
inequality, but in the market for loans. And that these may work through a higher cost of 
borrowing (Galor and Zeira, 1993), or through a credit ceiling on poor borrowers 
(Baneijee and Newman, 1993). Or that even if repayment is enforceable and agents are 
risk neutral, debt-overhang may lead to a moral hazard of effort problem, credit 
constraining the poor (Aghion and Bolton, 1993). Personally, I find that the greatest 
empirical contribution can be made by models that result in the poor being credit 
constrained, even if they are risk neutral. This suggests a loan market failure, which could 
be either due to repayment moral hazard, as in Baneijee and Newman (1993), or to effort
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moral hazard, as in Aghion and Bolton. I believe that it is an interesting but unresolved 
empirical issue, which of the two varieties are most important in determining credit 
constraints. Therefore, on grounds mostly of simplicity, I will adopt the Baneijee and 
Newman formulation in section 3.
Let us now consider the specific issue of the interest rate. Aghion and Bolton have an 
endogenous interest rate, in which they were followed by Piketty. This endogeneity allows 
for this important aggregate variable to be 'explained' within the model, and in addition 
opens up a wealth of realistic possibilities in terms of multiple steady states. Countries 
have widely different income distributions, and my own prejudice is that it would be very 
surprising if at least some of the differences were not due to 'history', or initial conditions. 
Nevertheless, there are sometimes good theoretical reasons to keep a variable exogenous, 
even when it is quite possible to endogenise it. An endogenous interest rate determined 
by equating domestic supply to domestic demand for credit inherently implies a closed 
economy. In the context of developing economies with access to the international capital 
markets, the world interest rate, which is effectively exogenous from their individual 
viewpoint (the small country assumption being justified in the market for capital) is a very 
important variable. If we treat the riskless interest rate as endogenous, we are no longer 
able to make predictions about foreign direct investment, capital flight, or any other form 
of capital flow. I believe that, for this reason, it is justifiable to keep the interest rate 
exogenous in the analysis in section 3. As a result, the steady state distribution is unique. 
This would no longer necessarily remain the case, however, if a labour market were 
introduced along the lines of Baneijee and Newman (1993). An endogenous wage rate 
might well then give rise to hysteresis. Whilst this would add to realism, the model is 
complex enough as it is, because of the two different technologies, and I leave a labour 
market out of the analysis on grounds of simplicity.
Finally, what about the convexity of production sets? Remarkable though Piketty's 
modelling achievement is, the fact remains that most production activities do have some 
fixed cost or indivisible initial outlay. Land in agriculture, a plant in manufacturing, a 
year's fee in schooling, even the costs of some minimum inventories in informal sector 
trading, are all examples of fixed initial outlays in production. More problematic is the 
assumption that all production takes place in a unique fixed scale. What is unrealistic is 
not that a minimum outlay is required for access to production. It is that beyond that level,
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people can not have larger projects, or indeed, replicate the existing one. Aghion and 
Bolton's contention that their technology is simply an extreme version of a U-shaped cost 
curve does not answer this point, because a richer agent in their model can not replicate 
the plant next door. The fixed size is a maximum amount of entrepreneurial production 
that may be undertaken.
This I find an unrealistic property, and one with serious consequences: the rich will lend 
rather than invest more, reducing the scope for augmenting inequality. In the model in the 
next section, therefore, I combine a minimum investment size with a convex production 
subset for any scale larger than that size.
Before turning to that model, it should be mentioned that the three theoretical chapters in 
this thesis, in common with the literature discussed above, do not consider political 
interactions between agents. Governments are assumed to be of the benevolent dictator 
variety, and there is no voting or any other political economic behaviour by individual 
agents. The very interesting issues which arise when policies are the outcomes of an 
explicit political process have been the subject of a related literature, of which Persson 
and Tabellini (1994) and Alesina and Rodrik (1994) are important examples. These papers 
also derive results which link greater inequality with a decrease in efficiency, although in 
different ways. They consider growth explicitly and, in general terms, inequality leads to 
less growth because it causes the voting process to approve more redistributive policies, 
which create disincentives to effort. Glomm and Ravikumar (1992) use such a voting 
model to analyze an issue closely related to the subject of this chapter, namely a 
comparison of public and private schooling regimes, in terms of both growth and 
inequality. They also find that public education leads to less inequality, but in their model 
private education will generally bring faster growth. One important reason for that is the 
impossibility of topping up: the two regimes are seen as pure substitutes, and the 
complementarity between public and private inputs allowed below is not permitted in their 
model. While the political economy analysis of distribution and growth is a flourishing 
an interesting area, which has generated insights complementary to those of the imperfect 
capital markets literature, there is no room to survey it here. I now turn to the model.
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3) A Model of W ealth Dynamics yielding D ifferent Degrees of Dependence on 
Governm ent Investment.
I assume a continuum of risk-neutral agents with wealth distributed in [0, wf] with total 
mass one12. At any time t, their distribution function is denoted by Gt(w), which gives the 
measure of the population with wealth less than w. All projects are conducted by identical 
households of normalised size 1. Agents live for one period and have one child each. 
They seek to maximise:
U(c,b,e) = hc*b1~t  -  e W
where 0«X<1. c denotes the agent’s total consumption, b denotes his bequest and e e (0,1) 
is his effort level in production. This formulation implies the ’’warm glow" bequest motive 
(see Andreoni, 1989), as well as that leisure is additively separable from consumption and 
bequests. There is one good, which can be consumed or invested, and if invested can be 
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$nx? = (1 - a)(l -  x) f(w(t),6) = wt+1
Domestic production takes place according to the following production function:
12 wf is very, very large.
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Q(kpg , e )  = 0  i f  e  < 1 (2)
Q(fc„g„l) = H K S )  (3)
where k denotes the level of private capital used in production. This formulation requires 
an inelastic labour supply, as output is zero unless full effort is exerted. Furthermore, even 
if e = 1, there is a fixed start-up amount of k (= k) which is required for production to 
take place. If both these conditions are satisfied, returns are given by the stochastic 
production function below:
®(kfig t) = 0 with prob  1 i f  kt < k  (4)
®(kfig )  = rkt with prob q  \ ktzk
= 0 with prob 1 -q  \ ktzk
(5)
where q  = v"1 (gjk) v 7 > 0
Here, v(.) is defined over the domain [0,1], with v(.) = °° for any q ^ [0,1], For example:
gjk  = qVa 0 < a < 1
Then,
E  [*(*„£,) | kt zk] = rqk = r k ^ g a (8)
Now, let gt = ggt + gpt, where the g subscript denotes the per capita stock of public capital 
provided by the government at time t, and the subscript p denotes the amount of public 
capital purchased privately by the agent in question at time t. The government’s budget 
constraint is given by:
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gg,jdG{w)  = T„l + X, (9)
0
where Tt denotes the domestic tax revenue in period t, and Xj is the value of net transfers 
from abroad in period t, which is given exogenously. I assume that these transfers are 
made to the government, which invests the receipts in a socially efficient way in public 
capital, g.
The issue of optimal government policy in a dynamic framework such as this, with an 
explicit distribution of income, imperfect capital markets, and a public capital input into 
private production, is both complex and potentially rich. This chapter does not pursue that 
issue, assuming instead that the government is constrained to raising its domestic revenue 
by means of a constant proportional income tax, and to spending it entirely in the 
production of gg, which it then distributes uniformly and free-of-charge to all private 
citizens. Hence:
m
Tt = v dGfiv) (10)
0
where f(.) is defined in equation (33) below and denotes the income accruing to any 
individual with wealth w and random drawing 0 in time t. The optimal choice of tax rate 
x depends not only on the government objective function, but also on the transfers X, on 
the country’s total GNP, on technological parameter a and - crucially - on the distribution 
function G(w). The next chapter provides a demonstration that, for most plausible GNP 
values and distributions G(w), the choice of x that maximizes GNP at steady-state is 
positive. It also investigates some interesting properties of that optimal T*, and discusses 
some more general taxation and expenditure policies open to (a less administratively 
constrained) government.
In this chapter, however, I assume that x is fixed at some historically given level, and any 
changes in public investment are brought about by changes in the exogenous level of 
foreign transfers X. As the next chapter demonstrates, the optimal x would generally 
change in response to any change in transfers, but this issue is treated there and the above
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assumption greatly simplifies the analysis in this chapter. Furthermore, since the large 
reductions in public investment which were observed in the 1980s were generally 
precipitated by comparable cuts in net transfers from abroad, it is not merely a simplifying 
assumption. In the context of structural adjustment policies, when the pressures forcing 
governments to slash investment were the twin deficits of the budget and the balance of 
payments - both of which were exacerbated by large cuts in foreign transfers - and when 
tax policies were in a first instance frozen, this assumption is quite appropriate. Long term 
aggregate net transfers13 to all developing countries fell from U$46.5 billion in 1981 to 
U$11.5 billion in 1991, with the figures for each year between 1984 and 1988 actually 
negative. Transfers to the severely indebted middle income countries fell from U$9.0 
billion in 1981 to -U$11.0 billion in 1990, whereas severely indebted low income 
countries suffered a decline from U$6.6 billion in 1981 to -U$0.9 billion in 1990 (World 
Bank, 1991). This assumption is true to the spirit of expenditure reduction in the 1980s, 
when "debt crises and budget crunches ... led many governments to neglect their 
infrastructure." (The Economist. 1993, p.50).
Three other assumptions complete the description of the production side of the economy. 
There is a fixed cost of purchasing public capital privately (Al), so that:
gpt e [£ ,,“) gp > 0 (11)
and there is an exogenously given riskless world interest rate r, such that 1< r < raa(l-a)1'a 
(A2)14. Finally, a 'subsistence technology' is also available to all agents, and is given by
13 Long term aggregate net transfers are defined by the World Debt Tables of the 
World Bank as the sum of net resource flows on long term debt (excluding IMF) plus 
official grants (excluding technical assistance) and net direct foreign investment, minus 
interest payments on long term loans and foreign direct investment profits.
14 This may be seen as a 'domestic viability condition’ on ?, given the world interest 
rate and the domestic technological parameter a. The second inequality imposes a lower 
bound on r, above which domestic investment is always profitable, provided k and g are 
combined in their optimal proportions. The optimal k/g ratio - (l-a)/a -equates the 
marginal revenue products (MRPs) of k and g. Substituting the ratio into the expression 
for either MRP, and requiring that it be greater than r, gives A2.
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s(e) = 0 for e < 1, s(l) = n. (A3)15
Four comments about this production structure may be appropriate at this stage. First, 
effort is an argument simply to acknowledge that there is a labour input, and to be explicit 
that there is no moral hazard problem associated with its supply, which is perfectly 
inelastic at 1. Both the main and the subsistence technologies only yield positive returns 
if e = 1. Note also that this specification rules out any labour pooling. Firms have a fixed 
employment level of 1, and may vary only their capital input.
Second, there are two sources of non-convexity in the production set. These arise from 
k and gp, which are minimum requirements for capital purchases. In particular, no 
production can take place with k < k, and no private purchases of public capital can be 
smaller than gp. To rule out the trivial cases, let k, gp > 7tF/r, where n and F are defined 
below.
Third, the complementarity between k and g comes from increases in g increasing the 
probability of success - and hence the expected value - of a project employing k. This 
suggests a world where observed returns to private investment are directly proportional 
to the amounts of private capital purchased, and not to the quality of roads or telephone 
systems, but where better roads and more reliable telephones increase the chances of the 
project being viable. Think of a farmer taking produce to the market. He owns a lorry (k), 
which he drives on a road (g). His returns depend on how many vegetables he can fit in 
the lorry, but the quality of the road determines the probability that he will make it to the 
market at all. Furthermore, no road (g = 0; q = 0) means no project: he would have to eat 
his produce by himself. Clearly, to build his own, private road, he would need a large 
fixed amount (gp).
Finally, notice that g is not a public good. In fact, its consumption must be rivalrous and
15 n and r are such that:
( - J -  -  r)(* - — ) < / ! <  tk l~ag j ‘ -  rk 
1- a r 8
The first inequality rules out poverty traps, and the second ensures that the subsistence 
activity is only chosen by credit constrained people.
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excludable. gg is simply the total government revenues divided up equally amongst all the 
household-firms. The natural way to interpret g is as an entitlement, made freely available 
to residents by the state, to any good or service useful in production, which can also be 
substituted for private alternatives, albeit at a cost. gg is the right to place a child in a state 
school, the right to use state hospitals, the right to be connected to public telephones or 
the power supply, the right to use a public road.
Turning now to the capital markets, I follow Banerjee and Newman (1993) in assuming 
that, although returns to investment projects are costlessly verifiable, repayment is not 
costlessly enforceable. Borrowers whose projects fail are forgiven, but successful ones - 
who must repay - face no cost of defaulting other than a fixed penalty F - unrelated to the 
size of their loans -which they are forced to pay if they are caught having defaulted. The 
probability that a defaulter is caught is n. Since all agents are risk-neutral, this means that 
the market for loans would only lend small amounts (up to 7tF/r), unless some institutional 
arrangement could be developed to increase agent willingness to repay. One obvious such 
institutional arrangement is a collateral requirement. Loan size is maximised by requiring 
that an agent's total wealth be left as collateral for any loan. I assume that this is the case 
in what follows and that lenders pay r on any collateral left with them, upon returning it 
to the borrower after repayment of the loan. All loans take place at this riskless rate r.
An agent that borrows an amount L, having left his wealth w as collateral will repay it 
iff:
V(L) -  nF  s  V(L) -  rL + rw  (12)
where V(L) is the value of the loan to the borrower. It follows directly that individual 
borrowers face a credit ceiling which is an affine function of their wealth, and which is 
given by:
Lc = w + TtF/r (13)
41 The Static Equilibrium.
From these simple utility and production functions, and using this design of the capital 
markets, we can now turn to the static equilibrium of the model. The goal of this section
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is to arrive at a description of the payoffs of all agents in any given period of time, 
depending on their initial wealth levels. To do so, I first identify the thresholds between 
social classes into which the continuum of wealth levels divides itself (Lemma 1) and the 
range of public investment levels of interest (Lemmas 2 and 3). I then determine the 
activities undertaken in each social class (Lemma 1 and propositions 1 and 2).
Lemma 1: 3 w*, w**; 0 < w* < w**, such that a) agents with w < w* are subsistence 
lenders, and b) agents with w* < w < w** are constrained to using public capital supplied 
by the government only.
Proof: a) The minimum investment necessary to become an entrepreneur is k. Agents with 
w < R obviously need to borrow if they are to invest, but they can only borrow up to their 
credit ceilings. Hence, agents with wealth less than w* = R - JtF/r will not have access 
to the start up investment needed to become an entrepreneur. This is an incentive 
compatibility constraint. Their only alternative is then to dedicate their whole effort supply 
to the subsistence activity and lend all of their wealth at the riskless rate r.16
b) If an agent wishes to complement the stock of public capital made freely 
available to her by the government (gg) by purchasing privately supplied public capital, 
then she must make a minimum outlay of gp. But because she must also have bought R, 
without which her returns on gp will be zero with certainty, it follows that agents with 
wealth less than w** = R + gp - rcF/r will not have access to sufficient funds to purchase 
private public capital. Since gp > 0, w** > w*. ■
The next two lemmas establish the existence of a range of values of government 
investment in which one observes a coexistence of projects using only gg with those that 
use both gg and gp.
Lemma 2: 3 gg such that for gg < gg no pure public capital (supplied by the government) 
projects are undertaken.
161 rule out the case in which these poorest agents might prefer to forgo earnings from 
subsistence to enjoy leisure, by assuming that h is large enough so that:
-« )* -“ >1
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Proof: An agent's expected payoff from borrowing to purchase k > k and gp > gp and 
undertaking a project is:
n  := r k ^ ig ^ g p f1 -  r(k+gp -w)  (14)
Hence,
-  n x - ip n a i+ g p  - r  a s )
which is decreasing in k and increasing in g. If there were no non-convexities in private 
capital accumulation (i.e. k = 0), agents with wealth w < w** would choose k by setting 
(15) equal to zero, that is: by equating the expected marginal revenue product of capital 
to the outside option r. But because of the non-convexity, gg could be so low that:
f ( l -a)k~*gga < r  (16>
If that is the case, investment will still take place iff:
rP~°g£ -  r(k-w) z rw (I7)
or:
rk ^ g ga ^ r  (18)
The equality boundary of (18) determines gg, which is thus given by:
8g :=(rlf)1Iak (19>
At lower levels of government supplied public capital, expected returns to domestic 
private capital investment - in the absence of private purchases of public capital - are 
lower than those to riskless lending at the international rate (e.g. capital flight). In that 
case, projects will only be undertaken by agents with wealth greater than w = max (w**, 
w'). w' is defined by:
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w ' := k + g* -  —  (20)
p r
where g'p (gg) is given by17:
f(l -ajk~a(gg +gpa = r  (21)
It follows that if gg < gg, all observed projects would necessarily use both gg and gp. In 
other words, the middle class disappears, and any entrepreneurs belong to the upper class. 
Figure 2 below illustrates the determination of gg: the expected marginal revenue product 
of k is a decreasing function of k, but increasing with g. Its curve thus shifts to the left 
as g falls. For each level of g, there is one curve for MPk, and one for the expected 
average product of k (APk), the expression on the LHS of (18). If g were to fall below 
that for the curves drawn in figure 2, any household constrained to investing only in k 
would prefer to lend its wealth at the going riskless rate r, rather than facing the lower 
prospective returns from investing k (or more) domestically.
17 An obvious interpretation of (21) is that it determines the level of gp necessary to 
raise the expected marginal product of k (evaluated at k) to r. Strictly speaking, however, 
it is an approximation to the true condition:
k +s ' ,
The definition and discussion of variable X, in the proof of proposition 2, establish that 
the LHS of the above equation tends to the LHS of (21) from above, as w —» «>. g p as 
defined in (21) is clearly sufficient for investment to take place, and the approximation, 








Lemma 3: 3 ggs such that for gg > gg$, there is no demand for privately supplied public 
capital.
Proof: Consider kf = wf + 7tF/r. g $ is given by:
(22)
because for k/g < (l-a)/a,
—  = f ( l - a ) f c 'V  -  r  > tk '- 'a g '- '  -  r = —  (23)
dk dg
Hence, all private investment would be in private capital until k = kj. But since the richest 
agent in society has w = wf, then her credit constraint prevents her from borrowing any 
money to finance purchases of privately supplied public capital. All agents poorer than 
her would not even be able to reach the optimal private-public capital ratio, and would 
therefore invest only in k. When ggs is supplied by the government, there is therefore no
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demand for privately supplied public capital in this society, and all observed projects 
would use only gg.«
Figure 3 below illustrates the determination of gg$. The downward sloping curve denotes 
MPk, as in figure 2, and the upward sloping one denotes MPg. They always cross along 
the dotted line, which gives the value of both marginal products when the optimal input 
ratio is being used. If gg = gg$, MPk exceeds MPg for all values of k that can be afforded, 





The last two results can be summarized as follows: private and public capital are 
complementary inputs. Their respective marginal products rise with the quantity of the 
other input. For very low levels of g, therefore, the marginal product of private capital is 
so low that it becomes more profitable for capital to leave the country (lent at r) than to 
be invested domestically. Only the very rich (w > w) can afford to buy sufficient amounts 
of privately supplied public capital to make it worthwhile to invest at home. This is 
reminiscent of capital externalities of the Arrow (1962) type, and could lead to capital
104
flows from poorer to richer countries, thus illustrating the expatriation of capital from poor 
countries with abysmal infrastructures, such as exist in Africa or Eastern Europe.
On the other hand, if gg is very high, then the returns to investing in privately supplied 
public capital are lower than those to investing in private capital. The wealth level of the 
richest agent is not high enough to enable her to obtain a loan large enough to drive k/gg 
to the optimal ratio. Therefore, no one has any incentive to invest in gp.
One might claim that below gg, one is in a poor country where infrastructure, public health 
and education are so limited that minimum conditions for private investment are lacking, 
and one observes little incentive to save, capital flight and the existence of a small sector 
of large modem enterprises which build their own transport and communications network, 
as well as schools and health centres. In a world above gg$, on the other hand, one might 
be in a rich country with an active and efficient government, which provides high quality 
infrastructure, a reliable health care system and such a good standard of public education 
that no one ever finds it in their interest to go to the market place for alternative 
provision of these services. Some European countries, notably in Scandinavia in the 
1960s and 1970s, might have approximated this extreme. By and large, however, most 
countries in the world display a co-existence of government-provided infrastructure, health 
and education services with privately supplied substitutes. For this reason and because we 
are interested in the effects of public investment on equity and growth, we limit our 
attention for the moment to cases where gg e (gg, gg$). This interval was established by 
Lemmas 2 and 3 as the range of public investment outlays in which projects relying 
exclusively on government-provided public capital will coexist with projects employing 
both gg and gp. It also implies that at w = w*, there is demand for k.
We are now able to describe the social structure prevailing in this economy, according to 
the sort of economic activity undertaken at each wealth level.
Proposition 1: In general, agents with wealth w e [w*, w**) are either borrowing or 
lending entrepreneurs. The only form of public capital they use is that supplied by the 
government.
Proof: As we are considering only cases where gg > gg, it follows from inequalities (17)
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and (18) that any agent with w = w* = R - 7iF/r will borrow to invest. These are the 
poorest agents in the interval [w*, w**). As we move along the interval to higher wealth 
levels, there are four possible cases, depending on the exogenous level of gg:
CASE 1)
/’(l -o)(w* * + — )-“£ /  a r (24)
T 8
In this case, gg is high enough, so that it is profitable to invest in k for any w e  [w*, 
w**). All agents in that interval will therefore borrow the full amount to which they are 
constrained, and invest it.
CASE 2)
fKl -a)(w* *+ — y ag ‘ < r < n  1 -a)(w* * y ,g ,a (25)Ji O O
This is a marginal case: all agents in the interval invest their full wealth in k, although the 
richest portion may not borrow all they are able to. No one in the interval lends.
CASE 3)
r(l-a)(w**)"aggfl < r < r(l-a)(w* + ^ )~ °g ga (26)
Then all agents with w e (w*, w0) borrow whatever they are allowed up to (w0 - w) to 
invest in k, while the richer people with w e (w0, w**) invest w0 in a project and lend (w 
- w0) at r. w0 is given by:
= r  (27)
CASE 4)
KX -a )(w *  * — )-%a < r < H w * +  — V g /  (2*)
r 8 r 8
In this marginal case, all agents invest exactly k. Those with w e  [w*, w* + TtF/r) borrow 
w* + 7tF/r - w to invest k. Those with w e [w* + JtF/r, w**) invest k and lend any 
remainder at r.
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The fact that - in all cases - they use only gg, and not gp, follows from part (b) of the 
proof to Lemma 1. ■
Figure 4 below illustrates the four different cases. In case 1, public investment is large 
enough to make it profitable for everyone in the middle class interval to invest 
domestically. Case 2 is a borderline one, but still there are no lenders. In case 3, 
households richer than w0 will choose to lend a fraction of their wealth in the international 
capital market, although they will invest up to w0 domestically. In case 4, although the 
marginal product of k (at k) is less than r, the total expected return from investing k 
exceeds r k, so that everyone invests exactly that amount. This can be seen as a special 
version of case 3, arising from the non-convexity of the production set.
Figure 4
Case 4 Case 3 Case 2 * Case 1
w** w**+jtF/r
Proposition 2: In the relevant range of public investment (i.e. for gg > gg), there are no 
lenders with w > w**. All agents with w e [w**, ©o) are entrepreneurs, borrowing up to 
their credit constraint and investing in k, or k and gp.
Proof: The expected returns to undertaking a project using technology (8) are a 
homogeneous of degree one function of both types of capital. It follows that there is an





where the inequality is assumed in (A2).
Define gg' := max (0, ak/(l-a) - gp), a positive value of which can be interpreted as the 
level of government capital outlays which would enable an agent with w = w** to reach 
the optimal k/g ratio. Define ws := gp/a + (l-a)gg/a - 7tF/r, which should be interpreted as 
the wealth level at which - using the exogenous gg and gp - the agent is able to buy 
enough k to reach the optimal input ratio (see equation (32) below). Also, let X = k/(k+gp) 
be the share of the loan used to purchase private capital k. With wealth above w**, two 
cases can arise, depending again on the exogenous level of gg and value of gp.
CASE 1) gg < gg'. (Since we are assuming that gg e (gg, ggs), this case can only arise if 
gg' > gg.) This case implies that:
and that ws < w**. dTUdk and 3ll/3g are functions of the ratio (k/g) only, because of the 
homogeneity property. It is evident that for k/g greater than the optimal, 3II/3g will be 
greater than the expression in (30) above, whereas 3ll/3k will be smaller. So in this case 
3ll/3g (k, gg+ gp) > raa(l-a)Ia > 3ll/3k (k, gg+ gp). That it is still worthwhile to purchase 
k is assured by the fact that gg> gg (see Lemma 2). Then at w**, X < 1, as a share of the 
loan is spent to purchase gp, so as to bring k/g closer to its optimal value. (Clearly, if it 
was worth buying k when gg = gg, it must be even more so with gg = gg + gp.) As wealth 
increases, X eventually tends towards 1-a (lim *,.^ = 1-a), while k/g is constant at (l-a)/a.
k > 1 - a (31)
a
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CASE 2) gg > gg'. This can only make investing more attractive than in case 1. Since in 
that case all agents with w > w** invested their full wealth domestically, they will also 
do so in this case. But now, at w** the marginal revenue product of k exceeds that of g 
(evaluated at the appropriate minimum purchase quantities: k, gg+ gp), so X = 1 and 
ws > w**. The definition of ws is such th a t:
” s-SP+*Flr m l - a  (32)
Sg + BP a
For w < ws, 0n/3g (k, gg+ gp) < 3n/3k (k, gg+ gp), so that agents prefer to invest in k.18 
This changes at w = ws, when (32) holds. For w > ws, X < 1 and dX/dw < 0, with 
lin^^X  = 1-a, as in case 1. Also, for w > ws, the k/g ratio is always at its optimal value, 
given by (29).
Hence, for any of the cases in proposition 2, agents wealthier than w** will borrow up 
to their credit constraint and invest fully in the domestic project. They will buy gp as soon 
as it is profitable to do so, which depends on the level of gg, and keep the optimal k/g 
ratio from the earliest opportunity. There will be no lenders in this wealth interval. ■
On the basis of lemma 1 and the two foregoing propositions, we can completely describe 
the pre-tax payoffs of agents as a function of their initial wealth levels. Naturally, these 
will depend on which case of proposition 1 happens to hold (which essentially depends 
on the exogenous gg). The flavour in all cases is similar, however, and I now limit 
consideration to case 1, for simplicity:
18 The non-convexities can create problems again. A very large gp drives g'^ down. A 
situation could arise where, although 3ll/3k > 3ll/3g when gp is purchased, rk'agga < r 
when it is not purchased. In that case marginal considerations are clearly not a guide to 
agents' optimal behaviour, and gp will be purchased. That this is better than lending abroad 
follows from the fact that II(w) > rw, V w e [w**, ®o) with a lower gg in case 1, when gp 
was purchased.
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Agents with receive with probability
w e [0, w*) n + rw 1




w e  [w**, °°) tXw + (r X - r) JtF/r q
0 1-q
These describe the three classes: subsistence workers, middle-class entrepreneurs who 
must rely on the government for their g, and the unconstrained upper class.
51 The Transitional Dynamics and the Steady State D istribution.
The utility formulation in (1) implies that a fixed fraction 1-a of net wealth at life-end is 
left as a bequest. Therefore we can identify the intergenerational dynamics for each 
dynasty precisely, in the following manner. If 0 e  {0,1} is defined as the random variable 
that indicates success for a project (0=1 with probability q; 0 = 0 with probability 1-q)19, 
and if it is clear that wt indicates initial wealth at the beginning of period t, we can write:
Different values for the parameters will generate different graphs for (33), but the 
parametric restriction in footnote 15 ensures that at least the two first classes are always
19 Since q, = v'1 (g/k)t, 0t is not i.i.d.. But - because (g/k)t is a function of the current 
value wt alone, and not of wt.j, V j * 0 - 0t is independently distributed over time. The 
same is true of \  = k^lq + gpt). This share of the loan used to buy k depends only on wt 
and on time-invariant parameters rc, F and r, but not on any previous value of w.
This implies that Pr (wt+1 e  A / wt, wtl, ..., w0) = Pr (wt+1 e  A / w j, which allows us to 
define the Markov process of the wealth variable in the unidimensional state space W, as 
in the proof of proposition 3 below.
(33)
where, of course, f (wt, 0<) = n + rwt i f  wt e [0, w*) 
i f  wt e [w*, w**)
i f  Wt G [W **, oo).
0t[ rwt + (f - r) k F /t]
0^^ rwt + (r Xt - r) 7tF/r]
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present. If parameter values are such that, in addition:
w** < w :------------— --------- ( f X - r ) —  (34)
l - « l ( l - o)(1-t) r
also holds, then all three classes will exist in the steady state20. Figure 5 below illustrates 
a configuration of (33) compatible with case 2 of proposition 2, along with the behaviour 
of X and k/g as wealth evolves. Figure 6 does the same for case 1.
w is obtained simply from equating wt+1 (0t=l) in (33) for wt e [w**, °°), to wt. It is, in 
other words, the wealth level which generates, for a successful project, a bequest identical 
to itself. Visual inspection of the transitional diagram suffices to see that w will constitute 
in some sense the upper bound of a limiting wealth distribution. This is because any 
individual receiving w > w as a bequest will necessarily bequeath to her child less than 
she received herself, and no bequest from someone in [0, w] exceeds w. Anyone in [0, 
w*) will bequeath more than she received, but in [w*, w] there is a positive probability 
associated with either outcome. In that range, entrepreneurial success leads to upward 
social mobility, and failure leads to (a rather extreme form of) downward mobility.
Given the nature of the model outlined above, it turns out to be possible to be fairly 
specific about the long run behaviour of this stochastic dynamic system, as is shown by 
the following proposition.
Proposition 3: The stochastic process defined by equation (33) is a Markov process, with 
the property that the cross-section distribution Gt(w) converges to a unique invariant 
limiting distribution G*, from any initial distribution G0(w).
Proof: see Appendix to Chapter 3.
20 For (34) to hold, it is clearly necessary - although not sufficient - that the 
consumption share of lifetime wealth, a, be large enough so that r^ (l - a) < 1 .1 assume 
this to be the case. The intuition is that if savings are too large (a  small), fuelling growth, 
there may be no upper bound on the limiting wealth distribution. On the other hand, if 














The intuition behind the proof is as follows. We first establish that the process in (33) is 
a linear Markov process in the set of all possible wealth values. This essentially requires 
that the expected value of wt+1 given wt be the same as the expectation given the complete 
history of {wt}. Then we show that there is a wealth interval to which any lineage with 
wealth outside that interval will eventually tend. This is the interval [0, w]. This is in turn 
used to show, drawing on an established Markov Convergence Theorem, that there exists 
a unique invariant probability measure which every lineage will eventually face. Finally, 
we establish the existence of a law of large numbers which allows us to reinterpret that 
probability measure as the steady state cross section distribution G*.
This limiting distribution G* is of interest because it is essentially the steady state - or 
equilibrium - distribution of the system. Proposition 3 is quite a strong result, in that it 
establishes the existence, uniqueness and stability of such a steady state distribution. It 
also follows from the analysis that G* has a compact support in [0, w], and that w* must 
belong to this interval. If (34) holds, so will w**, so that the equilibrium wealth 
distribution in this economy contains three social classes. The poorest people are 
completely credit constrained. They can not borrow enough to acquire the minimum 
amount of private capital needed to start a project. They obtain their (deterministic) 
income from a subsistence activity and from lending their initial wealth at the ruling 
interest rate.
There is then a middle class which consists of entrepreneurs that use publicly provided 
infrastructure, government hospitals and schools, and so on. Their projects are risky, but 
their expected value is high (compared to the alternative subsistence activity). Above them 
there is a richer group, who also undertake entrepreneurial projects similar to those of the 
middle class. The difference is that the mix of public and private capital used is different. 
Whereas the middle classes are unable to borrow enough to buy privately supplied public 
capital, the rich are able to do so. Their input ratios are therefore unambiguously closer 
to (and indeed often at) the optimal one. They are therefore able to produce more 
efficiently than their credit constrained fellow citizens.
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61 Policy Im pacts on the Steady State D istribution.
In the previous section, I established that the existence of capital market imperfections 
destroys the first best result that wealth inequalities tend to disappear in the long run. In 
this model, inequality persists in the long run invariant distribution, in the same way as 
in other models in this literature. Furthermore, I showed that if the production function 
uses two complementary inputs, one of which is partially (and freely) supplied by the 
government, and which I have identified with infrastructure, health or education services, 
and if there is a fixed cost for acquiring additional amounts of this input privately, then 
the investing class can be divided into two sub groups.
In this section I establish that, over a plausible range, increasing government expenditure 
in infrastructure not only increases the aggregate wealth level in steady state,21 but also 
reduces inequality of opportunity between the middle and upper classes (Proposition 4). 
I also return to the case where gg < gg, and show that in that case there is a second effect 
through which increases in government spending can reduce inequality, and have a 
positive impact on domestic output separate from that of the foreign transfer, which arises 
through a relaxation in the credit constraint (Proposition 5).
To do so, I wish to concentrate on ex-ante inequality - inequality in the distribution of 
expected end-of-period wealth at the beginning of the period - rather than on actual 
realized wealth levels. One reason for this is to abstract from the stochastic nature of the 
production function, which was made unrealistically stark for mathematical simplicity. 
Also, the expected payoff II, defined in equation (14), and the expected rate of return n/w, 
are eminently plausible concepts for discussing equality of opportunity.
Proposition 4: Consider case 1 of proposition 2. Then, for all gg € [gg, gg']22, any increase 
in gg leads to expected income gains for all agents with wealth greater than w*, but these 
gains are proportionately larger for those with wealth w e [w*, w**) than for those with
21 Which obviously follows from the fact that any increase in government expenditure 
in this paper is assumed to be financed by an identical increase in transfers from abroad. 
The issue of taxation is addressed in more detail in the next chapter.
22 Although it is not necessarily always true that g'g > gg, it can be shown that for 
reasonable values of gp and r, this will hold.
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wealth w e  [w**, w]. That is to say, government spending helps reduce the disparity 
between the expected rates of return facing the rich - who have access to private 
infrastructure, education and health services - and poorer entrepreneurs, who are credit 
constrained.
Proof: Noting that we are still considering case 1 of proposition 1, we can use (14) to 
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Because gg e  [gg, gg'], X < 1 for all households with w e [w**, w]. This is case 1 of 
proposition 2. Since 0 < a, X < 1, the right hand side of (36) is unambiguously greater 
than the right hand side of (38) and
dlljw





Hence, an increase in gg increases the expected rate of return facing poorer entrepreneurs 
by more than the one facing richer entrepreneurs. ■
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Now, (39) implies a reduction in inequality of opportunity iff:
5| <51 (40)
But this must be true by self-selection, as agents facing II/w given by (37) can choose 
to face (35) by setting control variable X = 1. If they choose not to do so, as risk neutral 
agents, it must be because the right-hand side of (37) exceeds that of (35).
This result has therefore established that for a certain range23, increasing public provision 
of infrastructure capital reduces inequality of opportunity, as measured by the ex-ante 
expected rate of return, between poorer entrepreneurs and their richer counterparts. 
Intuitively, this is because the constant returns to scale production function has an optimal 
input ratio, which maximises expected returns for a given input expenditure. Whereas the 
richer entrepreneurs are able to choose that ratio, those who are credit constrained - and 
therefore unable to purchase extra infrastructure privately - are not. The fact that they are 
poorer, that is, leads them to face a lower expected return, thus reducing their chances of 
upward social mobility. By increasing the stock of per capita public capital available, the 
government is not only increasing wealth, but also increasing equality of opportunity.24
Conversely, by reducing public investment (cutting gg) the government will lead richer 
entrepreneurs to purchase greater quantities of the private substitute gp, so as to stay at the 
optimal production ratio. Since this is impossible for the poor, the expenditure cut 
effectively worsens the impact of the moral hazard in repayment problem. It is because 
this problem affects only the poor entrepreneurs that it increases inequality of opportunity.
23 Although the proposition is more easily proved for gg € [gg, g'g], the result would 
still hold (on average) for case 2 of proposition 2 (gg > g'g), provided ws < w.
24 An appropriate disclaimer here is that the existence of subsistence lenders with 
deterministic incomes in this model prevents us from stating that increases in gg will lead 
to increases in equality of opportunity over the entire distribution. They do not use any 
form of capital, and the increase in its stock makes both kinds of entrepreneurs richer 
relative to them. Bottom-sensitive inequality measures may therefore record an increase 
in inequality overall. This is why Proposition 4 is stated in terms of entrepreneurs only. 
The result is the more relevant the lower k. Indeed, a special case of this model, with no 
fixed costs to the acquisition of private capital (k = 0), would make Proposition 4 
applicable to the whole distribution.
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Whilst it is possible to make an unambiguous statement about the effect of extra 
government investment on equality of opportunity, it is much harder to derive analytical 
results in this model for equality of outcome (i.e. of realized wealth). This is essentially 
because we know nothing about the specific functional form of G*. The proof of 
proposition 3 establishes the existence of a unique G*, but says nothing of its shape. The 
only two categorical statements that can be made about G*, therefore, are: (1) that the 
support of the distribution increases with gg, i.e: 3w/3gg > 0. This is because, (a)25:
(1-a)?— [1 - tt(l-a)] + /Xl-afttt-r)—  , , , ,
dw  _______r_____________________________ r_ > q (41)
dX [1 -  fA (l-a)]2
(b):
X = — - —  , SO —  < 0 (42)
* + g ,  dgp
and (c): for X < 1, k / (gg + gp) = (1 - a)/ a, so 3g Jdgg < 0. Hence:
dw _ dw dX &8p 
dgg dX dgp dgg
> 0 (43)
And (2), that the Generalized Lorenz Curve associated with the steady state distribution 
prior to an increase in gg, G* (low gg), can not dominate the Generalised Lorenz Curve 
associated with the distribution after such an increase, G* (high gg). This is simply 
because the mean of the former is lower than that of the latter (see Cowell, 1995).
That is to say: ex-ante inequality (of opportunity) decreases unambiguously with public 
investment financed from transfers from abroad, at least over the interval [gg, gg']; ex-post 
inequality (of realized wealth) behaves ambiguously, but we can be certain that the 
distribution with lower public investment per capita will not have second order stochastic 
dominance over that with higher gg.
25 Since ?A(1 - a) < 1 from footnote 20, and min (rX) = r(l - a) > r from assumption
A2.
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These results reflect the central manner in which increases in government spending can 
create more equality of opportunity in countries where there already is a reasonable 
amount of public capital (i.e, gg > gg ). But as I stated in Lemma 2, for countries with an 
anaemic public sector (gg < gg), entrepreneurial activity is restricted only to the very rich, 
with everyone else consigned to subsistence work and lending at the exogenous rate. The 
impact of extra government spending in this scenario is more dramatic, and is the subject 
of the following proposition:
Proposition 5: If (i): a country has such a low level of gg that w' > w**,
a) A unit increase in gg will reduce the minimum wealth required for investment by a unit, 
thereby unambiguously increasing the number of agents involved in domestic 
entrepreneurial production;
b) This will lead to an increase in overall income additional to the increase in returns to 
those who were already investing.
Proof: a) Equation (21), which defines gp', can be written explicitly as:
(ii): a stronger version of assumption A3 holds, so that :




So (20) can be expressed directly as a function of gg:
(46)
Clearly,
dw /ldgg = -1 (47)
which proves part (a).
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b) Call w' before the increase in gg: w", and that after the increase: w"'. Then the gain in 
income from the increase is given by:
wfl
AY = f  lE(B(w)) -  (n * rw)\dw (48)
»»
because the law of large numbers is applicable to the continuum of agents in [w"', w"]26. 
This can be written out as:
w //
Ar = /  [fifc'-X+g/ - r(fe+gp - n]dw (49)
Wf"
This expression is positive by (44), because, at w'", gp = gp' and the first term within the 
brackets is equal to the first term in the left hand side of (44), by the definition of gp'. 
As wealth increases from w'" to w", the value of the bracketed expression only increases."
Intuitively, proposition 5 captures the fact that when a country has so little infrastructure 
that it is not worthwhile even for those people who can afford to buy private capital to 
invest, and only those who can afford to buy that as well as a complement of privately 
supplied public capital are in business, then increases in government spending reduce the 
amount of gp which is required to make investing at home as profitable as lending abroad. 
This in turn reduces the minimum wealth at which people find it worthwhile to invest 
(w'), thereby expanding opportunities to poorer people, and expanding domestic activity. 
These gains in output and income will occur until w' is driven down to w** (i.e. gp' is 
driven down to gp). Any further increases in gg will not lead to extra output until it 
reaches gg , because in that intermediate range, the agents which would like to invest are 
credit constrained and can not buy the necessary amounts of gp.27
71 Conclusions.
This chapter combines a capital market imperfection of the moral hazard in repayment
26 See step IV of the proof of proposition 3.
27 Note that to be sure of preventing a collapse of the limiting invariant distribution 
to a single point (a poverty trap), the assumption in the first inequality of footnote 15 
(A3), needs to be strengthened. Instead of (k - 7tF/r), write w'.
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variety with a production function where private capital is complementary to the output 
of public investment. This combination of plausible assumptions generates a unique, 
invariant steady state wealth distribution, to which the system converges from any initial 
distribution (Proposition 3). This distribution G* is non-degenerate - meaning that wealth 
inequality persists in the long-run - and a set of parameter values exists such that it will 
include three social classes. The poorest members of society (with wealth less than w*) 
are so tightly credit constrained that they are unable to afford the fixed start-up costs 
required to invest in any project. In this model, they dedicate their full effort supply to a 
subsistence activity, and lend whatever wealth they have in the open international capital 
markets (Lemma 1). Alternative stories might have been told, involving monitoring 
technologies a la Banerjee and Newman (1993), where they would have been employees 
instead of subsistence farmers. This may well be an interesting approach, but I have 
chosen to avoid the complications of an endogenous labour market in this model.
The middle class (w* < w < w**) is wealthy enough to be granted loans which enable 
them to buy the necessary amounts of private capital to invest domestically. But their 
credit ceilings prevent them from acquiring private substitutes for public infrastructure, 
health or education (Proposition 1). Only the richest class (composed by those with wealth 
greater than w**) is able to complement the free public provision of these services with 
private alternatives, should it be profitable to do so. Unlike the middle class citizens, who 
might choose to lend some of their wealth at the international rate r, the rich always prefer 
to invest at home, given that they are generally able to allocate their investment optimally 
between the two inputs, and therefore face a higher expected return to their projects 
(Proposition 2).
To concentrate on the impact of changes in public investment which are brought about by 
changes in external financing, such as in the aftermath of the debt crisis of the 1980s, I 
assumed that, although expenditure is partly financed by domestic taxes, any change in 
expenditure mirrored a change in transfers from abroad, with the tax rate x fixed. A lower 
bound in per capita levels of expenditure was derived, below which the middle class 
disappears. With minimal government expenditure on schools, hospitals, roads, 
telecommunications and the like, domestic production becomes unviable for all but the 
very rich, who can afford to build their own infrastructure (Lemma 2). These are highly 
polarised societies, with masses of poor subsistence farmers and artisans, and a small -
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highly privatised - modem sector. Increases in government investment in such an 
environment not only increase the returns to those who are already investing in the 
country, but also lead to an expansion in domestic entrepreneurial activity amongst poorer 
people, previously consigned to the subsistence sector, whose wealth was being lent in the 
global capital markets (proposition 5).
Even if public expenditure is above that lower bound, so that a middle class does exist, 
there is a range over which increases in public investment are shown to lead to an 
increase in (ex-ante) equality of opportunity among entrepreneurs (Proposition 4). If the 
subsistence sector is relatively small, this can become equivalent to greater equality of 
opportunity for the whole society. Although the stochastic nature of returns prevents us 
from being able to say much about the impact on (ex-post) equality of outcome, it is not 
possible for a distribution associated with a lower level of public investment to dominate 
(in the Generalized Lorenz Curve sense) one with higher public expenditure.
The general conclusions from this exercise are that the "pure redistribution" policy 
implications of the literature surveyed by Aghion and Bolton (1992) are too restrictive. 
In that literature, the long term consequences of transfers to the poor, in terms of effort 
supply in a rational expectations environment are not discussed. But those, as well as 
targeting and practical implementation difficulties, are the reasons why developing country 
governments find it so difficult to mn generous rich-to-poor transfer schemes.28 This 
chapter shows that 'traditional' roles of the government, such as investing in sectors with 
high transaction costs or very large positive externalities, can also act to improve both 
equity and efficiency.
In particular, it is shown that productive public investment can alleviate inequality of 
opportunity even if expenditures are uniformly distributed, rather than targeted at the poor. 
This is relevant news for countries where the administrative or political difficulties 
associated with targeting are severe. Before this conclusion can be seized upon by 
advocates of universal benefits in general, however, the issue of optimal distribution of
28 I continue to ignore, as I have throughout the paper, considerations of political 
economy. This is despite the fact that they may very well provide the most realistic and 
important explanations for this absence. These results should be seen as a benchmark for 
the case of perfectly benign and competent governments.
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gg should be addressed. What if the government is able to costlessly allocate gg in 
different amounts to different households? What allocation pattern should it choose? There 
would appear to be scope for interesting further research into this issue, and into its 
interplay with different tax rates for different activities, using this dynamic distributional 
framework. The next chapter provides a preliminary sketch.
In any case, governments should be cautious as they embark in privatisation programmes 
and search for "private sector involvement" everywhere. There are very good grounds for 
privatizing inefficient steel mills, and excellent reasons for avoiding running budget 
deficits over long periods. But if there are sectors where market failures outweigh state 
failures, so that the government has a comparative advantage in supply, and if there are 
large costs to acquiring the private substitutes, reductions to public investment in them can 
be detrimental to both long term efficiency and long term fairness and equity. Similar 
lessons apply to international agencies and bilateral donors involved in determining 
transfers from abroad to developing countries. Given that sudden reductions in these have 
often led to sharp cuts in public investment, it is necessary to take into account their 
pernicious impact upon growth and equality in the recipient countries.
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CHAPTER 4
TAXING AND SPENDING: THE GOVERNMENT IN A DYNAMIC 
MODEL OF INCOME DISTRIBUTION.
Abstract: This chapter explores some of the determinants of the optimal scale of 
government activity in a model of the type presented in chapter 3. There is a brief 
conceptual discussion of various possible government objectives and of its wider policy 
options, with both tax and expenditure as more general functions of household wealth 
levels. The formal treatment is restricted to the case of non-targeted expenditures and a 
proportional income tax, as assumed in the previous chapter. For a government seeking 
to maximize GNP per capita at steady-state, the optimal tax rate is shown to depend on 
a number of factors, including the limiting wealth distribution. Conditions are derived for 
the optimal tax rate to be positive, even in a distributionally insensitive society, and some 
of its properties are discussed. The chapter both provides support for some of the 




The previous chapter suggested a mechanism through which government spending could 
reduce inequality of opportunity in a society with three defining features: imperfect capital 
markets; stochastic returns to production; and a production function where private and 
public capital are complementary. It demonstrated that, in that framework, increases in 
public investment from very low levels could raise the number of private firms investing 
at home and consequently gross domestic product. And that even in a higher range of 
public investment levels, it unambiguously reduced the gap in expected returns between 
rich and poor entrepreneurs.
However, the description of the government - albeit more complex than in most other 
papers investigating income distribution dynamics - was still very basic, raising a number 
of questions. The purpose of this chapter is to consider the role of the government in 
greater detail, and from a public economics perspective. The discussion touches on 
government objectives, and on its choices about how to raise and how to spend revenue, 
in more general terms.
The government of Chapter 3 raised revenue solely through a proportional income tax, 
with no exemptions. It used this revenue to produce a (rivalrous in consumption) capital 
good, which it distributed uniformly across all members of society. Section 2 in this 
chapter discusses explicitly what the government's various objectives might be; what more 
general policy options might be available to it in pursuit of those objectives; and why the 
assumptions made in Chapter 3 might be reasonable in that model. It suggests some issues 
which may deserve further attention from researchers in this field.
Although government spending in Chapter 3 was financed largely by taxes, the tax rate 
was assumed constant in the analysis. Changes in the supply of public capital gg originated 
from exogenous changes in transfers from abroad. Section 3 in this paper investigates 
what can be said analytically about an optimal tax rate x*, subject to the constraints on 
the type of policies available to the government outlined in the previous chapter and in 
section 2. In particular, it establishes the condition required for this rate to be positive, 
implying a role for the government.
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In an obvious sense, these are results about the optimal size of government. Section 4 will 
discuss the determinants of T*, and how it responds to changes in various parameters of 
the model, seeking to shed some light on the factors that influence the optimal size of 
government in a model of this sort.
21 G eneral Objectives and Policy O ptions for Governm ent.
It seems appropriate to precede a discussion of what determines the optimal size of the 
government in a specific context by considering first what objectives it might be pursuing, 
and second what its policy options are. Below, I refer to a number of different theories 
of the state, and outline their implications in terms of different objective functions or 
policy approaches in the context of the model in Chapter 3. Then the general policy 
options that might be available to a government are discussed, before restricting the range 
to those considered in the remainder of the paper.
I retain the assumption that this is a benevolent dictatorship, ruling out any principal-agent 
problems between society and its office-holders. There is no voting, and there are no 
incentive issues in the conduct of governmental business. "The government", as an agent, 
has no utility or payoff function of its own. Even so, a completely benevolent government 
may choose to maximize a variety of plausible objective functions - or indeed not have 
an explicit objective function - depending on what normative approach it takes to the role 
of the state. The discussion below draws on Section 11-2 in Atkinson and Stiglitz (1980), 
without in any way seeking to be comprehensive.
Among the normative theories of the state discussed there, those associated with Nozick 
and with the Pareto criterion are distinguished by the fact that they generate at best partial 
orderings across allocations/distributions. They do not rely on social welfare functions as 
such, and both are crucially dependent on the initial state. In the current context, the 
appropriate 'initial state' to consider is the limiting distribution G*(w) to which the 
dynamic system converges, with T = 0.
Even if the benevolent dictator is sympathetic to the 'minimal state' approach associated 
with Nozick (1974), it can be argued that there would still be a role for the government 
in the framework of chapter 3. This is because, although Nozick argues that the
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government has no business redistributing assets amongst individuals, provided the process 
which generated the observed allocation was just, he did see a role for public provision 
of some basic services, such as law enforcement and defense:
"a minimal state, limited to the narrow functions of protection against force, theft, 
fraud, enforcement of contracts, and so on, is justified...” (Nozick, 1974, pix) 
This is its part in ensuring a smooth running for the process which generates the outcomes 
that it is then not supposed to alter. Interestingly, the income distribution of Chapter 3 is 
the result of a process of production, bequest choices and random shocks. Such an 
endogenous distribution is suitable to investigating roles for government which are 
compatible even with the stringent requirements of the Nozickian approach.
While defense is undeniably a public good, some elements of law enforcement may have 
rivalrous consumption. gg may well be thought of as public policing and the free legal 
services often made available by the public purse, while gp is then the fees of better, 
private lawyers, or indeed the cost of private security firms. And it certainly is not novel 
to think of security against crime, and a clear observance of property and other legal rights 
as part of 'infrastructure', or as inputs into private sector production. As Stem put it:
"We may also include as part of infrastructure what we might term social 
infrastructure... A system in which individuals behave dishonestly ... or where 
property rights are unclear may lead to a very wasteful allocation of resources in 
insuring against dishonesty... or enforcing property rights. The costs involved and 
the distortion of incentives may constitute serious impediments to growth.” (Stem, 
1991b, p. 128. See also Stem, 1991a).
Nozick would most probably not accept taxation to finance health and education 
expenditures as legitimate, but even the restrictive areas which he - following Locke - saw 
as justifying the existence of a state would be compatible with the model presented in the 
previous chapter. In this sense, our framework establishes a role for the government 
compatible with a larger set of normative approaches than the simple cash-transfer policies 
suggested by Aghion and Bolton (1993) and the literature discussed in Chapter 3-2. In 
those models, because the government is not involved in the production process itself, the 
Nozickian approach would imply the complete absence of government.
Furthermore, there is a simple parametric interpretation in this model to distinguishing
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such a restrictive view from others more favourable to the state. To do so is equivalent 
to varying the value of the parameter a in the expected returns from production equation:
E  [*(*„£,) | k t zk ]  = fq k  = f k ' - 'g *  (1)
Since g denotes the public capital input, which was defined as the aggregate of the inputs 
in the production of which the government has a social cost-benefit advantage, it follows 
that normative views which suggest that there are very few inputs that should be produced 
by the government imply a small a, whereas those which find it justifiable for the 
government to be active in a wider array of activities imply a higher value for a. As we 
shall see in Section 4 below, this will have a direct impact on the optimal tax rate, and 
hence on the size of the government, as Nozick would have expected. (See also Arrow, 
1978, on Nozick's theories.)
The Pareto criterion - which essentially approves of an intervention if it makes at least one 
person better off, but no one worse off - would also be compatible with some forms of 
government intervention in this model, although not with the proportional income tax cum 
homogeneous distribution of capital which has been assumed.1 This is because all agents 
with wealth w e [0, w*) lose out from such a policy.
It is the utilitarian approaches to social justice, however, that lend themselves best to 
formalization, as they generate complete orderings of outcomes, given by social welfare 
functions of the general form W(U), where U is the vector of utility levels of all 
individual members (indexed by i) of a given society. The Rawlsian maximin approach 
is a special case, where WR := minj (U). In the current framework, because utility 
functions are individualistic and effort supplies are inelastic and identical, a Rawlsian 
government would be indistiguishable from one pursuing full equality of outcome.2 If 
public capital g was not a necessary input; in the absence of any administrative 
constraints, and with information flowing perfectly and costlessly, their optimal policy 
would be to tax each individual i (after the returns accrue, but prior to the consumption-
1 In the general case. It will become apparent after our consideration of the optimal 
tax rate that if T (w < w*) = 0 and for some special cases of G*(w) - e.g. w < wu - some 
positive tax rates would be compatible with the Pareto criterion.
2 In the absence of those assumptions, this is not necessarily the case. See Atkinson 
and Stiglitz (1980, p.341).
128
bequest decision, as indicated by Figure 3-1) exactly as follows:
w
T(w) = M .0< ) -  f a ,A ) d G '( w )  (2)
0
where the second term in the RHS is the mean of the limiting income distribution (call 
it p). Clearly, the tax would be negative for those with incomes below the mean, and 
positive for those above. The budget constraint would balance, because :
w
f  T(w)dG’(W) = 0 (3)
0
from integrating (2), the 'integral of a sum' rule, and the fact that mean income at steady 
state is a constant.
With public capital g as a necessary input, however - as is assumed in thesis - the above 
tax-and-transfer policy, with no expenditure on producing gg would not be optimal. The 
optimal policy would be more complex, with (at least) some of the tax revenue being 
allocated to producing gg, the allocation rule of which would also be non-linear.
The Rawlsian criterion is an extreme case of a more general class of welfare functions, 
the Bergson-Samuelson class. They can be expressed in general as:
w
W * = fb (U (y))dG \w )  w
0
where y{ := f(wi5 fy) denotes the pre-tax income accruing to agent i at the end of his life, 
with f(.) defined by equation (3-33). U(y) is the individual utility level as a function of 
his or her income, and <|> is a twice differentiable function such that <t>'(U) > 0 and <|>"(U) 
< 0.
This utilitarian formulation equates social welfare with a weighted sum of individual 
utilities, where the concavity of <|>(U) means that the weights decline with income. A 
criticism often levelled at this approach is that it requires interpersonal comparability of 
individual utilities, thus relying excessively on cardinality. Since for any agent making an 
optimal consumption-bequest choice, the utility function given by equation (3-1) can be
rewritten as U(y) = my - 1, where m is a constant3, however, this problem can be 
circumvented relatively painlessly for this model. Taking a linear transformation 
U' = m*1 (U+l), (4) can be equivalently written as:
w
W**' = f4>(y)dG"(w) (5)
0
The linear transformation of the utility function respects all ordinal comparisons that might 
be made across individuals, and allows for a very simple cardinal interpretation of the 
utility function: utility is identical to income, and can be measured in money terms.
The degree of concavity of <|>(y) is a measure of how much more heavily the welfare 
function weighs the incomes of the poor than those of the rich (see e.g. Cowell, 1995).4 
Now, one of the objectives of this chapter is to show that a number of plausible situations 
exist in which the optimal size of the government - proxied by x* - is positive. Since 
taxation and expenditure policies have a vast redistributive potential, a demonstration that 
the government should be active (i.e. T* > 0) becomes increasingly harder as the concavity 
of <J)(y) is reduced. Such a demonstration for a social welfare function that places no value 
on redistribution will imply that scope for government activities can only increase if the 
government's objective function is characterized by a more concave functional form for
For this reason, I take a linear <l>(y). Without loss of generality, take <|>(y) = y. Then:
Equation (6) can be interpreted in a number of different ways. For our transformed utility
3 m := ho^I(l-a)(l'c0(l-T). The taking of x as a constant in this context is legitimate 
because, from the viewpoint of the individual maximizing his utility in steady-state, the 
tax rate is an exogenously given constant parameter. The effect of x on reducing 
disposable income is taken into explicit account in the government's maximization 
problem which determines the actual observed value of that parameter. This is done 




4 As has been demonstrated elsewhere, the limiting 'most concave' case corresponds 
to the Rawlsian welfare function.
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function U1, this case of the Bergson-Samuelson social welfare function is the Benthamite 
social welfare function: an unweighed sum of all individual utilities. In addition, because 
the linear transformation has equated utility with the monetary value of income, this social 
welfare function turns out to be identical to GNP. And finally, because of population mass 
one, this is also equivalent to mean income or GNP per capita. In the remainder of this 
chapter, I will assume that (6) is the government’s objective function. Again, by 
deliberately choosing a government objective that has no regard for equity, I am taking 
the most difficult case for the government to find a role. A relaxation of this assumption, 
by taking (5) with a strictly concave <|> instead of (6), would alter the results of the 
remainder of this paper only in the direction of increasing the scope for government 
activity.
In maximizing this objective function5, the government has a potentially vast array of 
policy options. It can raise its domestic revenues by levying lump-sum taxes, or by taxing 
income, consumption, or bequests. In principle, it could also tax investment outlays, in k 
or gp. With no migration and perfect enforcement, a lump-sum poll tax is possible in 
principle. I rule this out on the grounds that it is an unrealistic alternative, rarely observed 
in practice: "Most of the taxes actually employed by governments are not lump-sum; and 
the main role of the concept is as a standard for comparison." (Atkinson and Stiglitz, 
1980, p.28).
Taxing consumption or bequests at different rates is clearly distortionary, as is taxing 
investment outlays in public and private capital differently. Taxing consumption and 
bequests at the same rate is equivalent to taxing income, since income is exhausted 
between them at the end of the individual's life. Taxing k and gp at the same rate is 
equivalent to taxing wealth at the beginning of the period, since it is exhausted in 
investment. But this is still distortionary in the sense that it would change the threshold 
at which individuals would prefer the entrepreneurial production function to lending their 
wealth at the riskless rate r.
5 Or, as the preceding discussion suggests, any other social welfare function of the 
Bergson-Samuelson variety; or indeed in playing a role compatible with the Nozickian or 
the Paretian approaches.
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Because effort supply is assumed to be inelastic at 1, taxing income in this model is not 
distortionary, provided the marginal tax rate is everywhere less than one. With marginal 
tax rates everywhere less than one, the agent will still choose the same actions to 
maximize net income, as she would have done with no taxes. Income taxation has 
therefore no substitution effect on agent behaviour in this model. Therefore, while they 
are not lump-sum taxes in the strict sense, they can reasonably be described as quasi­
lump-sum.6 Hence, while there is a wide range of tax policy options, if lump-sum taxes 
are ruled out it turns out that taxing income is the most efficient alternative.
Even so, without specifying a functional form for T(y), this still leaves an infinite array 
of possibilities for the government. In the foregoing discussion of the optimal policy for 
a Rawlsian government where no public capital input existed, we saw one special case for 
T(y). In chapter 3 and in the remainder of this chapter, I assume that T(y) = xy, where 0 
<  X < 1 is a constant. This is a proportional income tax regime. Since T(y) = X < 1, this 
special case is a quasi-lump-sum tax. As such, in the context of this model it is an 
efficient tax policy, compatible with maximizing (6). There is no efficiency-equity trade­
off, since the objective function is distributionally insensitive (in the sense that WB would 
remain unchanged for any Pigou-Dalton transfer). Naturally, if the social welfare function 
were instead given by (5), with a concave <j>(y), such a trade-off might arise, and some 
progressive income tax policies might become preferable.
On the expenditure side, the policy options available to the government are also complex. 
In principle, the government could even seek to eliminate the capital market imperfection, 
say by institutional means which raised the default penalty F to infinity. In that case, 
moral hazard in repayment would cease to be a problem and finite credit ceilings would 
no longer exist. This would be a first-best intervention, but it is ruled out here on the 
grounds that the story we are interested in telling relies on imperfect capital markets, 
which in turn are realistic enough.
6 Atkinson and Stiglitz (1980) define lump-sum taxes as "those that do not depend on 
any action of the individual; there is no way that he can change the tax liability." (p.28). 
Clearly, an income tax in this model does depend on the individual's investment, work and 
credit market choices. However, because of the inelastic effort supply assumption, 
provided that marginal tax rates are nowhere greater than unity, they have no effect at all 
on the choices a rational agent makes, and thus act as if they were lump-sum.
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Without that option, the government could disburse its revenue in two quite different 
ways: it could make cash transfers, or produce gg. In distributing gg, it could do so freely, 
or it could charge a user fee. In case it distributed it freely, it could choose individual 
recipient levels according to any function gg(w). Any non-constant such function would 
be an example of targeting.
Three observations about the model in chapter 3 may help shed some light on the nature 
of the optimal expenditure policy. First, even if the social welfare function is 
distributionally insensitive, as is the case with (6), the general optimal expenditure policy 
would include some cash transfers. Take an individual with wealth just below w*. gg is 
useless to her. But an infinitesimally small cash transfer would have a measurable impact 
on her own income, and hence on GNP per capita. This is not the only case where cash 
transfers may be more efficient than producing public capital, but it is sufficient for the 
claim that the optimal policy would involve some cash transfers. Furthermore, if G(w**) 
is not too close to 0, it follows intuitively from proposition 5 in the last chapter, that the 
optimal policy mix will also include some gg.
Second, there is no reason in principle why an administratively unconstrained government 
should not apply standard public finance principles to the supply of gg, and charge a price 
equal to marginal cost plus any Pigouvian tax.7 With functioning markets, it is commonly 
argued that where cash transfers are possible, they are preferable to transfers in kind. In 
this case, however, the existence of non-convexities in the production set, combined with 
capital market imperfections, mean that there are situations in which a transfer in kind is 
preferable to a cash transfer. For example, one in which individual i has wealth w4 e [w*, 
w**) and her allocated transfer is less than (w**-w) in value. She would then be unable 
to purchase any feasible combination of k and gp and, if she does not receive any gg, 
would be constrained to the subsistence sector. She would have been unambiguously better 
off if she had received the value of her transfer in gg, rather than in cash.8
7 Ahmad and Stem (1989) argue that an element of indirect taxation should be added 
to public sector prices, unless there are strong distributional arguments against it. In this 
model, though, all taxation has been restricted to be income taxation, for the reasons 
outlined above.
8 Although public provision of private goods free of charge is very common in 
practice, theoretical justifications are relatively recent. In this thesis, it arises from non­
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The third observation follows from the other two: because the model in section 3 has 
heterogeneous agents in a general equilibrium setting with imperfect markets, the optimal 
policy is in general complex: it would involve some of the revenue being disbursed as 
cash transfers and some being used to produce public capital. The public capital might in 
turn be distributed through some combination of sales and gifts-in-kind.
Furthermore, the exact nature of such an optimal policy, implementable by an 
administratively and informationally unconstrained government, would depend on the 
specific form of the limiting distribution G*(w) about which, as pointed out in the last 
chapter, nothing can be said. In addition, it appears unreasonable to assume that the 
specific identification of individual needs that would underlie the implementation of such 
a policy is informationally and administratively costless. It is for these two reasons that 
I ruled out cash transfers and public sector pricing from the model in the last chapter, and 
assumed that the distribution of gg was untargeted. I will continue to do so in the 
remainder of this chapter.
Summing up the discussion so far, we have a government whose objective is to maximise 
a Benthamite social welfare function given by (6) which, because of the assumptions made 
about the specific form of the individual utility function, is equivalent to GNP per capita. 
A government that is administratively and informationally constrained, so that it is unable 
to levy lump-sum taxes, to make cash transfers, to charge for the inputs that it provides, 
or to target their distribution in any way. This government will find it efficient to raise 
domestic revenue by means of an income tax. It will disburse those revenues by 
distributing public capital uniformly to all agents. The next two sections address the 
question of the optimal scale of this taxation-distribution activity.
However, this section has shown that optimal policies would vary substantially if these 
assumptions were relaxed. This chapter and the last aim to contribute to an understanding 
of the role of the government in dynamic models of income distribution, with imperfect 
capital markets. They show that even such a severely constrained government has a role,
convexities in the sets of purchasable commodities, but there are a number of other 
reasons why it can be an optimal policy for the government. See Besley and Coate (1991) 
and Blomquist and Christiansen (1995) for alternative approaches.
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both in raising GNP - contributing to economic efficiency - and in reducing inequality (of 
opportunity) - contributing to equity.
31 The O ptim al Tax Rate X*.








and: 0 < x < 1.
The maximand (7) was defined so as to be equivalent to steady-state GNP per capita (an 
indicator of productive efficiency in the economy). To do so, the Bergson-Samuelson 
social welfare function defined in (4), which was eventually transformed into (7), was 
defined in terms of pre-tax, rather than net, incomes. Our social objective is therefore to 
maximize the total output (income) that the economy produces at steady-state, and the 
above problem consists of choosing the tax rate that will achieve this.9 The benefits of the 
tax will be captured by the effects of public capital gg on increasing expected output. To 
capture the costs of the tax, it is convenient to define cot := w/(l-x), the 'zero-tax bequest'. 
cot is what agents at time t would have received from their parents in a steady-state with 
T=0, and can therefore be treated as a constant in the choice of an optimal x. As x rises,
9 An alternative approach would have been to choose the tax rate that would maximize 
after-tax incomes. That is a different problem, which would be solved by a different tax 
rate. I have chosen the former approach because, although g does not enter the utility 
formulation in equation (1-1), in many cases it might be more appropriate to think of g 
(the quality of hospitals, roads, the postal service,...) as entering both the production and 
utility functions of private agents. That is part of the rationale implicit in the fourth 
channel for impact of adjustment on the poor (the entitlement losses from expenditure 
reduction), discussed in Chapter 1-4. A maximization of after-tax private outputs would, 
in this model, ignore any such effects. Furthermore, the chosen approach yields clearer 
interpretations for the determinants of x* (see Section 4 below).
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wt = (l-T)(Dt falls accordingly, thus capturing the cost of the tax for this generation's 
investments. Replacing G>t into (7), and using the definition of f(.) from equation (3-33), 
we can rewrite the objective function as:
w* w **
WB = f[n+r(l-T)G>(|rfG*(w)+ f  « |/(1 -*)«>,+(*-r}nFlr]dG'(w)
0 »* (9)
+ f  q '[«l(l -  t)oj( +(fX -  r)*F/r] dG *(w)
where q and q' are the probabilities of success defined in equation (3-7). Using (6) and 
the fact that mean income (i.e. GNP) is constant in steady state, (8) can be rewritten as:
£^ = *11+ X, (10)
Using the definition of q and q', (10) can be substituted into (9), so that the government's 




• f [  ----- 1 [f(l-T)«.+(r-r)K F/r]</G '(w ) (11)
^ ( l - T ) « , + n F / r J  *
l \ ( . l -*)<*,+nF/r-gp
[f(l -  x)oj,+(f -  r)nF/r - fgp\ dG '(w)
by choice of T. The trade-off is captured by the fact that T enters positively in the round 
bracketed terms in the second and third integrals, where it finances public capital which 
raises the probability of success of projects, and negatively in the square bracketed terms, 
where it reflects the reduction in initial wealth available to purchase private capital, as a 
result of previous period taxation.10
10 It is because of this taxation in the previous period that we use the ’zero-tax 
bequest' CDt, so as to account for the effect of taxation on initial values of wt = (l-T)cot.
This is a sum of bounded integrals, and a government which knew the shape of its steady- 
state wealth distribution, G*(w), should in principle be able to solve the integration and 
differentiate the resulting expression with respect to x. Then, x* = argmax WB.
Unfortunately, we do not know the shape of G*(w), so that an analytical solution to the
follow an alternative path below. Acknowledging that a specific value for x* will not be
on G*(w), for which x* is positive, meaning that the existence of a government - even one 
constrained to these policies - is efficient.
To do so, I define the individually preferred tax rate of individual i as X* argmax E 
[f(wj, 0; x)]. I will show that 32Efi/3x2 < 0, Vw, 0 < x < 1, so that 3Efj/3x (0 < x < Xj*) > 
0. These results will be used to define the restrictions on G*(w) under which X* > 0. 
Throughout the remainder of this chapter, I make the additional simplifying assumption 
that F = 0, thus eliminating the domestic credit market altogether. This can be seen as a 
limiting case of the market imperfection already described, and it does not change the 
essence of the foregoing discussion in any way, while substantially increasing tractability.
This allows us to write the expected income for a middle class agent as a function of x:
where the subscript m stands for middle class. Note that, for the middle-classes, Xj* does 
not depend on the individual's initial wealth. This is not true, however, of the upper 
entrepreneurial class. Their expected income is given by:
above maximization is not possible. Rather than simulating a special case, I choose to
attained without specifying the distribution function, I seek instead to establish conditions
(12)
Maximizing by choice of x yields:
(13)
(l-t)w  - gp
Maximizing by choice of x yields:
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t  . (tt) = a(0> (15) 
“ <o 11
A discussion of the properties of the individually preferred tax rates for both classes is the 
subject of section 4. In order to continue towards an identification of the conditions under 
which x* > 0, however, it is necessary to look a bit further at the upper class case. (13) 
is clearly a special case of (15) - when gp = 0 - which is not surprising, since what 
distinguishes the upper and the middle classes is the former's ability to purchase private 
g. The general case, however, does depend on the individual's wealth:
0xu
0C0
- = - ( ^  - £ > > ) ]  -  * > > ) ( — ] < 0  V e » 0  (16)
wV« r  )  r  V (i )
The inequality follows from the fact that at the optimal input ratio, gp(©) = a© - (l-a)gg, 
so that gp'(©) = a > a - gg(l-a)/© = gp/©, V© > 0.
This means that the tax rate that would maximize expected income for individuals richer 
than w** is a monotonically decreasing function of initial wealth. In fact, it turns out that 
(15) yields a quadratic function of © (the upward sloping portion of which occurs with 
© < 0), and the relevant root (i.e the value of © > 0 that sets Tu*(©) = 0) is given by 
© = p (see Appendix to Chapter 4). The intuition for this result is that because agents 
with wealth greater than w** are able to purchase gp, they benefit substantially less from 
the existence of a government that supplies the free substitute gg than the constrained 
middle-class agents, who would simply not be able to use the entrepreneurial production 
function in its absence. Nevertheless, the government does supply gg free of charge, so 
that upper class agents who pay less in tax than they receive in public capital still prefer 
to pay a positive rate of tax to no government at all. These agents are those with wealth 
less than the mean. Once an individual's wealth is greater than the mean, she can only be 
made worse off by a government taxing and redistributing according to our assumptions. 
Their individually preferred tax rate, subject to our constraint of no negative taxation, is 
zero.11
11 This result is analogous to that in a model presented by Atkinson and Stiglitz (1980, 
pp. 398-405), where agents differ in ability, make different choices regarding their
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Equation (16) is an important building block in the determination of the condition under 
which x* > 0. The next step is to investigate the shape of the expected income function 
E[f(w, 0; t)] when x * T *. Twice differentiating (14) with respect to x yields:
i - f  = /“[ateJVtxn +X>g/-2[(l-x)o - g f -
dx
*  2a(l-o)n[tn +Z+*JT , [a-t)®  (17)
+X+gJJa[(l-t)<o
Since (l-x)a> > gp in all cases, so as to allow for the purchase of k, the underlined terms 
in (17) imply that 32Ef/3r2 < 0, for all © > 0,0 < x < 1. This means that expected income 
for an agent with initial wealth Wj is a strictly concave function of the tax rate, with a 
global maximum at Ti*(wi). As we would expect, it follows that 3Ef/3x (0 < x < Xj*) >0, 
and that 3Ef/dx (x > Tj*) < 0. From our discussion above, and inspection of (13) and (15), 
it is apparent that xm* is the upper bound of the set of Xj*. It follows that if x > xm*, it is 
always possible to raise everybody's income by reducing the tax rate. Hence, 0 < x* <xm*.
For a given G*(w), there always exists a X* which maximizes (11). To see under which 
circumstances it is positive, note that 3 wu such that
E[f(w, 0; x*] > E[f(w, 0; 0] for w* < w < wn, (a), and
E[f(w, 0; x*] < E[f(w, 0; 0] for w > wu, (b).
Begin with the case where w** > p. In that case wu = w**; (a) then follows from the 
facts that 3Ef/3x (0 < x < xm*) > 0 and that x* < xm*. (b) follows from the fact that above 
p, even the individually preferred tax rate would be negative, if this were possible. This 
means that these richer agents have a higher expected income with x = 0 than with any 
positive x. Now, if w** < p, w** < wu < p. The argument for this relies on three facts: 
first, if the actual x is below a person's preferred tax rate, than this person is certainly
education, and where the government makes only cash transfers. Strikingly, despite this 
quite different set-up, the authors find that: "...if the representative individual were above 
the mean, he would not favour the use of income taxation. If the representative man is 
below the mean...he has a preferred tax rate that is strictly positive." (p.401).
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better off with x than with no government; second, below w**, the optimal x is certain 
to be no greater than their individually preferred rate (xm*), so they will always gain; third, 
above w**, the preferred tax rates are either zero - if w** > p - or they decline with 
wealth, reaching zero at w = p. In the latter case, some of the upper classes may still be 
better off with x = x* than with x = 0. Figure 1 illustrates the implicit determination of 
wu, for some T* in the feasible range (0, xm*).
dEf . 
W  A
w* < w < w**W = \ i
W = |X 
W = VNfj
w* < w < w**
T* T*
Figure 1: Determining wu. For a given T*, E[f(wu, 0; x*)] = E[f(wu, 0; 0)].
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Using (a) and (b) above, it follows that T* > 0 iff:
Wu w* w
/Ww,0;T*)-^w,0;O)]rfG*(w) > T*/wrfG*(w) + f[ /(v i> ,0 ;0 )-J (w ,0;x*)]rfG*(w)
w* 0 wu
(18)
The interpretation of the condition is straightforward: the LHS is the total gain in end-of- 
period income for those people who benefit from the role of the government, from the 
existence of a tax rate T*. The RHS is the loss to those people who would have preferred 
no taxation-redistribution, from the existence of such a tax. The first term in the RHS is 
the loss to the subsistence producers, who can not use any of the public capital they are 
given. The second term is the loss to the richest agents in society, who are taxed a greater 
absolute amount than they receive back in public capital.
The main reason why it should be common for (18) to hold is that the integrand of the 
term in the LHS - the total income gain for all middle class agents12 - is substantial. With 
no government, they would be constrained to the subsistence activity, whereas with gg > 
gg, they are able to enjoy the higher expected returns of the entrepreneurial sector. The 
losses in the RHS, on the other hand, do not involve such qualitative changes in the nature 
of the agents' occupations: they reflect only the payment of taxes in excess of receipts of 
public capital.
In addition, the lower w* and the higher wu, the more likely it is that (18) will hold. This 
makes intuitive sense: the smaller the group of very poor agents, who live at the margin 
of entrepreneurial production; and the group of extremely rich people, who prefer to 
purchase their own private schooling, health care and infrastructure; as compared to the 
broad section of the population, which benefits from publicly supplied capital inputs, the 
more likely it is that a benign government seeking to maximize steady-state GNP will 
have an active role.
At this stage, one might raise the objection that in the context of this very segmented 
society, our requirement that the proportional income tax be collected from all agents is
12 And possibly some upper-class ones.
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unreasonable. Surely, one could imagine a situation where the informational requirements 
for the tax department to set subsistence farmers apart from entrepreneurs is not that high. 
And perhaps exempting those with w < w* from any tax actually saves on administrative 
costs, as well as appealing to some sense of justice, since they do not benefit from the 
existence of the government. If we take these considerations on board, the perfectly linear 
income tax schedule can be replaced by a discontinuous schedule such as:
T(y) = 0 , y < n + rw*
T(y) = xy , y > n + rw*.
This would have two implications: it would change condition (18), by eliminating the first 
term on the RHS, thus increasing the set of G*(w) for which T* > 0.13 And it would make 
it easier to introduce equity considerations into this government's objectives, since it 
exempts from taxation those at the margins of society, whose credit constraints were so 
severe that they did not benefit from any government investment at all.
41 The D eterm inants of X*.
As it was impossible to solve for x* explicitly without knowing the specific form of 
G*(w), a round-about approach to defining the conditions under which our government 
would be active in the economy was adopted. Let us now suppose that G*(w) is such that 
(18) holds, and that our government has computed X* explicitly for that given steady-state 
wealth distribution. This section investigates the likely determinants of the magnitude of 
this optimal tax rate. Although our approach does not allow one to express x* explicitly 
as a function of xm* and xu*(w), it is intuitive that any factors determining the individually 
preferred tax rates should also influence the optimal tax rate in the same direction. After 
all, the individual rates were obtained so as to maximize the expected incomes of those 
who benefit from taxation, and the optimal rate is the rate which maximizes the sum of 
all incomes (under our assumptions for the Social Welfare Function).
13 At the discontinuity, this income tax schedule is no longer quasi-lump-sum. But 
because the expected income as a function of wealth is also discontinuous at w*, a 
stronger version of assumption A3 (footnote 15) in Chapter 3 can restore that property of 
the tax, by ensuring that agents' decisions to switch from the subsistence to the 
entrepreneurial sector is unaffected by taxation. (The income effect, as for any lump-sum 
tax, remains.)
I now turn to three appealing results about the determinants of the individually preferred 
tax rates, which turn out to have signs which are independent from the wealth level, and 
are suggestive of the behaviour of the optimal tax rate.
The first is that the individually preferred tax rates increase unambiguously with the 
'importance' of public capital. This is represented by technological parameter a, which is 
the exponent of public capital g, in the expected returns from production equation (1). 
Differentiating (13) and (15), we obtain:
l. = i  + *  > o  <19)
da p
and
= a ~gr  + X *g” > 0 <2°)
da <o ii
where (20) is clearly analogous to (19), and tends to it as gp tends to zero. These results 
suggest that the more important public capital is in the aggregate production function of 
the private sector, or the larger the range of inputs in which the public sector is seen as 
having a comparative advantage, the greater the government's role that private citizens will 
demand.
The second result is that individually preferred tax rates decrease with the magnitude of 
foreign transfers (X), relative to domestic output, being made to the government. Again 
from (13) and (15):
9 t"* - = a  -  1 < 0  (21)
W iO  w u )
This is also an intuitive result, in that transfers in this model really represent foreign aid, 
and can by assumption only be used to finance public sector production, so that they 
reduce the need for domestic financing of the government. This appears to be similar to 
the old argument that foreign aid is detrimental to the domestic tax effort in developing 
countries (see e.g. Mosley et al, 1987), which has more recently been sometimes referred 
to as 'moral hazard of aid’. In fact, large aid to GNP ratios (X/ji > a/(l-a)) could drive 
even Tm*, the upper bound for possible values of x*, to zero.
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While (21) may appear to support that 'moral hazard of aid' view, the original argument 
pertains to a context where governments are not optimizing, and may be dissuaded from 
welfare-enhancing taxation by free receipts of foreign savings. That is not pertinent in this 
model, where the government is optimizing by assumption. What (21) really captures is 
the best response of a benign government to receipts of aid which can only be invested 
in g: to reduce the burden of taxation on private agents, allowing them to invest more in 
private capital. In this model, any wealth which is not taxed is invested in private capital, 
so that (21) does not capture a disincentive to saving; merely a reallocation in the optimal 
investment pattern, in response to a change in relative scarcities.
In this context, therefore, potential foreign donors should pay no attention to how their aid 
affects T*. They should focus on the effect of X on GNP or - if they care about equity - 
on some version of the Social Welfare Function given by (5). While a formal analysis is 
beyond the scope of this chapter, it is clear that for countries with a high a, and possibly 
a high G(w**), foreign transfers could have very high social returns.
The third result is that the individually preferred tax rates are monotonically increasing, 
but concave functions of GNP14:
= (1 - a ) X  > Q . f V  = -2(1 - a ) X  < Q (22)
0p p2 * 0p2 |13
The analogous derivatives for xu* can be obtained from (22) by replacing X with (X + gp). 
Two points about (22) are deserving of note. First, the fact that in the absence of any 
transfers both derivatives would be zero simply follows from the fact that the middle 
classes maximize their expected income when exactly 100a% of the resources available 
to them is allocated to the government. This is because government provision is the only 
way they can obtain the public capital input. A tax rate given by (13) would ensure that 
a(p + X) is available to the government. When X goes to zero, Tm* collapses to a, and 
therefore does not vary with p. What is driving the result of a higher Tm* for higher p is 
that X is being held constant, so that a larger share of g must be financed from domestic 
sources.
14 Which, as has been noted, in this model is identical to mean income or GNP per 
capita.
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The second point is that this monotonically increasing shape of the individually preferred 
tax rates with respect to GNP is obtained for a given G*(w). Ie, it would hold if every 
income in the limiting distribution, including the thresholds w*, wu and w**, were scaled 
up in the same proportion as the mean. In the more realistic case of growth in per capita 
income changing the densities, say, to either side of wu, (22) would no longer hold and 
the very shape of the relationship may change. If growth increases the numbers of those 
who no longer rely exclusively on the state for public capital, generating a boom in 
private provision of education, health care and infrastructure, then the optimal size of the 
government may decline with mean income.
As is stated there, the model in Chapter 3 does not feature steady-state growth in per 
capita income. Further elaboration on the considerations raised in the previous paragraph 
would require a model which did display steady-state growth. The next chapter does 
provide such a model, but it is not particularly well suited for this specific issue either, 
because its assumptions also prevent changes in the composition of the population 
between those with and without access to private sector alternatives to the government. 
It attempts to shed light on some changes that arise out of a more careful characterisation 
of the intertemporal consumption path, including growth, but it does not exhaust the issues 
to be investigated, and changes in the optimal size of government as a result of changes 
in composition of the social classes must remain an issue for future research.
5) Conplugipng.
This chapter has investigated the possible roles of government in a model of income 
distribution dynamics with imperfect capital markets and a public capital input into private 
production. By discussing explicitly a variety of possible objectives the government might 
pursue, and the wide range of policy options in general available to it, I have extended 
the scope of the analysis from the preceding chapter. The main results are as follows:
I) Although in general taxation and expenditure have substantial scope for redistribution, 
this model is compatible with an active government even if society subscribes to a 
minimalist, Nozickian approach to the state, or if it chooses simply to maximize mean 
income, without explicit importance being attached to distribution. In the Nozickian case, 
this is essentially because the government plays a genuine role in the process by which
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productive outcomes are generated. In the distributionally insensitive utilitarian case, this 
is because the government contributes to overall productive efficiency, by reducing the 
importance of moral hazard in repayment problems and the subsequent credit constraints.
II) In general, with an administratively and informationally unconstrained government, the 
optimal tax and expenditure schedules T(y) and gg(w) are complex. User fees may be 
charged for some provisions of public capital, but these may co-exist with transfers-in- 
kind and cash transfers, depending on the specific circumstances.
HI) Even if we assume that the government is administratively and informationally 
constrained, and restrict its feasible tax policies to a proportional income tax and its 
expenditure side to the free-of-charge untargeted distribution of public capital in kind; and 
even if the government is unconcerned with equity, and aims simply to maximize steady- 
state GNP, even then it was shown that - provided a reasonably weak condition holds - 
the optimal tax rate x* is positive, and the government is active.
The aforementioned condition for x* to be positive is given by (18), which states simply 
that the income gains from the existence of the optimal tax - as compared to a situation 
with no government - summed across all those who benefit from it, should exceed the 
income losses from the existence of the tax, summed across all those who would have a 
higher income with x = 0.
IV) Ceteris paribus, X* is larger:
a) the larger the technological parameter a, which can be interpreted both as a measure 
of the range of productive inputs which the public sector has a social cost-benefit 
advantage in producing, and as a measure of the importance of these inputs, relative to 
private capital, in raising the expected value of private output;
b) the lower foreign transfers to the government are as a proportion of GNP;
c) the larger the ratio of population mass in the middle class - whose productivity benefits 
most from government redistribution - to the sum of those in the subsistence class and 
above wu in the upper class - who lose out from redistribution. A corollary of (c) is that 
X* is larger, ceteris paribus, the larger the minimum amount of public capital that can be 
purchased, gp.
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Chapter 3 showed that some traditional roles of the government - such as the provision 
of free education and health care services, or of access to infrastructural networks - can 
reduce inequality of opportunity, by giving poorer people access to important inputs they 
can not purchase privately. This chapter has shown that a benign government, under some 
administrative or informational constraints, will fulfil those traditional roles and have that 
'social cement' effect, even if all it cares about is efficiency. It has also argued that if the 
government did care for equity it would do more, and that if it was less policy 
constrained, it would still choose to perform some of these activities, alongside other 
options such as cash transfers.
These results add substance to the view of the public sector and to the meaning of 
governance inherent in the recent literature on income distribution dynamics with 




THE DYNAMIC IMPACT OF EXPENDITURE REDUCTION ON 
INCOME DISTRIBUTION IN A DUAL ECONOMY
Abstract: This chapter extends the analysis of Chapter 3 to a framework compatible with 
positive steady-state growth in per-capita incomes. It uses a model of the endogenous 
growth variety, but the focus is on the dualism of the economy: one group has access to 
a private technology that can be used to substitute for public investment, and the other 
does not. These groups were derived endogenously in Chapter 3, and here it is shown that 
their intertemporally optimizing behaviour can lead to ever-increasing divergence, if public 
investment falls below a certain threshold. Different modelling techniques capture a 
flavour similar to that of the previous chapter, but interesting differences arise with a more 
satisfactory characterization of the choice of intertemporal consumption path. The role of 




Chapter 1 listed five different channels through which the policies associated with 
structural adjustment might affect the distribution of income. I suggested there that 
attention had so far focused on the first three, namely relative price effects, labour market 
effects and asset price effects, but that the last two - changes in household 'unpriced' 
entitlements as a result of government expenditure reduction and long term effects on 
capital accumulation - may also play an important role. The last two chapters analyzed 
these two effects, by means of a model where a reduction in public investment had a 
negative impact on steady-state output and on the distributions of income and wealth.
Nevertheless, as was pointed out in the literature survey in Chapter 3, any model which 
generates an invariant limiting wealth distribution necessarily requires assumptions which 
rule out an important stylized fact of economic dynamics: growth in per-capita incomes. 
As Reynolds (1983) and Chenery et al (1986) - among others - have documented, a 
stagnant GNP per capita in the long run is the exception rather than the rule in actual 
economies.
The use of Markov processes as a modelling tool in the literature described in chapter 3 
is well suited to studying the dynamics of income distributions, because of the 
convergence theorems which establish the limiting probability distribution of outcomes 
facing an individual agent, and of the existence of a law of large numbers which allows 
us to reinterpret that probability distribution as a cross-section income distribution. The 
cost of this modelling device, however, is that it constrains the modeller to live in a world 
without growth. Efficiency considerations, such as can be made, are couched in terms of 
steady-state output levels, rather than growth rates. This is unhelpful for formulating 
policy advice, or indeed for understanding a world where the main indicator of medium 
to long-run country performance is the growth rate. The marriage between distribution and 
growth theories is not yet complete.
This chapter combines insights from the dynamic distributional analysis of chapter 3 with 
some simple lessons from endogenous growth theory. The focus of the analysis is still the 
role of government. More specifically, it is still the effects of a reduction in public 
investment on income distribution over time, when markets are imperfect. But this chapter
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concentrates on a more careful description of the intertemporal consumption choices of 
agents, and it is from this that growth will arise. The crucial assumption that allowed a 
model with constant returns to accumulatable factors not to generate steady-state growth 
was the 'warm-glow' bequest motive embodied in the utility function (1) of chapter 3. The 
reader will recall that for a bounded limiting distribution to exist, a parametric restriction 
had to be placed on a, the exponent of consumption in the Cobb-Douglas utility function.1 
This restriction was a lower bound on a, that is: a minimum share of income that had to 
be consumed at the end of every period. Clearly, this imposed an upper bound on savings, 
and hence on the speed of capital accumulation.
Below, I will replace the successive generations model of chapter 3 with infinitely lived 
agents maximizing an (identical) intertemporal utility function. The production functions 
available to them are expressed slightly more generally, and in a format common to the 
endogenous growth literature. They are no longer stochastic, but are otherwise closely 
analogous to those in chapter 3; they certainly have the same returns to scale properties. 
But combined with the new intertemporal preferences, they generate a simple two-sector 
endogenous growth model, suitable for investigating the consequences of an external 
shock leading to expenditure reduction, for both the overall growth rate and for equity.
The main result is that a cut in public investment - government expenditure on 
infrastructure or anything else that may enter as an input into the production process of 
household-firms - will not only reduce the economy's growth rate, but may also lead to 
increasing inequality, if some people are more dependent on the government than others. 
It extends the results of chapter 3 to a case in which saving behaviour is less ad-hoc, as 
it is based on full intertemporal optimization, satisfying the Keynes-Ramsey condition that 
agents' marginal rate of intertemporal substitution must be equal to their marginal rate of 
transformation along the optimal path. Combined with the usual endogenous growth 
assumption of constant returns to the accumulatable factors, this generates positive growth. 
This chapter establishes that growth by itself is not sufficient to eradicate inequality. In 
fact, in the presence of a market imperfection, such as the one borrowed from the previous 
chapters, it can lead to ever-increasing inequality, in a case of polarizing growth.
1 See footnote 20 in chapter 3.
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In this case, the lower growth rate of income for the government-dependent poor is due 
not only to the (exogenous) fall in the growth rate of public expenditure, but also to an 
induced effect on their optimal savings rate. The marginal product of their private capital 
is reduced, their marginal rate of transformation falls, and they therefore (rationally) 
expect to get fewer units of future consumption for any unit of current consumption that 
they give up. The cut in government expenditure on infrastructure therefore impacts both 
directly and indirectly, and has the effect of reducing the rate of accumulation of private 
capital as well.
The motivation for the inclusion of government expenditure as an input into production 
is, as before, the observed complementarity between public and private capital in 
generating output. A factory needs electricity supplied by the public sector, roads on 
which to drive the lorries that will carry its output to market, and benefits from the skills 
its workforce has learned in public schools and from the fact that workers recover from 
illness in public hospitals more rapidly than they would at home. Mines and plantations 
need railroads to take their produce to ports and cities, and some may benefit from public 
irrigation schemes. Shops and offices use public telecommunication and postal services. 
Although endogenous growth models such as Romer (1986) have not denied the 
importance of this public-private complementarity, neither have they focused explicitly on 
it, as the assumption of an aggregate capital stock, and hence aggregated investment 
decision, overlooks important issues of the role and size of the state in the development 
process.
Stem (1991b) drew attention to these issues as deserving further investigation in the study 
of the determinants of growth, and specifically suggested that: "if we go beyond the 
aggregate, however, there are two further crucial issues which arise: (v) infrastructure, and 
(vi) the allocation of output across directly productive sectors...” (Stem, 1991b, p.128). 
Barro (1990) looked at the first of these issues and sought to determine, in a long run 
context, the optimal size of public investment, as a result of the trade-off between its 
contribution to production and the inefficiencies it induced through taxation, notably on 
the returns to private investment.
In this chapter, I depart from Barro's analysis in two important respects. First, there is no 
taxation; my analysis of the optimal tax rate and size of the government, in a context with
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explicit income inequality, was contained in chapter 4. The government acts merely as a 
distributor of the net resource transfer the country receives from abroad. This is 
exogenous, and changes therein will proxy for the credit collapse which led to the debt 
crisis of the 1980s, whereby the current account deficits of many countries had to be 
sharply reduced. Second and most important, although Barro does consider the two 
technologies described below, he considers them in turn, whereas I ascribe each to a 
sector. The sector 2 technology is a pure private capital alternative to sector 1 technology. 
Barro's paper was an important contribution to thinking about the role of government in 
growth; not about its impact on the dynamics of income distribution.
This chapter draws on the previous chapters in one particularly important respect. Here 
I assume simply that there are two types of people: those who, by virtue of their wealth, 
family name, personal acquaintances, or other assets have sufficient access to capital that 
they can embark on the large projects that are required to substitute for public investment, 
and those who do not. Clearly, this assumption is a short-cut to the endogenous derivation 
of the two entrepreneurial classes of chapter 3. There, the different input ratios and rates 
of return to investment where the result of agents making optimal choices in the face of 
credit market imperfections and given their initial wealth levels. Membership of each 
sector was therefore endogenous and, furthermore, lineages moved across sectors over 
generations. That was a richer story, and the cruder assumption of fixed sector 
membership below is merely a simplification well suited to the analysis in this model.
The chapter is organized as follows. Section 2 briefly tells a two-period story, which 
brings out the main results very clearly. Then, in section 3 ,1 switch to a continuous time, 
infinite horizon framework and look at the optimal path for such an economy when there 
are no capital market imperfections (i.e. any convex combination of the two technologies 
is available to all). This provides us with a benchmark for comparison with the more 
interesting case where there are two classes, with asymmetrical access to the two 
technologies. Section 4 extends the analysis by making a more nuanced assumption about 
access to sector 2 technology, thereby deriving a more realistic distribution of growth 
rates. Section 5 concludes.
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21 The Two Period Storv.
There are two groups of agents: N household-firms2 (or consumer-producers), each of 
normalized size 1, and a benign government. All household-firms live for two periods and 
maximise:
= t/o(co0 + U f a 9) , i -  Ij2
c i -  .  i  (1)
where Ut(c) =  --------  , 0<o<l
Equation (1) implies additive separability and a zero pure rate of time preference, 
following Ramsey (1928). Subscripts denote the time period (0, 1) and superscripts the 
type of household-firm (1, 2), as defined below. Utility displays constant elasticity of 
substitution between consumption in different periods, in the standard way.3 In addition, 
I make five basic assumptions.
Al) Type 1 people have access to the (homogeneous of degree one) production function:
y, = (2)
where kj denotes the stock of private capital available at time t and gt denotes the stock 
of public infrastructural services available at time t. gt is produced by the government 
from resources it receives from a foreign transfer Xt (which must be used up in period t) 
and uniformly distributed free-of-charge to all agents in the economy.4 (2) is continuous
2 There are no restrictions on N, so that there is no substantial difference from our 
previous use of a continuum of agents. But in this simpler model, there is nothing to be 
gained from straining one's powers of abstraction by imagining such a thing as a 
'continuum' of people...
31 impose an upper bound of 1 on a, so as to rule out the "infinite agony, finite bliss" 
case. This imposes a lower bound on utility, thereby preventing low consumption levels 
from generating unreasonably large and negative values of utility, which could upset the 
generality of some of the results that follow.
4 See chapter 3 for the definition and properties of g, and chapter 4 for a discussion
of more general government policies, and the role of taxation.
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up to the first derivative. The following standard conditions are assumed to hold: Oj, 0 2, 
<E>12 > 0; On, < 0; 0>(k,0) = 0; <^(0,g) = «>; <^(0 0,g) = 0 , ^ fcO ) = 0, and ^ (k ,^ )  =
00.
A2) Type 2 people have access to production function (2), as well as:
xt = Akt A>  1 (3)
yt and xt are the quantities of an identical, homogeneous good produced by sector 1 
(technology (2)) and sector 2 (technology (3)) respectively, where the sectors differ only 
in the technology of production. I assume that these agents can choose between allocating 
all of their capital (kj to (2) or to (3), but a convex combination of both technologies is 
not feasible to any individual. This is a departure from the weaker assumptions of chapter 
3, where unconstrained (upper-class) agents could use the gg they received and top it up 
with gp. We have dealt with that more general case there, and this assumption will 
simplify the analysis below while remaining faithful to the spirit of the story.
A3) Both k and g depreciate at 100% per period. I.e., k, is equal to investment in period 
0.
A4) Iq, and g0, which are both given exogenously, are such that Alq, < ^(ko, g0).
A5) The exogenous level of gj (< g0) is such that Ak,* > <J>(k,\ gt), where kx* is given by 
m c o W ic o  = ^(k,*, g,).
(A4) and (A5) are assumptions about the exogenous path of public capital g which, as 
stated above, is given by the path of foreign transfers made to the government. The 
assumptions mean that the government-dependent technology, to which everyone has 
access, is the most productive at t=0, given initial levels of expenditure by the government 
(and the initial capital stock). But given the lower level of glt the optimal level of private 
investment in technology (2) - i.e. that which equates the marginal rate of substitution to 
its marginal rate of transformation - is less productive in that technology than if used in 
the private-capital-only technology (3).
It follows from these assumptions that type 2 people will then produce 0(1^, g0) at t=0 
and Akj at t=l. After all, if they choose to use technology (2), they will set k,2 = k,*,
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which is the investment level which then maximizes their utility. But then it will be in 
their interest to use technology (3), because of A5. Hence if they choose any kt2 ^  k,*, 
it must be because Akj2 > Ak,* > <J>(kj\ g,). Their problem is therefore to:
I t e  fr.2)1-   ^ f r ? "  -  2 (4)
1 - 0
s.t. O(ko, g0) = c02 + k^ and Ak^ = c,2.
This is a simple maximization in one variable, the choice of c0 or, equivalently, of kv 
Similarly for type 1 people, who are constrained to using the government-dependent 
production function, and thus maximise (4), with superscripts 1 instead of 2, subject to: 
^(ko» go) = ^  + W  and ^ ( kA gi) = c,1.
Proposition 1: Type 2 people invest more than type 1 people, (k,2 > kj1).
Proof: see the Appendix to Chapter 5.
Corollary 1: Consumption at period 0 is higher for type 1 people (Cq1 > c02)
This follows directly from:
cl (5)
Since k,2 > k,1, then c02 < c0!. ■
Proposition 1 captures the essence of the mechanism through which a reduction in the 
provision of public capital increases inequality persistently in the growth models of this 
chapter: by reducing the future productivity of private capital to the government-dependent 
(type 1) agents, it reduces their incentive to save and thus their growth rates. In Chapter 
3, the use of the "warm-glow" bequest motive in the utility function (equation 3-1) meant 
that a constant share (1 - a) of income was saved. Savings (i.e. bequests) were lower for 
those unable to buy privately supplied public capital because their income was lower. It 
was the difference in expected rates of return that drove the inequality result (see 
proposition 4 of Chapter 3), while saving behaviour was unaffected. Proposition 1 shows 
that when savings respond to the expected future productivity of capital, those less
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dependent on the government will - when the private technology is superior to the 
generally available one - invest more and hence grow more rapidly. As we will see in the 
infinite horizon version of the model, this effect adds persistence to the results presented 
in previous chapters.
The intuition behind the proof in the appendix can be understood from the fact that 
equation (A6) can be rewritten as:
t fW )  _ „
— — p  = ®i(*i>8i) (6)
u \ c \ )
which states the familiar Keynes-Ramsey optimality condition that the marginal rate of 
intertemporal substitution must equal the marginal rate of transformation5 along the 
optimal consumption path, for type 1 individuals. Equation (A2) in the appendix is the 
analogous condition for type 2 agents, and it can be expressed as:
O S * .  A mvisit
Since A > ^ ( k ,1, gj), following from assumption A5, the left hand side of equation (7) 
exceeds that of equation (6):
> £ ^ )  (g)
U '(c fr  U \ c l )
It follows that:
c 2 c 1
(»)
c 2 c 1 c0 c0
which just states that the unconstrained people (type 2) will in the situation depicted by 
this example, choose the steeper consumption path. They are prepared to give up a larger 
proportion of current income for the sake of higher future income, because their marginal
5 The marginal rate of transformation (MRT) differs from the more common form (1 
+ marginal product of capital) because that form is derived from an assumption of zero 
depreciation, whereas I have assumed full depreciation.
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rate of transformation is higher. The next result should therefore come as no surprise.
Proposition 2: Type 2 people consume more at period 1: ct2 > c /.
Proof:
c *  = A k* > Akj1 > ft(V »£i) = ^  (10)
where the first equality is one of the constraints from equation (4); the first inequality 
follows from proposition 1; the second inequality follows from assumption A5 and 
equation (6); and the final equality from the analogous constraint from equation (4) for 
type 1 agents. ■
Corollary 2: In a population that is heterogeneous with respect to access to a fully private 
infrastructural technology, a cut in government capital expenditure (from g0 to gj) may 
lead to an increase in income inequality.
Proof: This example was constructed so that:
yo = ®(*o>So)= (11)
But we have just proved th a t:
y? = c l > c l = y,1 (12)
Proposition 3: The welfare of type 2 people is larger than that of type 1 people:
U(c02, O  > Ufco1, C j1) .
Proof: by revealed preference. The choice set available to type 1 agents is a strict subset 
of that available to type 2 agents. If type 2 agents did not pick (c0\  q 1), when that was 
feasible, but instead their maximization led to bundle (c02, Cj2) ,  it must be the case that: 
U2(c02, Cl2) > XJl(c0\  c,1). ■
Proposition 3 merely confirms that those with greater production choice sets do better than 
those with smaller ones. Propositions 1 and 2, however, reveal the interesting possibility 
that a cut in untargeted investment by the government may increase inequality over time, 
by reducing the productivity of those who are more heavily dependent on public 
investment (type 1 people). They are less able to substitute away from government-
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provided capital-augmenting services, such as state schooling, health care, 
telecommunications and indeed all sorts of infrastructure. This is formally captured by 
Corollary 2, which summarizes the key result of the section: while type 2 agents are able 
to (at least partly) compensate for spending cuts, due to their access to a private 
production function, type 1 agents have no such protection. A reduction in (uniformly 
distributed) expenditure by the public sector can therefore negatively affect their private 
saving and investment decisions, and lead to greater inequality.
The results of this section are captured in Figure 1 below:
Figure 1: Two-period investment choices by different groups of agents.
This figure depicts the intertemporal consumption choices made by both types of agent. 
y0 = O(ko, g0) is the maximum possible consumption at t=0, in which case c, = 0. The 
maximum consumption at t=l is obtained by saving all of y0 at t=0. Along the horizontal
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axis, the distance between any c0l and y0 is equal to k,\ the savings of household i at time 
0. The intertemporal consumption possibility frontiers are thus 'flipped' production 
functions, with their origin at y0, and increasing as c0 decreases. The concave function is 
given by technology (2), with g = g1? whereas the straight line is given by the private 
production function (3).
The crucial assumption A5 is represented by the fact that y1 = d>(kj*, gj) is below the Ak 
line. Tangencies with the (identical) intertemporal indifference curves determine the 
consumption choices. Because the (absolute value of the) slope at Z exceeds that at Q, 
UXcq^ /U^c,2) > lT(c01yU'(c11). Hence c,2/c02 > CjVcq1 : the slope of OZ is greater than that 
of OQ. That is: the growth in consumption is greater for type 2 people.
31 The Continuous Time. Infinite Horizon case.
Having investigated the basic mechanisms of intertemporal choice in this two-technology 
set-up in a discrete-time, two period model, let us now turn to a continuous-time, infinite 
horizon framework, in which the main results of the paper are derived. The economy 
again consists of two groups of agents: N infinitely-lived consumer households, which are 
also perfectly competitive firms, and a benign government. Following Barro (1990), all 




where it is again convenient to assume that:
(14)
with 0 < G < 1. Households therefore differ only on the supply side, in that all households 




where the conditions in assumption A2 still hold, but type 2 households also have access 
to a private capital only technology, given by:
x,*Ak. (16)
If we assume all households are of identical size, normalized at 1 without loss of 
generality, then yt and xt6 are output per capita in sectors 1 and 2 respectively, and and 
k*t are capital-labour ratios.7 gt is the level of government expenditure at time t. Unlike 
in Barro (1990), there is no taxation of any kind in this model and the government's 
budget constraint is simply Xt = gt, which constrains it to balance the budget in every 
period. I assume that foreigners set the level of transfers X to grow at the same rate as 
yt, to enable us to confine the analysis to a comparison of steady-states. This assumption 
is analogous to the constant proportional tax rate in Barro (1990), and it means that g/y, 
is constant in steady state. A plausible rationale is that X embodies net investment flows 
into the production of yt, and these grow as the sector does, maintaining a constant rate 
of return. If we prefer to think of X as aid transfers, the g/g = y/y condition implies a 
"backing winners" policy by the donors.
The technology which is commonly available to all households is given by (15), and it 
is homogeneous of degree 1 in both inputs, as implied by the second equality. As in 
section 2, both production functions (15 and 16) are constant returns to scale in capital 
alone (although there are two types of capital in 15). This is the assumption that allows 
for positive per capita income growth in the system. It follows Romer (1986), Lucas 
(1988), Barro (1990) and much of the extensive literature on endogenous growth, which 
can be seen as an outgrowth of Arrow (1962).
6 (15) and (16) are perfectly analogous to (2) and (3) in section 2. They are rewritten 
here with subscripts attached to their specific capital-labour ratios for greater clarity in the 
maximization that follows.
7 Notice that (13) implies that there is no labour-leisure choice in the model. All 
households supply 1 unit of labour per period, as in the previous chapters. There now is 
a pure rate of time preference p, for the usual integral convergence reasons. I also assume 
that A > p > 0, so that sector 2 is viable.
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So as to obtain a benchmark for comparison, let us temporarily relax assumptions A1 and 
A2, so that all households have access to both technologies. In fact, any convex 
combination of the two technologies is available to any agent. In this case, each identical 
household chooses a fraction 0 of period t savings to invest in production using 
technology (16), and the remainder is invested in sector 1, using technology (15). 
Households therefore maximise (13), subject to:
K r & f i v y r c )  (17)
and
*,+y,-c) <18>
But this is a standard dynamic optimization problem in continuous time, with two control 
variables (ct, 0,) and two state variables (k^, kyj. Although one could use economic 
intuition to simplify it immediately, let us set up the current value Hamiltonian for the 
problem in its current form, to obtain confirmation of the intuition from the first order 
conditions:
=tt(c^+X,e,k4*x(+«(fcyPgI) -c(]
There are six first order conditions, namely:








t -  ta
lim \ijs ' pt=0 (25)
t -  <*>
Equation (21), obtained from differentiating (19) with respect to the choice variable 0t, 
states the obvious result that, since there are no barriers to capital mobility across sectors, 
the shadow prices of capital in each sector must be identical along the optimal path. This 
allows us to write:
Uf(ct) = Xt (26)
which states the usual condition that, at the margin, the value of resources allocated to 
investment must equate the loss in utility from not allocating them to consumption today. 
Equations (24) and (25) are transversality conditions, which require that the discounted 
shadow values of capital in both sectors should tend to zero in the limit.
Using (14), (21), (22), (23) and (26), we obtain the familiar Euler equations for each 
sector, with the explicit form associated with Constant Relative Risk Aversion (CRRA) 
utility functions:
- = - ( A - p )  (27)
c  a
and
(28)c o  J
Since (27) and (28) must both hold along the optimal path for this economy, it follows 
that the marginal product of capital must be the same in both sectors, as we would 
expect:
<29>
In the steady state, the overall capital stock and output both grow at the same rate as
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consumption, which is given either by (27) or (28) above. Clearly, 0 will be chosen 
identically by all households, depending on the (exogenously determined) value of g at 
time t, so as to equate those marginal products. The Inada conditions in A1 imply that 
O<0<1. Furthermore, since 0 12 > 0 and On < 0, dky/dgt > 0 along (29), so that 
30/9g < 0, as we would expect. In other words; the proportion of savings allocated to the 
government-dependent technology (1-0): (a) is always strictly positive, because 
MPky (ky = 0) is infinite, and (b) increases with g, since MPky increases with g, requiring 
a higher k to keep it equal to A, as required by optimality of intersectoral allocation.
In the absence of some asymmetry in access to the two technologies, this framework will 
clearly not generate any distributional effect over time. As suggested in chapter 3, 
inequality amongst otherwise homogeneous agents can only arise if there is some market 
imperfection. Let us then return to the case we wish to model, in which there are two 
types of household-producers, by reinstating assumptions A1 and A2.8 Type 1 agents have 
access only to production function (15), and type 2 agents have costless access to either 
(15) or (16). This means that type 1 households are constrained to investing all of their 
savings in sector 1. They therefore seek to maximize (13), subject to:
& j,= yrc,  (30)
This problem corresponds to maximising the current value Hamiltonian function given by:
H % 9X) = (31)
The Euler equation that follows from the first order conditions is identical to (28). 
Because g/g = y/y = ky/ky, g/kyt and 0,(kyt, gj) are constants. Given the assumptions made 
about the derivative signs on (15), (28) by itself implies that this sector's growth rate is 
a monotonically increasing function of g/yt.
Type 2 households, on the other hand, are those fortunate few who have access to
8 Including the ruling out of convex combinations of the two technologies. Type 2 
agents may choose between (15) and (16), but must then allocate all their capital to the 
chosen technology.
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sufficiently large funds so as to substitute for public investment privately, if that is 
profitable. They will choose between technologies 1 and 2 on the basis of which has the 
highest marginal product of capital. If we for a moment allow ourselves to imagine that 
they are constrained to investing all of their savings in sector 2, the asymmetry of the 
problem becomes clear. In that case, their problem would be equivalent to a maximization 
of the following current value Hamiltonian function:
B \c „ X )  = u {cy\,(A k„  -  ct) (32)
The Euler equation that is implied by the first order conditions of (32) is identical to (27). 
It is immediately apparent that the derivative of the growth rate in this sector with respect 
to g/yt is zero. To proceed, it will be useful to establish the following result.
Proposition 4: E (g/y)*, such that:
- if g/y < (g/y)*, then 0,(1^, g*) < A
- if g/y = (g/y)*, then g,) = A
- if g/y > (g/y)*, then ^ (k ^ , g,) > A.
Proof: Since ky/yt is constant by definition at the steady state, the higher g/y, the higher
g/ky. But O^k^, g^ is homogeneous of degree zero in both arguments, so O^k^, g j = 
© (g/kyt). Since 0 12 > 0, CD' > 0.
Because d>,(k,0) = 0, <bj(k,°o) = d>12 > 0, 3 a finite limit for 0,(k,g), as g/y —> ©°. This
ensures that: E g/y such that O^kyt, gj) < A
E g/y such that 0,(1^, g,) > A.
Continuity of ^ (k ^ , g j is then sufficient for the existence of (g/y)*. ■
Proposition 4 establishes that there exists a critical public capital to output ratio, below 
which the marginal product of capital in the private production function (equations 3 or 
16) is higher than that in the technology available to all (equations 2 or 15), and above
which that is reversed. This has obvious implications for the investment choices of type
2 agents, who can choose between technologies, and hence to a comparison of growth 
rates between the two types. We turn to this below.
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Figure 2 plots the steady-state growth rates arising from each technology, against the 
public capital to output ratio:
Figure 2
c/c A
1/0 ( A - p )
Figure 2: Growth rates for the two technologies, as functions of the public capital to
output ratio.
While in deriving the two optimal consumption paths in the above diagram we used the 
recourse of imagining that type 2 households were constrained to investing only in sector 
2, what we are really interested in is the case described earlier, when there is asymmetric 
access to production possibilities. Namely, I assumed that type 1 households were 
constrained to sector 1 (i.e. they must lie along DE), but type 2 households could choose 
between sectors 1 and 2 costlessly so as to maximise their utility.
Proposition 5: If an external shock reduces X at time t in such a way that g/y falls 
below (g/y)*, then (a): the overall rate of economic growth will fall; and
(b): income inequality (previously non-existent in this economy) will
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arise and, given the foreign transfer growth rule, increase with time.
Proof: Since
_ (cogYV  °  ~ * (33)
l - o
where y=  c/c, it follows that maximising (13) at t=0 is equivalent to choosing the highest 
rate of growth of output and consumption compatible with the first order conditions. 
Therefore, type 2 households will use sector 1 technology for g/y > (g/y)* (lying along 
ME), and switch to sector 2 technology when g/y < (g/y)* (lying along BM). This means 
that points along segment MC are never used by any household, as they are strictly 
dominated by switching to the government-dependent technology. If we wish to proxy the 
adjustment policy in response to an external shock such as those hitting many developing 
countries in 1982 by an expenditure (level) reduction such that the government share of 
GDP falls say, from (g/y)0 to (g/y)!, which the rate of growth of foreign transfers is 
thereafter set to maintain, it follows that a new steady state path arises, with (g/k)t < 
(g/k)0. There are two effects. First, the overall growth rate of the economy falls from y0 
to icyR + (1-k)yp, where k  is the proportion of type 2 households in the population. But 
also, we observe an inequality augmenting effect of the expenditure reduction. Whereas 
kN households see their income grow at Yr = l/cx(A - p), the remaining (1-k)N grow at 
the lower rate Yp = l/<* [co(g/k)i - p]. This generates a two-spike distribution of growth 
rates across society, and also a two-spike income level distribution at any time t, with the 
spikes diverging over time, for as long as the exogenous capital market imperfection 
persists and for as long as g/y remains below (g/y)*. ■
Both groups are worse off as a result of the fall in foreign transfers, as we would expect 
from a contraction in the economy's consumption possibilities set, but it is the 
government-dependent type 1 people who suffer the greater decline in growth rate. In this 
model, it is in fact even possible that the fall in g/y brings marginal product O, (k, g) 
below the discount rate p, leading to negative growth.
The cut in public investment therefore affects not only aggregate expenditure at the time, 
but also the growth rate of the economy, as described above. In this chapter I emphasized
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that the existence of different degrees of ability to substitute privately for government 
provided services leads to an increase in inequality. Furthermore, because the marginal 
rate of transformation of those private agents who rely on government inputs has fallen, 
their own incentives to save and invest are lower. The fall in the growth rate of their 
income and consumption is the result not only of a direct effect of lower growth in public 
capital available to them, but also of an induced decline in their own private capital 
accumulation.
41 An Extension: A M ore Realistic D istribution of G row th Rates.
The stark dichotomy of the result obtained above, with two diverging but internally 
homogeneous classes, is a consequence of the assumption that households either have full 
access to sector 2 technology, or no access at all. While this captures an important 
cleavage between different groups in some developing countries, it is clearly unrealistic. 
It is plausible to imagine a society where degrees of dependence on state provisions are 
more varied. Some households may be unable to build privately the roads and ports they 
need for their production process, but may be able to afford private schools for their 
children and a private health insurance, thereby being able to accumulate human capital 
privately, without need for government expenditure on those sectors. Others may use 
private mail systems and DHL, rather than be subjected to the delays and risks of the state 
postal service. Others yet may subscribe to private cellular telephone networks, or buy 
private electricity generators for their homes and businesses.
This range of different degrees of access to private sector alternative technologies of 
production can be introduced into the model as follows. Let a variable ^  e (0, 0*(g/y)), 
which we may call 'access', represent the maximum fraction of household i savings that 
can be allocated to sector 2 investment. The absence of a t subscript implies that I assume 
it to be time invariant for all households.9 The distribution function F(^) describes how 
access to private capital technology is distributed across all households. Now, for g/y > 
(g/y)*, no household in this economy wishes to invest any funds in sector 2, so the
9 Notice that unlike 0t, which was a choice variable, and therefore unconstrained 
between 0 and 1, ^  is fixed for each household i e  {1,...,N}. Let 0* be the value of 0 
which would be chosen identically by all households to maximize (19), for a given g/y.
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distribution of growth rates is a mass point at a point along ME, determined by the 
exogenous level of g/y. For g/y < (g/y)*, on the other hand, all households would ideally 
like to invest a proportion 0* of their savings in sector 2. As we know from the initial 
analysis in section 3, any households with ^  = 0* are able to equate marginal products 
of capital across the two sectors and reach a first-best allocation.10 Given the range
assumed for however, it is always at or below the optimal fraction, so that it is taken
up entirely if g/y < (g/y)*. Agents therefore solve a dynamic optimization problem with 
a single choice variable (Cj), a single state variable (lq), and along the optimal steady-state 
path, household i has a growth rate of consumption, income and capital stock given by:
y , - - R | A  + d - 5 i)® ,(* ,.& >  -  P i (34)a
This is clearly increasing in as:
1 ^ = 1 ^ - ® , ^ ]  (35)
and A > ^(Iq , gt) because g/y < (g/y)* and ^  < 0*, Vi.
Equation (34) states that, in this set-up, an agent's income growth rate is an increasing 
function of a convex combination of the two (sectoral) marginal products of capital, with 
the weight given by This suggests a society where, in times of low public investment, 
people will fare differently from one another, with their individual income growth rates 
positively related to their degree of access to substitutes for publicly provided inputs. 
Referring back to Figure 2, we therefore have a distribution of growth rates over the N 
households, whose support is the continuum PR, and which is a functional of F(^). The 
higher a household's ability to access the private-capital-only technology, the higher its 
growth rate after a shock that reduces the government expenditure on social and physical 
infrastructure below the critical level (g/y)*.
10 As rises for a given g/y < (g/y)*, lq/g falls. This raises O, (k, g), thus shifting 
DE upwards in figure 2. When £ = 0*, the upward sloping growth rate function for sector
1 (DE) intercepts BC at point R. I.e, the interception point M has gradually moved left 
as the agent has become able to shift an increasing proportion of his savings to the fully 
private technology, thus raising the MPk in the government-dependent sector.
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51 Conclusions.
Building on insights from Chapters 3 and 4, this paper has extended the analysis of the 
effects of public investment on income distribution to economies with positive steady-state 
growth rates. Two simplifications were made to allow us to focus clearly on growth: class 
membership was assumed to be given exogenously in this model, although it was derived 
endogenously in chapter 3; and taxation, which was considered in detail in chapter 4, was 
omitted from the analysis.
This chapter replaced the successive generations framework of Chapter 3, where all 
savings were modelled as bequests. Bequest behaviour was fairly ad-hoc, and subject to 
parametric restrictions which constrained the rate of capital accumulation. Instead, this 
chapter had infinitely-lived agents, whose saving behaviour was based on intertemporal 
utility maximization and which respected the Keynes-Ramsey condition. There were two 
technologies to produce the same good: one depended on public capital, which could only 
be produced by the government, and the other was linear in private capital alone. There 
were also two types of people: those of type 1 could only use the first technology, and 
those of type 2 could choose between using either.
In this set-up, it was shown that the overall growth rate of the economy depends on the 
public capital to output ratio (g/y). It was also shown that there is a threshold ratio (g/y)*, 
above which everyone uses the government-dependent technology, and there is no income 
inequality. Below the threshold, however, type 2 people switch production to the private 
technology, and grow at a faster rate than their counterparts of type 1. Income inequality 
arises, and increases over time so long as the public capital to output ratio remains below 
the critical threshold. In this case, the larger the share (1-k) of constrained (type 1) agents, 
the lower the overall economic growth rate.
In the basic version of this two-sector economy, the post-shock distribution of income is 
rather coarse: a two-spike distribution is derived, because the two different groups are 
internally homogeneous. Chapter 3 yields a more refined distribution, but Section 4 shows 
that a more realistic scenario can be derived straight-forwardly within this endogenous 
growth set-up as well. This is done by defining a variable 'access' © ,  as the maximum 
share of household savings that the particular household is 'allowed' to invest in the
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private technology (sector 2), and letting it be distributed non-uniformly among the 
households. It then follows that a more complex distribution of household growth rates 
will arise, which depends on the distribution of access, F ^ ) . Naturally, the higher a 
household's ^  , the higher its growth rate.
As the two-period version of the model (described in section 2) established, the main 
mechanism through which a cut in public investment increases inequality in this model 
is by reducing the savings incentive of the access-constrained type 1 people. Their 
marginal product of capital - and hence their marginal rate of transformation - increases 
with public investment. A fall in the latter thus reduces their willingness to save and 
consequently their rate of capital accumulation. This is why a one-off reduction in the 
level of public investment - matched by a reduction in the growth rate of public spending 
later so as to keep constant a new, lower g/y ratio - can have a persistent augmenting 
effect on inequality. The ratio of incomes from type 2 to type 1 people increases over 
time because type 1 people know that they are less productive - since they do not have 
access to the protected private technology - and hence rationally invest less.
An interesting conclusion follows. It is possible that what may appear to be spendthrift 
behaviour by the poor - if they save less than richer people - or laziness (in a model 
where k was interpreted as human capital) - if they invest less in their education - may 
not be the result of different preferences11, but of unobserved constraints arising from 
market imperfections which victimize them. The poor may have exactly the same income- 
leisure trade-off as the rich, and may save or invest less purely as a result of fully rational 
behaviour in light of credit constraints or other barriers to the most productive activities.
As I have argued in previous chapters, there are a number of ways in which the 
government may act so as to correct these imperfections, resulting in both greater equity 
and efficiency. Even if a first-best elimination of the root of the market failure is 
infeasible, and even if cash transfers are difficult to implement, these models have 
suggested a reason why in-kind transfers, such as free education and health-care, or 
spending in infrastructure, may achieve those worthwhile objectives. This should be borne 
in mind by governments considering the role they desire to play in the development
11 In plainer English, 'may be no fault of their own'.
processes of their countries.
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CHAPTER 6
BRAZILIAN MACROECONOMICS IN THE 1980s: A BRIEF 
OVERVIEW
Abstract: This short chapter presents some basic macroeconomic facts and figures for 
Brazil during the 1980s, as a background to the distributional analysis of the period which 
is contained in Chapters 7 and 8. It briefly describes the instability which characterized 
the decade, and reports on the various policy initiatives implemented by different 
governments with the aim of restoring macroeconomic equilibrium. This chapter 
introduces the third, empirical part of the thesis, and provides information which will be 
useful for an understanding of the inequality and poverty trends presented later.
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11 Introduction.
This thesis has so far dealt with structural adjustment, income distribution and the role of 
government in the abstract. Chapters 1 and 2 provided a discussion of the background to 
the reforms of the 1980s and of conceptual channels through which expenditure reduction 
and expenditure switching may affect the distribution of income. Chapters 3, 4 and 5 
focused more narrowly on mechanisms through which sustained (public) expenditure 
reduction can impact on the long run distributions of wealth and income.
This chapter and the next two constitute the third, empirical part of the thesis. Since long- 
run data on access to public services and expenditures on private substitutes to those 
services was not available for Brazil, an empirical test of the implications of the models 
presented in the foregoing chapters was impossible. Instead, these final chapters consider 
the more general issue of the behaviour of income distribution during a period of (short- 
run) expenditure reduction1 and macroeconomic instability. They do so by means of a case 
study of Brazil in the 1980s.
In the field of income distribution analysis, Brazil appears to be one of the countries most 
deserving of study. Of the 71 countries for which the World Development Report 1995 
(World Bank, 1995) lists percentage shares of income accruing to different groups, Brazil 
has the largest share going to the richest 10% (51.3%), and the (joint) second lowest share 
going to the poorest 20% of its population (2.1%). This comparison appears to support a 
widely held notion that it is one of the countries with the most unequal distributions of 
income in the world. But unlike most others who approach it in terms of inequality - e.g. 
Guatemala, Honduras, Kenya, Panama, South Africa - Brazil is a major world economy, 
with the world's ninth largest GDP, after the G7 and Spain. It is the largest economy 
amongst all developing countries, and by far the largest of Latin America.2
In addition to this unique combination of size and inequality, Brazil has expierienced an
1 In the sense of a reduction in the overall level of aggregate demand, not - as we will 
see below - of public expenditure.
2 Based on a comparison of GDPs for 1993, from Table 3 in the World Development 
Indicators in World Bank (1995).
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interesting recent economic history. In the 1960s and 1970s, when import substitution 
industrialization (ISI) and an interventionist state held sway across the developing world, 
Brazil was one of the largest borrowers and fastest growers of all. In the 1980s, when the 
debt crisis put an end to that growth cycle, and led to a decade of stagnation for a large 
number of developing countries - and certainly for those more severely indebted - Brazil 
was one of the worst hit. The average annual real GDP growth rate fell from 9.0% in 
1965-80 to 2.7% in 1980-90 (World Bank, 1992).
In that decade, Brazil and many other developing countries were the focus of a great deal 
of talk about structural adjustment, and the transition from ISI to a new, export-led and 
market-based growth strategy. Fiscal restraint and devaluations were to be followed by 
deeper structural reforms. Trade was to be liberalized, state owned enterprises were to be 
privatized, tax systems reformed, and financial markets deregulated. But unlike some other 
countries, Brazil did not successfully implement many of these reforms in the 1980s. The 
country saw at least four failed stabilization plans, and annual inflation in 1990 was 
2,938% (IDB, 1994), the highest in the period. Tariff reductions and privatizations did not 
begin in earnest until 1990/1. Discussions on tax and social security reforms were only 
beginning to take place in Congress in mid-1995. In short, Brazil in the 1980s was a 
country failing to adjust to the debt crisis.
Following the oil price shocks of the 1970s, and the subsequent debt crisis, Brazil teetered 
on the brink of reform for the whole of the decade. External balance was achieved by 
means of a severe reduction in imports, as we are about to see. But internal equilibrium, 
characterised by sustainable growth rates and price stability, proved elusive for a long 
period, despite a number of failed stabilization 'plans'. This chapter is anchored on some 
basic numbers, presented in Table 1 below.
The table contains data on a set of variables related to macroeconomic performance in the 
period. GDP per capita is included as a basic indicator of living standards, and it shows 
the stagnation which was the hallmark of the decade.3 Annual growth in GDP and open
3 Stagnation is revealed by these national accounts data. This is at odds with the 
growth implied by household incomes reported in the PNAD data, as we will see in 
Chapter 7. The reasons for and consequences of this are discussed in Chapter 7-3 and 7-4.
Table I: Macroeconomic Indicators
1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990
GDP per capita (1988 US$)a 2,252 2,237 2,145 2,118 2,235 2,362 2,394 2,346 2,377 2,233
Annual growth in GDP (%)b -4.4 0.6 -3.4 5.3 7.9 7.5 3.6 -0.1 3.3 -4.6
Open Unemployment (%)c 7.9 6.3 6.7 7.1 5.3 3.6 3.7 3.8 3.3 4.3
Govt spending (% of GDP)a 27.3 28.7 31.7 29.9 37.6 35.9 32.4 40.9 46.5 47.2
Fiscal Surplus (% of GDP)a -2.2 -3.1 -4.6 -5.0 -11.1 -13.3 -11.2 -21.4 -24.9 -14.4
Annual Inflation Rate (%)a 106 98 142 197 227 145 230 682 1,287 2,938
Trade Surplus (US$ billions)*1 1.19 0.78 6.47 13.09 12.47 8.30 11.16 19.17 16.11 10.75
Current Account Surplus 
(US$ billions)41
-11.75 -16.31 -6.84 0.04 -0.27 -5.30 -1.45 4.16 1.03 -3.28
Real wages in manufacturing 96.1 97.7 81.9 80.3 90.6 105.3 112.2 92.2 99.5 80.0
(1980= 100)c
Notes: a Source for 1981 -1983: IDB (1991). Source for 1984-90: IDB (1994). Due to data revision, there are some discrepancies between
the time-series reported in the two volumes above, but these are not too great.
b Source: IDB (1991), p.54.
0 Source: Thomas, J.J. (1995). Open unemployment is an annual average of monthly data for the metropolitan areas of Sao Paulo, 
Rio de Janeiro, Belo Horizonte, Porto Alegre, Salvador and Recife.
d Source: IDB (1991, 1992).
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unemployment proxy for the behaviour of aggregate demand and the business cycle 
position. The next three variables are indicative of the macroeconomic stance of 
government policy. The upward trend in government expenditures a share of GDP (from 
27.3% in 1981 to 47.2% in 1990) and the substantial increases in overall fiscal deficit are 
evidence that the government was not contributing to expenditure reduction through its 
own accounts. Repeated increases in the rate of inflation (from 105.6% in 1981 to 
2,938% in 1990) reveal that macroeconomic stability had if anything become a more 
elusive goal than in the 1970s. The next two variables reflect Brazil's external position. 
Here there is evidence of adjustment to the negative shocks of 1979-82, albeit with slips 
in 1986 and 1990. Finally, real wages in the manufacturing sector are included as an 
(imperfect) proxy for average real wages across the whole economy.
The chapter is divided into three basic periods: Section 2 discusses the recession of 1981- 
83; Section 3 deals with the recovery of 1984-85; and Section 4 reports on the populist 
inflation of 1986-1990.
2) The Recession of 1981-83.
The roots of the external imbalances which led to the debt crisis of the early 1980s lie, 
as was suggested in Chapter 1, in the choice of response made by many developing 
countries to the oil price shocks of 1973/74 and 1979/80, which had a massive impact on 
the terms of trade between oil exporting and oil importing countries throughout the world. 
While the industrialized countries as a group responded by immediate contractions in 
economic activity and imports, rather than by accumulating large current account deficits, 
oil importing developing countries in general - and Latin America in particular - continued 
growing strongly in the 1970s, financing the larger import bills through ever larger current 
account deficits.
In the case of Brazil, this led external debt to rise from US$ 12.6 billion in 1973 to US$ 
83.3 billion at the end of 1982. Naturally, this led to an ever greater financing burden, 
which showed up in the interest services item of the current account. Servicing 
requirements rose from US$ 2.2 billion in 1973 to US$ 11.3 billion in 1980. By 1982, the 
year in which Mexico defaulted and Western commercial banks virtually ceased voluntary 
lending to Latin America, servicing requirements were equivalent to 97% of Brazil's entire
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export revenue.
It is to the credit of economic policy makers in Brazil at the time, led by Minister Mario 
Henrique Simonsen, that the need for adjustment to the balance of payments was 
understood. In 1980, even while the economy was still growing, the government freed 
interest rates and stepped up the rate of monetary corrections and mini-devaluations, with 
a view to keeping the real exchange rate competitive, discourage imports and increase 
exports. In early 1980, the Cruzeiro was devalued by 30%, and in 1981, the rate of 
nominal devaluation was virtually identical to domestic inflation. At the same time, 
Simonsen's team eliminated a number of price controls and attempted to deal with 
excessive public expenditure by creating a Special Secretariat for State Enterprises 
(SEST), empowered to control budgets across some 370 state-owned companies.
These reforms did not, however, go far enough in the direction of paring Brazil's endemic 
public deficits which, as can be seen from Table 1, kept on rising gently through the 
period. This was due in part to the fact that higher international and domestic interest rates 
kept the overall deficit rising despite a non-negligible reduction in the primary deficit. 
These higher interest rates, combined with substantial expansions in the money supply and 
with the effect of the faster nominal devaluations kept inflation quite high in 1981 and 
1982, and rising substantially in 1983, despite the recession, which was brought about 
more by international effects than by the mildly contractionary policies pursued by the 
government. GDP fell in both 1981 and 1983, and was virtually unchanged in 1982, 
causing GDP per capita to fall for three consecutive years.
While the combination of stubbornly high inflation and an internationally induced 
recession meant that domestic indicators looked dismal in 1983, there were nevertheless 
signs of progress in reducing the current account deficit. This reached its peak in 1982, 
at US$ 16.3 billion, despite the devaluations and the domestic recession, because 
international conditions prevented any export gains. Industrial countries were in the throes 
of their own recessions, so there was no scope for expanding volume, and weak demand 
meant that the terms of trade moved strongly against Brazil. Export value consequently 
fell by 13.4% in 1982 alone. (IDB, 1983). But with some improvement in economic 
activity in industrial countries in 1983, export markets opened up again, and the 
devaluations pursued by Simonsen's team began to pay off. The current account deficit
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was cut by almost US$ 10 billion, to US$ 6.8 billion, well within the target range 
negotiated with the IMF early in the year.
31 The Recovery of 1984-85.
Following the international recovery with a lag of one or two years, Brazil's GDP grew 
by 5 .3% in 1984 and by 7.9% in 1985. This was due not only to greater demand for 
Brazilian exports from abroad, but also to a reversal of the contractionary macroeconomic 
policies pursued in the previous three years, which led to a rise in domestic consumption. 
The fiscal deficit continued to rise in 1984 and more than doubled in 1985, under the new 
civilian regime, to 11% of GDP. Indexation became overwhelmingly pervasive, so that 
not only wages, but almost any contract between economic agents included clauses 
whereby the nominal value of a variable was changed at the end of a period, so as to 
restore its real value from the previous period. In particular, this was true of government 
debt and interest payments on it: estimates of 'monetary correction' payments on the 
domestic debt soared from 9.1% of GDP in 1982 to some 20.7% in 1984 (IDB, 1985).
The pervasiveness of indexation mechanisms effectively endogenised the money supply, 
which grew by 203.5% in 1984 and 312.1% in 1985 (Ml; see IDB, 1986, p.220). Given 
these growth rates of the money supply and the steady devaluation of the cruzeiro, it is 
not surprising that inflation rose further still, to 196.7% in 1984 and 226.9% in 1985. But 
the devaluations, combined with the improvement in the international environment, led 
Brazil to achieve at least one of its macroeconomic adjustment policy objectives in 1984. 
That year, the trade surplus was a record US$ 13 billion, which was sufficient to balance 
the current account (US$ 42 million surplus). This balance was essentially maintained in
1985.
The basic features of this brief two-year period, between the recession and the launching 
of the Cruzado plan in 1986, were therefore threefold: growth resumed, based on the 
strength of the international recovery and on the relaxation of domestic contractionary 
policies; this relaxation, the growth in aggregate demand and the spread of indexation led 
to a further acceleration of inflation, to a point where it was perceived to threaten to 
become hyperinflation; and despite domestic growth, the strength of foreign demand and 
the maintenance of a competitive exchange rate led to substantial trade surpluses, which
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achieved current account balance, for the first time since before the first oil price shock.
41 1986-1990: Defeat in the Populist F iyht Against Inflation.
Despite the remarkable achievement of its predecessors in balancing the current account, 
which required turning around a US$ 16 billion deficit in two years, the civilian 
government which rose to power in 1985 was faced with a difficult economic scenario, 
where rising inflation was the main problem. Given the recent stagnation in per capita 
incomes, the historically high rates of unemployment, and the rise in poverty in 1983-84 
(see Chapter 7-5), tackling inflation through conventional, orthodox means - which were 
likely to increase unemployment or lower real wages - was not perceived as a desirable 
option. Indeed, as the IDB (1985) accurately predicted: "... since the clamour to resume 
growth is becoming increasingly difficult to ignore, it seems likely that the new 
government will examine various alternative policies - including proposals for monetary 
reform and deindexation of the economy - for reducing inflation while minimizing further 
losses of income and output.” (p.215).
This was indeed what the government tried to do with the Cruzado Plan of 28 February
1986. This plan replaced the cruzeiro with a new national currency: the cruzado, worth 
1,000 cruzeiros. More importantly, it contained a sweeping set of incomes policies such 
as price and wage freezes and the abolition of monetary correction on any financial asset 
other than the basic passbook savings account (cademeta de poupan9 a). To implement 
this, the main financial indexator, the ORTN, was replaced by a fixed factor, called the 
OTN. All assets which were contracted to be readjusted according to changes in the 
ORTN were thereby deprived of any form of monetary correction. Rents and mortgage 
payments were also frozen, and a new unemployment programme was set up, which 
envisaged the provision of benefits to the unemployed for up to four months.
The price and wage freeze was intended originally as a temporary measure, designed to 
break the inflationary expectations while the budget was brought under control, and the 
private sector got used to a new, stable currency. Lara Resende et al (1987) suggest it was 
not meant to last longer than 90 days. In the event, however, the economists who designed 
the plan were unable to persuade politicians to adopt the necessary measures to reduce the 
deficit. The temporary stability of the price level removed the burden of the inflation tax
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and transferred real income to wage earners. Real wages in manufacturing in 1986 were 
up 16% on the previous year (see Table 1). Average industrial capacity utilization rose 
to 80% (Belluzzo, 1986), and growth continued apace, reaching 7.5% in 1986. Combined 
to the consumption boom, which drove the growth in output, failure to reduce the fiscal 
deficit doomed the Cruzado plan to failure. Aggregate demand continued to run at levels 
well in excess of those compatible with stable prices, and once the freeze was removed, 
inflation would gradually return.
Despite growing relative price distortions, and increasing evidence of shortages in some 
sectors, the freeze was maintained until November, when President Samey's government 
and his supporters won one of the most comprehensive electoral victories in the history 
of Brazil (Veja, 1986). Less than two weeks after those elections, Samey's ministers went 
on television to announce a new package of measures, including many price rises - some 
as large as 100% - and tax hikes, which became known as the Cruzado II, and which 
really marked the end of the original Cruzado plan. Despite months of a supposed price 
and wage freeze, 1986 inflation was 145.3%, most of it clocked through illegal price rises 
in the last months of the plan, when it was clear to the private sector that the economy 
remained overheated, public finances remained out of control, and the statutory price level 
was unsustainable. In addition to this, the substantial rise in consumption and some 
measure of real appreciation in the latter part of the year conspired to disrupt the one 
thing the previous governments had achieved: external adjustment. The current account 
went from near balance in 1984 and 1985 to a deficit in excess of US$ 5 billion in 1986. 
In the international environment of the mid-1980s, voluntary inflows were simply not 
available to finance this increase, and the government was forced to declare a 'technical 
moratorium’ on 20 February 1987, which suspended interest payments on US$ 67 billion 
of foreign bank debt (IDB, 1988, p.361).
The failure of the Cruzado plan ushered in an era of despondency in Brazilian 
macroeconomic policy. This was characterised by the uneasy co-existence between the 
knowledge that there was no political will to tackle the underlying causes of inflation - 
notably the fiscal imbalance - and the need to be publicly seen to be doing something 
about escalating price rises. Two other 'plans' were implemented under this administration: 
the "Plan of Macroeconomic Control", otherwise known as either "Novo Cruzado" or 
'Plano Bresser', was launched in June 1987, under Minister Bresser Pereira. The
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centrepiece of the plan was once again a wage and price freeze, this time for a maximum 
of 90 days. In order to prevent a further deterioration of the balance of payments position, 
the cruzado was immediately devalued by 10.56%. To prevent a continuing budgetary 
crisis in the state owned companies, whose prices had been kept artificially low to reduce 
private sector price rises, there were one-off substantial rises in electricity, telephone, steel 
and petrol costs.
The combination of these relative price adjustments, substantially raising input costs 
across the economy, with a freeze imposed on private sector prices was not perceived as 
a particularly credible strategy. Not even by the government itself, which announced at 
the outset that after the removal of the freeze, "wages will be readjusted monthly, 
according to the average inflation in the three preceding months." (Folha de Sao Paulo, 
13/06/87, p.l). As a result, the plan "achieved few successes and, by year-end, had been 
essentially abandoned."(IDB, 1988, p.363). Inflation was over 14% per month in 
December, and kept rising in 1988. For 1987 as a whole, it reached almost 230%. Despite 
the rhetoric against the public deficit, this was not substantially curtailed and remained 
above 10% of GDP. In particular, Congress awarded substantial pay rises across the public 
sector, leading the IDB to comment openly that: "The most pressing problem was posed 
by the Federal Government wage bill, which was projected to exceed non-earmarked 
current revenue."(IDB, op. cit.).
This failure to control public expenditure and to bring it in line with revenues continued 
through 1988. No plans were attempted this year, partly because all political attention was 
focused on the drafting of a new Constitution. As Table 1 indicates, public spending 
continued to rise, driven mostly by wages and debt financing costs, both of which were 
heavily indexed and not discretionary. The fiscal deficit almost doubled, and inflation 
almost tripled. Domestic demand fell, led by investment cuts due to growing uncertainty. 
This led to the first GDP contraction since 1983, but also to a substantial recovery in the 
trade balance, and so to a significant current account surplus.
By December 1988, monthly inflation reached 28%. With the Constitution completed by 
October, Samey's third Finance Minister, Mailson da Nobrega, announced the third price 
and wage freeze in January 1989. This was titled the 'Summer Plan', a virtual repeat of 
the Plano Bresser, but with an even shorter intended period for the freeze: six weeks. Like
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its predecessor, it included a devaluation and hikes in public tariffs. Like the Cruzado of 
1986, it replaced a beleaguered currency by cutting three zeros off it, and calling it the 
New Cruzado. It too insisted that government expenditures would be cut. Ministries were 
abolished, public employees were threatened with redundancy and a privatization plan was 
drawn up.
And once again it came to naught. Once again it was an election year - presidential this 
time - and both the President and Congress were exceedingly hesitant to reduce the 
expenditures which traditionally provide them with electoral leverage. There was no mass 
firing of public employees, and not a single company was privatised in 1989. The fiscal 
deficit neared a quarter of GDP and in June the IBGE was measuring inflation rates above 
20% per month again. For 1989 as a whole, the index reached 1,287% and it continued 
to accelerate into the first quarter of 1990, prior to the swearing in of the new 
government, on March 15.
On March 16, the new President, Mr Fernando Collor de Mello, launched the last 
economic plan of the decade. The Collor plan was different from its predecessors. Prices, 
wages and rents were not frozen. Instead, its centrepiece was a freeze of financial assets 
intended to drain liquidity from the economy and sustain the new currency - which was 
renamed the cruzeiro. Bank account holders were forbidden from withdrawing more than 
Cr$ 50,000 (USS 1277) from their current accounts, or 20% of any funds held in 
overnight or other interest bearing deposits. (Financial Times, 19/3/90). The remaining 
balance - most of the stock of financial wealth in the economy - would be released in up 
to eighteen months when, it was hoped, cuts in government spending and new taxes would 
have balanced the budget, and the Cruzeiro would be a stable currency.
The plan did include attempts to streamline the federal administration, to initiate a serious 
privatization programme and to raise tax revenues. New taxes were imposed on large 
fortunes and on inheritances, and there were efforts to improve tax collection across the 
board. On the expenditure side too, the government made deeper cuts than had been 
attempted under any of the previous plans. As a result, the IDB figures presented in Table 
1 indicate a reduction in the deficit of the order of 10 percentage points of GDP.
But this did not suffice to eliminate inflation. By exploiting loopholes in the legislation
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governing 'exceptions' to the asset freeze, most companies and individuals holding large 
balances had managed to release them by July. As a result, "not only was the economy 
remonetized more rapidly than had been intended but also the recovery of liquidity was 
extremely uneven." (IDB, 1991, p.49). In the absence of a price freeze, and in light of a 
severe contraction in output, caused by the earlier liquidity squeeze and by the 
government expenditure cuts, the re-expansion of the money supply led to a sharp 
readjustment in the price level, which quickly became inertial again. Annual inflation in 
1990 was very nearly 3,000%, the largest in Brazilian history by a factor of more than 
two. Compounding the failure, the initial severity of the wealth shock was such that output 
plummeted by 4.6% and real wages in manufacturing by some 20% over the year.
The end of the decade, therefore, saw the country back where it had started the 1980s: in 
a stagflationary scenario. The next chapter describes the evolution of inequality and 
poverty during the period, and some of the trends and fluctuations appear to be related to 
the macroeconomic history sketched above. Chapter 8 examines these links more formally, 
as a complement to the more standard inequality decomposition analyses it contains.
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CHAPTER 7
GROWING APART: INEQUALITY AND POVERTY TRENDS IN 
BRAZIL IN THE 1980s
Abstract: This chapter reports on a detailed investigation into the evolution of inequality 
and poverty in Brazil during the 1980s, using a large repeated cross-section household 
survey data set. Summary statistics, decile means and decile shares are presented for every 
year, as well as different scalar inequality and poverty measures. First and second order 
stochastic dominance results are reported for a number of distributions, and statistical tests 
are performed to infer population dominance, generating robust welfare and inequality 
comparisons. Analogously, mixed stochastic dominance is used in poverty comparisons. 
Sensitivity of the measures and of the observed trends to the equivalence scale used is 
investigated. The main finding is that inequality worsened unambiguously, although not 
monotonically, during the 1980s. Poverty also rose, despite some growth in mean reported 
incomes, but its behaviour was more cyclical than that of inequality.
11 Introduction
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This chapter focuses on the application of appropriate and up-to-date concepts and 
techniques to forming judgements about the evolution of inequality and poverty, and to 
making welfare comparisons over time. It aims to present a detailed picture of what 
happened to the distribution of income in Brazil during the 1980s. Chapter 8 will then 
discuss some possible explanations for the trends, by means of standard inequality 
decompositions and some simple correlation and regression analysis based on the 
behaviour of macroeconomic aggregates.
Brazil's pronounced inequality, combined with the recent economic history described in 
Chapter 6, make it virtually unique as a case study for the behaviour of income 
distribution in the 1980s. Not surprisingly then, it has been the subject of a large 
literature, at least since the 1970s. The World Bank's (1993b) Social Indicators of 
Development 1993 alone lists 95 references on inequality and poverty in Brazil.1 It is not 
my intention here to survey these works, but some of the more recent pieces cover the 
time period of this chapter, at least in part, and have been helpful to the formulation of 
my approach and as references for comparing results.
Barros, Mendon9 a and Rocha (1993) is probably closest in scope to these chapters, 
although the emphasis on welfare dominance, the poverty aggregation procedures, the 
inequality decomposition analysis and the way in which I investigate links to the 
macroeconomic environment are new. Fox (1990) discusses the impacts of some 
macroeconomic trends on poverty and employment levels over the period 1970-1987, and 
some of her analysis draws on published summary tables of the PNAD, the data set used 
here in its complete form. Fox and Morley (1991) extend that analysis and apply a simple 
macro model to Brazil. Their paper contains a number of predictions for aggregate 
variables for the 1990s, and its focus is very different from mine. Hoffman (1989) 
contains a careful empirical study of the personal and household income distributions until 
1986. It appeared as a chapter in an important volume on the subject, edited by Sedlacek 
and Barros (1989). Pfefferman and Webb (1983) use expenditure survey data from
1 Some of these references go a long way back. The list includes books, book 
chapters, journal articles and working papers; written in English, Portuguese and Spanish.
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ENDEF2 to argue that poverty declined in the 1970s and perhaps more intensely than 
suggested by the income data. That poverty decline is broadly corroborated by Tolosa 
(1991), who also uses more recent data to obtain poverty trends in the 1980s. Thomas 
(1987) also uses ENDEF data and the associated regional price indices, to look at regional 
and urban-rural differences in the incidence of poverty in the 1970s.
Most recently, Amadeo et al (1994) use PNAD data for the 1980s to investigate trends 
in the composition, quantity and 'quality' of employment in Brazil. They include a brief 
discussion of the impacts of labour force changes on income distribution, but this is 
decidedly not their main focus. Jatoba (1995) also focuses on labour force trends and their 
implications for poverty. These papers differ substantially amongst themselves, and so 
differ from this one in different ways. The main objective of this chapter is to provide a 
detailed, comprehensive description of the evolution of the distribution of income in Brazil 
during the 1980s, using the largest available data set and the best-practice techniques of 
inequality analysis and intertemporal welfare comparison. It relies heavily on stochastic 
dominance results, and I believe that it fills a gap in the existing literature.
The chapter is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses some basic concepts and the tools 
of distributional analysis, including the scalar measures used and stochastic dominance. 
Section 3 describes the data set, which consists of nine years of the repeated cross-section 
household survey PNAD, produced by the Brazilian Statistical Institute (IBGE), and 
discusses some of its shortcomings. Section 4 analyses the changes in the distribution of 
gross household income per capita, and hence in inequality, using standard tools: Pen 
parades, Lorenz and Generalised Lorenz curves for looking at whole distributions, as well 
as summary inequality measures. Section 5 contains the results on the evolution of 
poverty: §5.1 describes the derivation of the chosen poverty lines, and §5.2 presents three 
poverty indices for different years across the decade, as well as the poverty mixed 
dominance comparisons. Section 6 investigates the sensitivity of the results, both on 
inequality and on poverty, to variations in the equivalence scale used. Section 7 concludes.
2 The Estudo Nacional da Despesa Familiar (ENDEF), or National Family 
Expenditure Survey, was carried out by IBGE in 1974/75, and remains Brazil's most 
recent nationwide expenditure survey. The Pesquisa de Orgamentos Familiares (POF), or 
Family Budget Survey, was conducted in 1987, but it covered only 11 large urban areas. 
See section 5 for details.
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21 Concepts and Tools of D istributional Analysis.
As stated above, my objective in this chapter is to gain some insight into the evolution 
of the distribution of income in Brazil in the 1980s. This section contains a brief review 
of the main analytical concepts and tools used in the sections that follow. It is not 
intended as a literature survey or a comprehensive treatment of distributional analysis; for 
which the reader is referred to Atkinson (1983) and Cowell (1995).
Income, the distribution of which we are about to consider, is of interest ultimately as a 
proxy for welfare, or standard of living. The first issue confronting the empirical 
investigator, then, is whether it is a good proxy. Experts differ on this point and many 
have suggested that other variables, such as consumption expenditure, or indices which 
give weight to environmental and political entitlements, should replace income altogether. 
Sen's (1981) entitlement approach is a notable example of a conceptual challenge to 
income as the best measure of living standards. Others argue that consumption 
expenditure is a more reliable guide than current income to real living standards, either 
because (if capital markets work) there are theoretical reasons to see it as a better proxy 
for permanent income (see, e.g. Chauduri and Ravallion, 1994), or for empirical reasons 
to do with data reliability and reporting problems:
"In the context of measuring welfare in LDCs, there is a very strong case in favour 
of using measures based on consumption rather than on income. The standard 
argument for consumption over income - that in view of the permanent income 
hypothesis, consumption is a better measure of lifetime welfare than is current 
income - is much weaker than arguments based on practicality and data." (Deaton, 
1994, p. 126)
This is not an issue to be lightly dismissed. Income reporting problems, principally at the 
top and bottom ends of the distribution, are known to be frequently very serious. 
Worryingly, Mercader (1995) finds that even in relatively high-quality data countries, such 
as Spain, income and expenditure can yield very different rankings over the same 
population. The choice of current income, rather than expenditure, in the analysis that 
follows is the result of a constraint on data availability. The last comprehensive national 
household expenditure survey conducted in Brazil is the ENDEF, of 1974-75. The POF 
of 1987 covers only 11 large urban areas and, because it was the only such exercise
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carried out in the 1980s, it would not allow any comparisons over time in the decade, 
which is my principal objective. Although there are limitations to the income data set used 
in this chapter, it is available for every year in the relevant period and, as I will argue 
below, some of the problems are likely to be less severe if one is more interested in 
inferring trends, rather than levels of welfare.
Even if one accepts income as the variable for analysis, there is the second issue of the 
many different definitions of income one can use. Current income differs from permanent 
income, and may be given in gross or net terms. Income can come in cash or kind. Becker 
(1965) has urged the concept of "full" income, to include the imputed value of leisure. 
Atkinson and Stiglitz report as "the widely accepted 'ideal' or 'comprehensive' definition" 
that of Haig and Simons:
"Personal income may be defined as the algebraic sum of (1) the market value of 
rights exercised in consumption and (2) the change in the value of the store of 
property rights between the beginning and the end of the period in question." 
(Simons, 1938, p.50, in Atkinson and Stiglitz, 1980, p.260).
That is the concept we are after, the ideal definition of current income, which clearly 
differs from permanent or lifetime income, as well as from full income. Again, this choice 
is not based on a value judgement, but on what is available in practice. Even so, the data 
discussion that follows will suggest likely deviations of our income values from the above 
definition, which we include here as a benchmark.
Then, there are the related issues of the income recipient and equivalent scale. In 
theoretical models such as those in foregoing chapters of this thesis, one can assume that 
all households are of the same size, and normalize it to one. But in reality, household 
sizes and compositions vary, and economies of scale give rise to the need for some means 
to compare household incomes across widely differing compositions. There is no single 
universally used approach, but most practitioners do use one of many existing equivalence 
scales to make household incomes comparable. Coulter, Cowell and Jenkins (1992b) 
provide a review of the main issues involved in constructing equivalence scales and 
discuss the sensitivity of poverty and inequality measures to the choice of equivalence 
scale. Once a particular equivalence scale is chosen, equivalised household income can 
be ascribed to each household or, as in this chapter, to each individual in the household.
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In this thesis, a simple assumption about equivalence scales is made: our working 
definition of equivalised income is household income per capita. The income recipient is 
the individual. This is in line with the existing literature on Brazilian income distribution, 
but I discuss the implications of relaxing this assumption and varying the equivalence 
scale in Section 6. Any discussion of equivalence scales is postponed to that section.
Once a particular definition of income has been agreed, an equivalence scale has been 
adopted and the income receiving unit defined, we can turn to the distribution itself. Like 
many other economic entities, income (e.g. gross household income per capita), denoted 
by y, can be represented as a discrete or as a continuous variable. Correspondingly, the 
distribution of income can be represented as a vector y, the dimension of which is given 
by n, the number of income recipients in the population or sample in question, or as a 
distribution function p = F(y), where p denotes the share of the population with incomes 
below y.3 It follows that inequality measures - measures of the dispersion of such a 
distribution - can also be defined in discrete (summative) form, or in continuous (integral) 
form. We will define scalar measures in discrete form, which is the most convenient in 
practice, but will rely on continuous distributions when it comes to defining stochastic 
dominance results, in keeping with the existing literature.
Perhaps the first remarkable thing about inequality measurement is the sheer multitude of 
scalar measures that have been suggested. Cowell (1995) lists twelve such measures in his 
Appendix Table 1, namely the variance, the coefficient of variation, the range, the relative 
mean deviation, the logarithmic variance, the variance of logarithms, the Gini coefficient, 
the Atkinson class, the Dalton class, the Generalized Entropy class, the Herfindahl index 
and the Theil index. And these are but a few examples.
The reason why so many measures have been suggested is that they all behave differently 
(some pairs only slightly differently, others quite dramatically so). Properties of various 
measures are discussed in detail by Cowell (1995), and it would fall beyond the scope of 
this section to dwell on them here. However, one consequence of indices behaving
3 Alternatively, the distribution can be described by the density function f(y) = 
dF(y)/dy. Issues related to modelling the Brazilian density function, parametrically and 
non-parametrically, are not discussed in this thesis. See instead Cowell, Ferreira and 
Litchfield (1995b).
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differently from one another, and in fact often ranking two distributions (F and F*) in 
opposite ways, was to somewhat damage the credibility of inequality measurement. Two 
complementary approaches exist to try and remedy that problem: the first is the so-called 
axiomatic approach, which builds up a list of desirable properties for an inequality 
measure to have, until the set of eligible measures is small enough. The second is oriented 
specifically towards distributional comparisons, and abandons the (attractive) idea of 
summarizing dispersion in one number. This is the stochastic dominance approach, 
whereby whole distributions are (partially) ranked with respect to well specified criteria, 
but no scalar value is attached to them.
Although many axioms have been suggested for inequality measures, I will focus here on 
five popular ones. Let the (general) inequality measure be denoted by I(y). Then consider 
the following axioms:
(I) The symmetry (or anonymity) axiom is satisfied iff for any permutation y' of 
vector y, I(y) = I(y')-
(II) Let yj > y-’, y lt y} e  y. Consider y \ which is obtained from y simply by a 
transfer 5 > 0 from yt to yj, such that y4 - 8 > yj + 8. The weak transfer axiom is 
satisfied iff I(y) > I(y')-
(HI) For any scalar X > 0 , the scale invariance axiom is satisfied iff I(y) = I(Ay).
(IV) For any scalar X > 0, the population replication axiom is satisfied if I(y) = 
I(y[X]), where y[A,] is a concatenation of the vector y, X times.
(V) Let y be partitioned into K subvectors, y,, y2, ... yK. Define p(x) as the mean 
of any vector x; 1 ^ ^  := I(p(yJ); and 1 ^  := XKk=1 wkI(yk), where wk = skavk1’° 
> 0, 0«x<l. s denotes income share of group k, and v denotes its population 
share. Then the decomposability axiom is satisfied iff I(y) = 1 ^ ^  + 1^^. 4
Whilst there is no unanimity with regard to which axioms an ideal measure should satisfy, 
there has been increasing acceptance of the above set (I) - (V). Indeed, Theorem 5 (p.60) 
in Cowell (1995) states that any measure I(y) that satisfies these axioms is a member of 
the Generalized Entropy Class, and can thus be expressed as follows:
4 A weaker version of the decomposability axiom requires simply that the overall 
inequality measure can be represented as a function of within-group inequalities, group 
mean incomes, and group sample sizes (n), i.e.:
I(y) = <E> (I(yi),.... I(yK); n(yi)» •••> ^(yx); n(yj), n(yK)}.
i
i
where a  is a choice parameter. The Theil index is simply G(l).5 The coefficient of 
variation, which is also used below, is a simple transform of another member of this class. 
In fact, G(2) = 1/2 CV2. The third scalar measure used below is the Gini coefficient. It 
does not satisfy all of the axioms above, although it does satisfy (I), (II), (HI), (IV) and 
a weaker version of (V), where decomposability is defined only for non-overlapping 
partitions. Although its non-decomposability for overlapping partitions is a disadvantage 
of the Gini, it is such a widely used measure, that commonality and comparability with 
other studies was felt to justify its inclusion. It is not used in the decomposition analyses 
of Chapter 8, where another member of the Generalized Entropy class is introduced.
Hence, three different scalar measures of inequality are presented in Section 4: the Gini 
coefficient, the Theil index [G(l)j and the coefficient of variation.6 They will provide a 
revealing picture of the trends and fluctuations in inequality over the decade, and one of 
their advantages lies in the summarizing power of a single number. Nevertheless, even the 
restricted set of measures that satisfy the axioms listed above can rank two distributions 
y and y’ differently, simply because they are more sensitive to changes in different income 
ranges in the distribution. Some examples of this arise in Section 4, where the results are 
presented.
Because these indices explicitly measure different things - by virtue of the parametric 
choice which determines which income range they are particularly sensitive too - there is 
nothing 'wrong' with these ambiguities. Still, it was felt in some quarters that conflicting 
results from different measures weakened conclusiveness and the policy relevance of 
inequality analysis. These concerns gave rise to the stochastic dominance approach, 
pioneered in the context of income distributions by Atkinson (1970). Although it is again 
not my intention to survey this well known literature, it is useful to re-state the main 
definitions and results which the analysis in section 4 draws on.
5 G(0) and G(l) are the only two members of the GE class that satisfy a stronger 
version of the decomposability axiom, obtained by adding the requirement that £w k = 1.
6 Their formulae appear in Appendix B to Chapter 7.
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A distribution F(y) is said to display first order stochastic dominance over another F*(y), 
iff:
F(y) z F*(y) Vy A F(y) < F*(y) 3y (2)
i.e., if its distribution function lies nowhere above and at least somewhere below that of 
the other. Now, as we stated above, somewhat less formally:
y
p  = F(y) = f f td d x  » )
0
where x is the integrating notation for the income variable. The inverse function y = F !(p) 
is known as a Pen parade. Just as the distribution function tells us what share p of the 
population has income lower than or equal to y, the Pen parade tells us the income level 
of quantile p of the population. It is a useful diagrammatic construct, which we use below 
in common with much of the literature. First order stochastic dominance is often also 
defined in these terms:
F 'l(p) i  F*_1(p) 'ip A F ‘‘(p) > F*"*(p) 3\p (4)
i.e., if the Pen parade corresponding to one distribution lies nowhere below and at least 
somewhere above that of another, it has first order stochastic dominance over it.
Now let us define the deficit curve G(yk) as follows:
7k
GCy*) = f F ( y ) d y  (5)
0
A distribution F(y) displays second order stochastic dominance over another F*(y), iff: 
Giy,) S G*(y*) Vy* A G6't) < G*(y,) 3yt (6)
Again, analogously to the first order case, the result can be expressed in terms of a dual 
function, the Generalized Lorenz Curve, defined as:
(7)
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where K is the integrating notation for p, the population share variable. Changing the 
variable of integration yields a perhaps more familiar definition:
y*
GUp) = f y d F ( y ) <*)
0
which immediately reveals that the height of the curve at percentile p is given by the 
mean of the distribution until p. Now because the Generalized Lorenz is a dual - rather 
than the inverse - function of the deficit curve, the two can not be used interchangeably 
in every circumstance. Fortunately, as discussed by Atkinson and Bourguignon (1989) and 
Howes (1993a), second order stochastic dominance until income level y (FD2F*(y)) 
implies and is implied by Generalized Lorenz dominance until percentile p (FDLF*(p)) 
if p = F(y) < F*(y). This holds automatically for comparisons of complete distributions, 
such as those discussed in this section and in Section 4, since p = F(y) = F*(y) = 1 . 1  
hence refer to the two forms of dominance over complete distributions interchangeably 
below, and return to the issue only when discussing dominance in the context of poverty 
in Section 5.
So F(y) displays Generalized Lorenz dominance over (second order dominates) F*(y) iff:
GUp) * GL*(p) V/> A GUp) > GL*(p) 3p (9)
It follows from these definitions that first order stochastic dominance is a stronger 
requirement, which implies (but is not implied by) second order stochastic dominance.
Finally, there is a special case of second order stochastic dominance which is particularly 
useful in the study of inequality, in that it compares mean-normalized distributions. A 
distribution F(y) is said to display Lorenz dominance (mean-normalized second order 
stochastic dominance) over another F*(y) iff:




Up) = —  \F -\n )d n  « «
i* C y >  J0
is a Lorenz curve for the distribution given by F(y).
The usefulness of stochastic dominance analysis derives from the existence of a set of 
rather powerful (and well-known) theorems which establish welfare and inequality 
comparisons across distributions. The first states that if (2) - or (4) - holds, then social 
welfare enjoyed in F(y) is unambiguously higher than that in F*(y), as measured by any 
individualistic, additive, increasing and symmetric social welfare function. The theorem 
is proved by Saposnik (1981, 1983), and discussed again by Howes (1993a) and Cowell 
(1995). The second theorem states that if (6) - or (9) - holds, then social welfare enjoyed 
in F(y) is unambiguously higher than that in F*(y), as measured by any individualistic, 
additive increasing, symmetric and strictly concave social welfare function. This theorem 
is due to Shorrocks (1983), who also introduced the Generalized Lorenz curve.
The third theorem refers to mean-normalized second order, or Lorenz dominance. 
Formulated in welfare terms7, it simply restates Shorrocks's theorem for the (very) special 
case of two distributions with exactly the same mean. It is more widely used, however, 
to compare inequality - rather than welfare - across any two distributions. As Howes 
(1993a) points out, welfare, inequality and poverty can be studied under one common 
general framework, but with inequality results being drawn by abstracting from the mean 
by normalization, and poverty results by considering a censored distribution, cut off at the 
poverty line. In inequality terms, this third theorem states that if (10) holds, then 
inequality is unambiguously higher in F*(y) than in F(y), as measured by any inequality 
measure that satisfies axioms (I) and (II) above. This theorem is due to Atkinson (1970), 
who drew on analogies with the financial risk literature, including Hadar and Russell 
(1969) and Rothschild and Stiglitz (1970). Although I will report the changes in scalar 
inequality measures as discussed above, all three of these theorems will be heavily relied 
upon in establishing our intertemporal comparisons of the income distribution in Brazil, 
in Section 4.
7 As in Cowell (1995, p.42).
31 The D ata Set.
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The data sets are the Pesquisa Nacional por Amostra de Domicflios (PNAD) for 1981- 
1990, produced by the Institute Brasileiro de Geografia e Estatistica (IBGE). Data were 
collected each year from a representative national sample of households, selected 
according to a three-level multi-stage sampling procedure. This is based on a successive 
selection of municipalities, census sectors and individual households. All capital 
municipalities, metropolitan municipalities, municipalities with high populations and those 
'with a special economic or social characteristic1 are automatically selected. Other 
municipalities are grouped according to size, and from each group at least two are 
randomly selected, with sampling probabilities based on populations drawn from the most 
recent census. For each municipality selected in the first stage, census sectors are 
identified and randomly sampled, with sample weights again determined by population 
proportions reported in the census. Finally, within each selected census sector, individual 
households are sampled. The total sample size varies each year, from a minimum of 
286,000 (in 1986) to a maximum of 517,000 individuals (in 1985)8. A list of exact sample 
sizes on which our analysis is based is presented below in Table 1.
Table 1: PNAD Sample Sizes in the 1980s.










* The number of individuals gives the sample size for the analysis in this chapter, 
where the income recipient is the individual. The number of households gives the 
sample size for some of the decomposition analyses in Chapter 8, and is included 
here for general information.
8 The sampling method embodies a natural growth in the sample size of the survey, 
reflecting the underlying population growth rate. There was a sharp break in 1986, when 
the sample size was reduced for cost-related reasons, with special care paid to maintaining 
precision. See IBGE (1991).
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The survey reports annually on a range of variables which form the basic data set, 
common to every year, with only minor exceptions. Questions are asked on subjects 
pertaining to the household and to individuals within the household. Information is 
recorded on the geographic location of the household; characteristics of the dwelling; 
household size; relationships between individuals in the household; activities of 
individuals; income from labour, specified in up to two separate jobs and in total; income 
from transfers; income from other sources, such as land rents and capital incomes; 
occupation and other labour characteristics; age; gender; education; colour and literacy. 
Population weights, based on the 1980 Census are also included. Appendix A to Chapter 
7 includes a copy of the original PNAD questionnaire for 1989, as well as a full list of 
variables available on the original data tapes, briefly described in English.
In addition to this core set of indicators, a further supplementary survey was conducted 
in some years. A table of topics for these surveys is listed below in table 2.












These chapters focus on income, although other variables, such as household size, 
individual age, gender and education, are used in the analysis. Income is gross monthly 
household income per capita (from all sources) and the income receiver is the individual. 
In practical terms, this means that our income vector consists of variable v410 - total 
monthly income of the household - divided by household size h, entered h times. Note 
that variable v410 is not the direct response to any question asked to a member of the
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household under the household section of the questionnaire (section 2). It is rather the 
summation across all individuals aged 10 or above, of variable v602 - total monthly 
income from all sources for the individual. Variable v602 in turn is also not a direct 
response variable. It is the sum of variables v537, v538, v549, v550, v578, v579, v580, 
v581 and v582. These income variables are listed separately, in Table 3 below, for ease 
of reference.
Table 3: Key Income Variables in the PNAD D ata Set
a) variables pertaining to individuals
v537 gross cash income from main occupation
v538 income in kind from main occupation
v549 gross cash income from second main occupation
v550 income in kind from second main occupation
v578 value of retirement pension received
v579 value of other occupational pensions received
v580 value of 'abono permanente' received
v581 value of rental income
v582 value of any other incomes not falling under any of the above
categories
v600 income from main occupation (v537 + v538)
v601 income from labour (v537 + v538 + v549 + v550)
v602 total income from all sources
b) variables pertaining to the household
v410________Total household monthly income
The interviews using the questionnaire in Appendix A were carried out face-to-face in the 
last quarter of every year. Labour occupational status questions were asked with respect 
to a reference week, and income questions with respect to a reference month. This was 
September in every year except 1981, when it was October. All data for 1982 is excluded 
on advice from IBGE, because in that year the survey was carried out with a 12-week 
reference period. This methodological divergence from other years was reflected in the 
collected data, hampering intertemporal comparability. See IBGE (1993, p. 10). The small 
proportion of households with missing income data were excluded from the sample. These 
constituted approximately 1% of the sample in each year; e.g. 0.80% in 1981, 0.99% in
1985 and 1.34% in 1990.9
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For a country with very high inflation, such as Brazil in the 1980s, the importance of 
having time-series income data expressed in real terms is obvious. The unit in which the 
data could be expressed might have been the local currency, an alternative unit such as 
the minimum wage, or the US dollar. One of the problems with the local currency is that 
it changed name and unit of account three times in the relevant period10. Another problem 
is that inflation was so high that it is difficult to associate real values to the monetary 
values of previous periods.
The minimum wage is often used as a unit for comparing incomes over time in Brazil. 
But its value in real terms was far from constant during the period, detracting from its 
usefulness. For these reasons, and for ease of international comparability, the US dollar 
was chosen as the income unit. The last year in the series was chosen as the base year, 
for ease of current understanding of the values.
Nominal Brazilian currencies were converted to constant 1990 US dollars according to the 
following procedure. First, local currencies were converted into 1990 Brazilian Cruzeiros 
using the CPI deflator, the INPC (IBGE, 1993); second, the Cruzeiro series was converted 
to 1990 US dollars using the exchange rate for the interview month in 1990. The rate used 
was the period average market exchange rate for September 1990, as reported in the rf 
series of the IMF International Financial Statistics. This procedure was compared to the 
alternative whereby local currencies were converted directly to the current dollar values 
each September, and the nominal US dollar series was subsequently deflated using the US 
CPI. The former was chosen on the grounds that it was considerably less susceptible to 
error from inappropriate choices of exchange rate than the alternative procedure. This was 
found to have a serious impact on intertemporal comparability of mean incomes, and was 
exacerbated by very high rates of inflation. The two procedures are described in greater 
detail in the data documentation mimeo by Cowell, Ferreira and Litchfield (1995a).
9 The sample sizes reported in Table 1 above are after these exclusions.
10 The Brazilian currency was the Cruzeiro until 1986, the Cruzado from 1986 to 
1988, and the Novo Cruzado from 1988 until March 1990, when it was again renamed 
Cruzeiro.
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After downloading and decoding the tapes, a number of consistency checks were carried 
out. In terms of discrepancies between data entry on tape and the description in the 
manuals, the only variable that was found to be entered wrongly was the radio ownership 
dummy - responses were coded as 2 and 4, instead of 1 and 3 as the manual states. For 
the handful of observations checked every year, the summation of incomes as described 
in table 3 above was correct. A general check of our own data handling was performed 
by comparing our results with those published by IBGE (1993), which reports average 
incomes, Gini coefficients and decile shares for all years 1981 to 1990, calculated from 
the PNAD.
Whilst our estimates from the micro-data match very closely the official estimates of 
inequality and income distribution, our estimates of average incomes are at variance. We 
investigated the reason for this divergence as our 'first problem1. Furthermore, both our 
estimates of average incomes and those of the IBGE are very different from aggregate 
figures such as GNP per capita in the World Development Reports, or GDP per capita as 
reported by the IDB (see Table 6-1). This is the 'second problem'.
With regard to the first problem, we established that discrepancies between our estimates 
and those of IBGE are due to differences in the (in their case implicit) equivalence scale 
used. IBGE (1993) presents two series of average incomes:
1) average income per individual aged 10 or more years, with income;
2) average income per individual aged 10 or more years, with or without income.
The first definition therefore ignores not only children, but also 'adult' individuals who 
themselves have no income, but live in households where there is an income. The second 
definition includes the latter but continues to disregard children. Table 4 compares 
estimates from the micro data with the official reported figures, and also with our 
preferred definition of income and sample. The fact that the means for the definitions 1 
and 2 are almost identical, and that those for definitions 3 and 4 are also very close is 
reassuring. It signifies that a) the data set is almost identical to the one used by IBGE 
(differences are due to a small number of observations being lost in the decoding and 
downloading of the tapes), and b) the calculation methodologies can replicate those of 
IBGE.
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Table 4: Com parison of estimates of average incomes, 1990 (Cruzeiros).
Definition 1 Definition 2 Definition 3 Definition 4 Definition 5
27 016 27 025 15 978 16 055 12 406
Definitions:
1: IBGE estimate of average income per individual aged 10 or more with
income.
2: Our estimate from micro-data of average income per individual aged 10 or
more with income.
3: IBGE estimate of average income per individual aged 10 or more with or
without income.
4: Our estimate of average income per individual aged 10 or more with or
without income.
5: Our estimate of average household income per capita across all individuals.
Note that differences between definitions 1 and 3 (and hence between 2 and 4) are due 
to the following: definition 1 excludes all individuals with zero income, regardless of their 
household income), whereas definition 3 includes those who are older than ten. This 
implies that the mean in definition 3 is income per capita (aged > 10), whereas definition 
1 is income per income earner.11
On that basis we can ignore definitions 1 and 2. Furthermore, definition 5 (average 
household income per capita across all individuals) was deemed preferable to definitions 
3 and 4, because it includes all children, regardless of their ages, since children do 
consume. It was felt that to exclude them artificially and unjustifiably inflated the average 
income statistic. It could be seen as a very crude way of taking household scale 
economies into account, but it is not presented as such by the IBGE, and I prefer to adopt 
income per capita as a working definition, and to return to the issue of equivalence scales 
explicitly in Section 6.
11 This is why the IBGE revised (some but not all) their estimates from definition 1 
to definition 3, in IBGE (1993).
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The second problem concerns discrepancies between estimates based on the household 
survey and statistics reported in, for example, the World Development Reports. For 1990, 
mean monthly income by our chosen definition is Cr$ 12,406, or US$ 164. This gives an 
annual income of US$ 1968. The WDR 1992 reports Brazil's 1990 GNP per capita as US$ 
2680. This represents a deviation of 36%, and the equivalent figures for other years are 
not substantially different.
This is an example of the general problem of comparability between national accounts 
based and household survey based statistics, common to many countries. National 
accounts include such items as public expenditure on health and education, which are very 
difficult to measure and account for in a household survey. In the case of Brazil, it has 
been argued that the level discrepancies (which are large) arise primarily out of under­
reporting of capital and other non-labour incomes. It has also been suggested that the 
importance of these income sources increases monotonically with income, thus causing 
PNAD-based studies to underestimate income inequality (see Lluch, 1982).
Hence, while the 'first problem’ of comparability with IBGE published data has been 
satisfactorily accounted for, the second issue is a substantial one. Practitioners of 
distributional analysis seem to regard discrepancies with national accounts data as a 
regrettable but inevitable reality of household survey data. Lluch's work does suggest that 
the under-reporting of income which is one of the causes of these discrepancies is not 
uniform across the distribution of income in Brazil, and that it tends to underestimate the 
incomes of the rich more severely than those of the poor. Unfortunately, given our data 
set, little can be done other than to note this issue and bear it in mind when interpreting 
the results.
There are four additional reasons to suspect mis-reporting of one kind or another. First, 
still on the issue of income from capital, it is clear from the questionnaire in Appendix 
A that any such income should be reported under item 5 in question 28, the last of the 
form. It would therefore figure in variable v582, whereas rental income would figure 
under v581. The fact that capital income is lumped with benefit income in the last 
question of the survey, after the detailed consideration given to labour incomes earlier, is 
unlikely to counteract the natural tendency for many people to under-report interest, 
dividend, or own profit incomes.
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Second, even if capital incomes were correctly reported, and so were benefit incomes, one 
could still not interpret v582 as 'capital income', because there are state transfers which 
are not listed explicitly under items 1, 2 and 3 of question 28, and which should hence 
be lumped together with capital incomes in item 5, under 'all other earnings'. One example 
is the incipient unemployment insurance programme, which was initiated in 1986 and 
benefitted 1.4 million unemployed workers in 1989 (see Barros et al, 1993).
Third, it is doubtful that interviewers across Brazil were sufficiently careful to instruct 
respondents who own small businesses, whether formal or informal, on the need to 
separate the labour component of their income from that which is return to capital. Given 
the structure and emphasis of the questionnaire, it is reasonable to expect that most of this 
income will have simply been reported as labour income. Anyone knowing Brazil's 
multitude of shops, stalls and other family owned businesses of all descriptions is unlikely 
to be prepared to regard this problem as negligible in terms of biasing the data on the 
composition of income by source.
Fourth, although the questionnaire does ask explicitly for a value associated with any 
income in kind, some scepticism is most probably justified as to the accuracy with which 
respondents are likely to have valued their income, say, in own agricultural produce in 
subsistence activities in rural areas, or in imputed rent for live-in domestic servants. While 
it is possible to be reasonably confident that this will affect the reported incomes of the 
poor to a greater extent than those of the rich, it is difficult ex-ante to predict in which 
direction it would bias them. The fact that respondents may not know the exact market 
prices of their income in kind does not pre-determine whether they will under- (or over-) 
estimate it. Ex-post, however, the extremely low incomes reported for the poorest 
households (see Section 4 below), incompatible with survival for any length of time, lead 
one to suspect that under-reporting of income in kind by the poor may be more common 
than over-reporting.12
Given all of these problems, it is appropriate at this point to re-emphasize that the main
12 Note, however, that these are current monthly incomes, so that some very low 
values may be explained by idiosyncratic shocks. These very low values would be a 
source of greater concern if the data purported to represent some measure of permanent 
income.
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objective of these chapters is to gain insight into the evolution of the income distribution 
over the decade. They aim to provide a comprehensive analysis of the trends in inequality, 
based on the best available data and the most appropriate techniques. The existing 
literature, briefly described in the introduction, leaves no doubt that the PNAD is the best 
available data set. And it had, to the best of my knowledge, not previously been subjected 
to such a detailed scrutiny, in particular as regards the use of stochastic dominance 
analysis.
The maintained hypothesis on which this analysis is based, then, is that there is no reason 
for the profile of mis-reporting of capital income (mostly by the rich) and of income in 
kind and/or own produce (mostly by the poor) to have changed very much over the 
decade, so that even if one could query exact values of any of the scalar measures, inter- 
distributional comparisons should largely be valid.
The problems with what is actually captured by the questions relating to income in the 
PNAD questionnaire and their impact on the interpretation of the data are not slight, and 
it was my intention to highlight them above. Nevertheless, the point made in the last 
paragraph appears sufficient to warrant carrying out the intertemporal comparisons 
presented below. In this way, this work seeks to avoid, on the one hand, the danger of 
data carelessness, and on the other "the danger of falling prey to a kind of nihilism 
[which] takes the form of noting, quite legitimately, a difficulty of some sort, and then 
constructing from it a picture of total disaster" (Sen, 1973, p.78).
For more detail on the sampling procedure, see IBGE (1991). For a complete report on 
the decoding and verification methodology, refer to Cowell, Ferreira and Litchfield 
(1995a).
41 Inequality in Brazil. 1981-1990.
This section contains the main results relating to inequality trends and the evolution of the 
Brazilian income distribution in the 1980s. Summary statistics for the income distributions 
of each comparable year over the decade are shown below in Table 5. The table illustrates 
two key features of the distribution. The first is the difference between mean and median 
income. In each year, median income was only approximately half the mean. This
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indicates that the distribution of income was extremely skewed to the right, with 50% of 
the population receiving incomes less than about half of the arithmetic mean.
Table 5 also suggests a 14.7% growth in mean monthly incomes between 1981 and 1990. 
This is clearly at odds with the picture of stagnation that emerges from the GDP per 
capita figures in Table 6-1, where 1990 growth over 1981 is -0.8%. This is a further 
consequence of the general problem of comparability between national accounts based and 
household survey based statistics, to which I alluded in Section 3. The usual practice in 
these cases seems to be to rely more heavily on the national accounts data for the 
behaviour of income aggregates, while using the survey data to obtain a lower bound 
estimate of inequality.
In this specific instance, a plausible hypothesis to explain the growth disparity is that there 
might have been a shift in the composition of income towards formal labour earnings - 
which are more accurately reported - and away from other sources more commonly 
understated. Tentative backing for this conjecture comes from the fall in open 
unemployment over the decade (see Table 6-1), as well as from the detailed labour market 
analysis by Amadeo et al (1994), who find that: "in conclusion... work relations in Brazil 
became slightly more formal in the 1980s." (p. 14). While I return to this disparity in the 
conclusions, it would be inappropriate to ignore any feature of the survey data in the 
analysis below. The welfare analysis that follows naturally incorporates the growth in 
mean reported incomes apparent in Table 5, but the reader should bear in mind that any 
results on welfare changes are therefore upper bound estimates.
The second key feature of Table 5 is the growth in inequality over the decade, as 
demonstrated by the three summary measures, the Theil index, the Gini coefficient and 
the coefficient of variation (CV). Between 1981 and 1990 the Theil index rose by fifteen 
percent, the Gini coefficient increased by more than five percent, and the CV increased 
by nearly twenty-three percent. However, this rise in inequality was not monotonic over 
the period. Both the Theil index and the Gini rose every year from the previous one, 
except in 1984, 1986 and 1990. The CV also fell in 1984 and 1990, but it rose in 1986, 
falling the next year, and then rising almost to its 1986 level by 1990. The differing 
behaviour of the measures in 1986 arises from their sensitivity to incomes in different 
ranges of the distribution. The Theil index is more sensitive to low incomes, the Gini to
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1986 1987 1988 1989 1990
213 166 166 196 164
110 84 79 88 79
0.694 0.710 0.750 0.796 0.745
0.581 0.592 0.609 0.618 0.606
2.084 1.891 1.869 2.154 2.009
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incomes in the middle of the distribution, and the CV is more sensitive to top incomes.
Despite this observation, the three measures present a remarkably coherent picture. First, 
there was an unambiguous tendency for income inequality to rise in Brazil during the 
decade. All three measures increased substantially during the recession of 1981-83, and 
although they fell with the resumption of growth in 1984, they soon resumed their upward 
trend, which was unchecked until all three measures peaked in 1989, except for the 
aforementioned falls in 1986-87.
Second, 1986 was an atypical year, in that both the Theil index and the Gini fell, 
indicating falling inequality with respect to the bottom of the distribution. The sharp rise 
in the CV suggests a greater dispersion amongst higher incomes. These changes go against 
the general trend and are almost surely due to the effects of the Cruzado Plan, which was 
introduced in February 1986 (see Chapter 6). This plan lowered inflation substantially, 
impacting positively upon those least able to protect their incomes against the inflation 
tax.13 Although end-of-year inflation was 145.3% (still much lower than either 1985 or 
1987 rates), it would have been quite a bit less in September, the PNAD reference month 
for incomes. In addition to lower inflation, the lower inequality amongst the poor in 1986 
may also reflect the accumulated effect of three years of growth. The fall in all three 
inequality measures in 1990, albeit to levels still much higher than the decade average - 
and indeed than any year up to 1987 - is also connected with a severe, if short-lived, 
reduction in inflation in the second and third quarters.
The behaviour of mean incomes per decile sheds further light on the remarkably consistent 
time paths of the inequality measures (see Table 6)14. The data shows that although overall 
average income rose between 1981 and 1990, the average incomes of the poorest 30% 
fell. The top ten percent gained the most, with average income rising by roughly 20 
percent, whilst the middle groups at worst stood still, and the poorest decile lost by almost 
ten percent.
13 This effect is at least partially captured by the real income data, to the extent that 
nominal returns on financial assets and/or capital gains are reported as nominal income 
by those to whom they accrue.
14 Decile groupings were used for reporting income shares and means, whilst all 
graphs and dominance results were generated using percentiles.
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Table 6: Brazil 1981-1990. Mean incomes per decile.
Decile 1981 1983 1984 1985
1 13.92 12.45 12.88 13.85
2 26.32 22.52 23.45 26.02
3 37.47 37.75 32.61 37.16
4 50.29 42.55 43.29 50.17
5 65.33 55.46 55.89 65.27
6 84.67 72.21 72.76 85.80
7 111.67 96.60 96.41 114.46
8 153.72 135.23 133.16 159.17
9 237.07 213.58 207.17 248.60
10 644.46 581.29 570.87 702.14
top 1% 1692.51 1578.79 1487.34 1949.80






























































The recession caused mean incomes for all deciles (but the third) to fall between 1981 and 
1983. From 1983 to 1984 there was equalizing growth, with mean incomes for the bottom 
six deciles (again except the third) rising and those of the top four falling. This is 
perfectly in line with the fall of all three inequality measures in Table 6 and, indeed, with 
the fact that 1984 Lorenz dominates 1983, as we shall see below. As growth accelerates, 
all decile means are higher in 1985 than in 1984. Between 1985 and 1986, incomes for 
all groups again increased significantly, although not uniformly. This reflects not only the 
large GDP growth rates of 1985 and 1986, but also the aforementioned redistributive 
effect of falling inflation. The mean incomes of the poor and middle groups grew 
proportionately more than the mean of the rich15, which confirms the picture obtained 
from falls in the Theil and Gini. Between 1986 and 1987 all ten decile mean incomes fell, 
but the mean incomes of the poor and middle groups fell by proportionately more than 
those of the rich16.
The gains that had accrued to all groups from 1984 to 1986 were eroded almost entirely 
by 1988 for the lowest three deciles. By the end of the period, their mean incomes had 
fallen to below their 1981 levels, whilst the next three deciles were little better off.
Further insight may be gained by examining the income shares of different deciles of the 
distribution. This abstracts from changes in the overall mean, to look exclusively at 
inequality. Table 7 below shows shares of total income accruing to each decile. Between 
1981 and 1990, the shares of all but the richest 20% fell, and these gained chiefly at the 
expense of the poorest groups. The poorest decile lost 20% of its original share of total 
income, the fifth decile lost nine percent of its original share, and the richest gained by 
almost six percent.
Again we see that the recession early in the decade was inequality-augmenting, as deciles 
2 to 8 lost income share to deciles 9 and 10.17 Between 1983 and 1984, shares of deciles
15 Between 1985 and 1986 average income of decile 1 rose by 48%, that of decile 5 
by 47%, and that of decile 10 by 40%.
16 Between 1986 and 1987 average income of decile 1 fell by 31%, that of decile 5 
fell by 24%, and that of decile 10 fell by 21%.
17 Although there was a 2% increase in the share of the poorest decile.
Table 7: Brazil 1981-1990. Income Shares by Decile.
1981 1983 1984 1985
Decile
1 0.97 0.99 1.03 0.92
2 1.85 1.78 1.88 1.73
3 2.63 2.51 2.61 2.48
4 3.53 3.37 3.47 3.33
5 4.59 4.39 4.48 4.35
6 5.94 5.71 5.83 5.71
7 7.84 7.64 7.72 7.62
8 10.78 10.70 10.67 10.59
9 16.64 16.90 16.59 16.54
10 45.23 46.00 45.72 46.73
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1986 1987 1988 1989 1990
0.96 0.84 0.70 0.73 0.77
1.80 1.64 1.52 1.48 1.52
2.60 2.41 2.26 2.15 2.26
3.46 3.30 3.09 2.94 3.10
4.51 4.39 4.14 3.95 4.19
5.88 5.79 5.50 5.32 5.53
7.73 7.71 7.38 7.25 7.46
10.60 10.66 10.35 10.41 10.54
16.38 16.52 16.48 16.40 16.70
46.08 46.74 48.54 49.35 47.93
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1 to 7 rose at the expense of the top three deciles. This was partly reversed in 1985 (as 
we will see, 1984 Lorenz dominates both 1983 and 1985), but between 1985 and 1986 the 
lowest eight deciles recovered some of their original share in total income. After 1986, 
there is a continuing deterioration of the distribution of income for three years, with 1989 
recording the highest share for decile 10, and the lowest for deciles 2 to 7. There is some 
improvement in 1990 (which Lorenz dominates 1988 and 1989), but it is still much worse 
than earlier in the decade (1990 is Lorenz dominated by every single year between 1981 
and 1987). In 1990, all but the richest 20% were worse off than in 1981, in relative terms.
This implies that gains by deciles 4 to 8 between 1981 and 1990, in terms of mean 
incomes as reported in Table 6, were due to economic growth - as implied by the survey 
data - rather than to redistribution. In relative terms, the top 20% of the distribution gained 
at the expense of the poorest 80%. In fact, despite growth in the overall mean, these 
inequality augmenting redistributions caused the poorest 30% to lose out even in absolute 
terms. This is in line with the findings of Datt and Ravallion (1992), who use a parametric 
method to decompose changes in poverty into a growth and a redistribution component. 
Comparing Brazil's performance in the 1980s with that of India, they state that:
"With Brazil's worsening distribution (from the point of view of the poor), far 
higher growth rates than those of the 1980s would have been needed to achieve 
the same impact on poverty as India attained..." (p.294).
I now turn to the results of our investigation into stochastic dominance relations among 
the distributions in the decade. In keeping with common empirical practice, these are 
presented in terms of Pen parades, Lorenz curves, and Generalised Lorenz curves, rather 
than in terms of distribution or deficit functions. Section 2 contained a discussion of the 
equivalences between the two sets of concepts and definitions.
Pen parades plot incomes per percentile for each of the years in the sample. Graphs for 
1981, 1983, 1986 and 1990 are shown in Figure 1. The usefulness of this tool for 
intertemporal comparisons of social welfare is that if the parade for year A lies nowhere 
below and at least at one point above the parade for year B then, as discussed in Section 
2, social welfare is higher in A than in B for any social welfare function that is 
individualistic, additively separable and increasing in income (see the first theorem above).
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Lorenz curves plot the cumulative share of income against the cumulative share of 
population, ranked in increasing order of income. Plots for 1981, 1986 and 1990 are 
shown in Figure 2. Lorenz dominance is diagrammatically analogous to Pen parade 
dominance, and indicates that inequality is lower in the dominant distribution for any 
inequality measure that satisfies the Pigou-Dalton Transfer Principle (see the third theorem 
in Section 2). Finally, a Generalised Lorenz curve plots the cumulative share of income 
scaled up by the distribution mean, against the cumulative share of population ranked in 
increasing order of income. Graphs for 1981, 1986 and 1990 are shown in Figure 3. 
Generalised Lorenz dominance is diagrammatically analogous to Lorenz dominance and 
indicates that social welfare is higher in the dominant distribution for any social welfare 
function that is individualistic, additively separable, increasing in income and strictly 
concave (see the second theorem in Section 2).
Since there are nine years of data, each of the three comparisons described above is 
possible for 36 pairwise combinations. For each of them, three outcomes are possible: A 
may dominate B, B may dominate A, or the curves may cross. Table 8 below summarizes 
all 108 possible dominance comparisons. Cell (i, j) has an L (G, P) if year i Lorenz 
(Generalised Lorenz, Pen parade) dominates year j. For example, if i = 1984 and j = 1983, 
we can see that the 1984 distribution Lorenz dominates that of 1983. A cell (i, j) may be 
empty of any of these three letters for two reasons: cell (j, i) may be full, or the relevant 
curves for i and j may cross.
The distributions are initially compared at the percentile level of aggregation, and the 
entries in Table 8 thus refer to sample dominance at that level. As Howes (1993a) has 
pointed out, this procedure is clearly statistical - in the sense that it is a comparison based 
on sample averages - and the inference of population dominance from the results should 
therefore be subject to a statistical test. Howes has proposed such a test, based on the 
simple test of sample mean differences. The key statistic is given by:
A A *
z. = _ c' - c ‘I / 4
f t .<?„. (12) + -
N N \
where £ = £w) is a vector of heights of curves (Lorenz, Generalized Lorenz or
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Pen's Parades) at the disaggregated sample level; Q  is the relevant element in the diagonal 
of the variance-covariance matrix associated with and N is the sample size. Zj is 
asymptotically normally distributed. The individual null and alternative hypotheses are 
given by:
H„: C, < &• .
H,: Ci > Ci* •
The complete test is described by Howes (1993) as an intersection-union test:
Ho*. £  < £*. 3i, i = 1,..., W.
Hp & > &*, Vi, i = 1,..., W.
where the name refers to the fact that the rejection region of the test is the intersection of 
the rejection regions for all individual tests, and the non-rejection region is the union of 
all non-rejection regions. A rejection of the joint (or complete) null hypothesis allows one 
to infer population dominance from the sample dominance. Using Howes's endogenous 
bounds method, Table 8 denotes those percentile dominance results which were found to 
be statistically significant at the 5% level, for a range of 99% (*) or 100% (**) of the 
distribution, based on checking the complete disaggregated sample.
Inspection of the table reveals that most dominance results obtained from a comparison 
at the percentile level of aggregation are found to be statistically significant based on a 
comparison at the fully disaggregated sample level. This allows us to interpret the results 
as referring to the Brazilian population in the discussion below.
The two most remarkable general features of the table are, first, that there are very few 
G or P dominance results, but many cases of Lorenz dominance and, second, that the 
latter are heavily concentrated above the diagonal. The interpretation of the second 
observation is that there was a marked trend for increasing inequality in the decade. For 
example, 1988, 1989 and 1990 are all Lorenz dominated by every single year between 
1981 and 1987. The interpretation of the first observation is that clear-cut welfare 
dominance results are much harder to find, since growth in mean reported income in the 
decade was offset by the increase in inequality, preventing social welfare from rising 
unambiguously for the aforementioned wide classes of social welfare functions.
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Table 8: Inequality and Welfare Dominance Results
1981 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990
1981 G**JP* L** L L** L** L** L**
1983 L L L* L** L*
1984 L L L L** •L** L** L**
























In what follows, we briefly discuss some of the more specific results available from Table 
8, and indeed some comparisons where crossings occurred. We turn first to the Pen 
parades. The striking feature of the curves is the difference between mean incomes among 
the rich and mean incomes among the poor in each year. We have already seen in Table 
6 that mean incomes among the top ten percent are around 50 to 60 times higher than 
among the poorest ten percent, but when we examine the top one percent the differences 
are even more marked. Average income of the top one percent in 1981 was $1693, 
compared with the average of the poorest one percent of just $5. Average income of the 
top one percent in 1990 was $2236, compared with $4 for the poorest one percent. In each 
year the distribution is so skewed in favour of the rich, that only the top 25% of the 
population have incomes above the overall average.
According to the Pen parades, welfare in 1990 is higher than in 1981 for the top 67%, but 
lower for the poorest 26%18. This reflects again the fact that growth in the 1980s - even
18 The parades for 1981 and 1990 cross three times between the 26% and 33% points.
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if it was as high as the survey data would suggest - did not benefit the poorest households 
in Brazil. But its absence does seem to hurt everyone: 1981 dominates both 1983 and
1984, reflecting the serious society-wide effects of the recession. This is in line with the 
large increases in poverty during the recession described by Datt and Ravallion (1992), 
and confirmed by our findings in the next section. The most impressive year, of course, 
is 1986, where growth and the inflation-reducing Cruzado Plan combined to produce very 
large welfare gains.
The Lorenz curves confirm the picture of rising inequality over the period, with 
dominance of the 1981 curve over all those from 1985 onwards. 1983 also dominates
1985, 1987, 1988, 1989 and 1990. 1984 dominates all subsequent years and 1985 
dominates 1988, 1989 and 1990. Inequality was therefore unambiguously lower at the 
beginning of the decade than at any subsequent time. The Lorenz curve for 1990 lies 
below all those for 1981 - 1987, but above those for 1988 and 1989. Between 1985 and 
1986 there is a fall in inequality, with dominance up until the top percentile, which 
confirms the picture described by the summary inequality measures earlier - the bottom- 
sensitive Gini and Theil index both fall between 1985 and 1986, whereas the top-sensitive 
CV rises. The Lorenz curve for 1986 dominates that of 1987, hence inequality 
unambiguously rises19.
In terms of Generalised Lorenz dominance, as for Pen parade dominance, the most 
remarkable feature is that 1986 G-dominates every other year in the sample. Since mean 
income in 1986 is higher than in any other year in the decade, it clearly could not be 
dominated by them. But in fact, the mean is so high that 1986 not only G-dominates 
1987, 1988,1989 and 1990 (years in which mean incomes were lower and inequality was 
higher), it also dominates 1981 and 1984, when inequality was unambiguously lower, and 
1983 and 1985, whose Lorenz curves its crossed.
In summary, inequality increased unambiguously during the 1980s, causing welfare
19 We would, however, expect a crossing of the 1986 and 1987 Lorenz curves near 
the top of the distribution, because of the behaviour of the summary measures (both the 
Gini and Theil rise, while the CV falls). Although inspection of the percentile points does 
not reveal a crossing, a finer partition does. This is why this dominance result is not 
statistically significant.
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amongst the poorest third of the population to decline, despite growth in the (reported) 
overall mean income. The bottom of the distribution experienced a substantial, but 
temporary, improvement in 1986.1 now turn to an examination of poverty in the decade, 
using the PNAD data set.
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51 Poverty in the 1980s.
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Given the results of the previous section - particularly the absolute fall in mean incomes 
for the bottom three deciles - it is not surprising that poverty as a whole increased over 
the 1980s. Although this chapter has been principally concerned with inequality, this 
section explores the poverty trends in greater detail. Following Sen (1981), the discussion 
is structured according to the two component aspects of poverty analysis: the identification 
problem and the aggregation problem. The first subsection discusses the choice of poverty 
line(s), which identifies the poor within the population. Some of the merits and limitations 
of the adopted approach are described.
The second subsection presents aggregated information on changes in the extent of 
poverty in Brazil, according to three different aggregation procedures - one for each of the 
poverty measures computed: the headcount index (H), the normalized poverty deficit 
(NPD) and the Foster-Greer-Thorbecke (FGT) index with the poverty aversion parameter 
oc=2. In addition, just as scalar measures were complemented by an investigation of 
stochastic dominance in the analysis of inequality, this subsection discusses poverty mixed 
dominance among the years studied.
5.11 Identifying the Poor: The Choice of Poverty Line.
Although the debate on the measurement of poverty has included views that poverty 
should be seen as simply an aspect of inequality - referring, for example, to "the nature 
and size of the differences between the bottom 20 or 10 per cent and the rest of society" 
(Miller and Roby, 1970, p. 143) - most researchers see poverty as a concept inherently 
distinct from inequality. The distinguishing feature is closely related to the focus axiom 
of poverty analysis: for a given poverty line, measures of poverty satisfying this axiom 
do not change if there is no change in the incomes of the poor, regardless of what happens 
among the non-poor. This is to say: once the set of the poor has been identified, poverty 
is an exclusive attribute of the poor, not of their position relative to the non-poor.
It follows immediately that the choice of a poverty line - which separates the poor from 
the non-poor - is crucial; any poverty measure can only be understood with reference to 
a particular poverty line. This section describes the derivation of the poverty line adopted
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in this chapter. The first choice facing any empirical researcher in this area is whether to 
embrace an absolute or relative concept of poverty. I follow Sen (1983), who argues for 
an "irreducible absolutist core in the idea of poverty"(p.l59), and adopt a poverty line 
based on an estimate of the income needed to meet basic needs, rather than simply a 
fraction of median income.
In particular, I use a set of regionally specific poverty lines which was painstakingly 
calculated by Rocha (1993), intended precisely for use with PNAD 1990 data. Rocha 
starts her procedure by following standard practice and computing the minimum cost of 
food baskets required to attain the FAO recommended caloric requirements. Because of 
substantial differences across the country's regions - and within these regions, from 
metropolitan to other urban areas and then to rural areas - in both consumption patterns 
and prices, a food basket was calculated for each area specifically.20 The food costs for 
each area therefore respect not only price differences, but also differences in tastes and 
local food availability across the different areas.
Once these food baskets had been costed, Rocha decided to deviate from the standard 
procedure of multiplying this number by the inverse of an Engel coefficient to obtain the 
poverty line. She argues convincingly that substantial relative price changes in Brazil 
during the decade meant that the Engel coefficient was not stable, and that - given the 
availability of detailed expenditure data from POF - it was preferable to calculate non­
food expenditure amongst the poor directly.21 This she did for each separate metropolitan 
area again, and adding the non-food expenditure amongst the poor to the food basket cost
20 In fact, this was done for the nine metropolitan areas (Belem, Fortaleza, Recife, 
Salvador, Belo Horizonte, Rio de Janeiro, Sao Paulo, Curitiba and Porto Alegre), as well 
as Brasilia and Goiania, for which a recent (1987) expenditure survey data set was 
available. This was the Pesquisa de Or9 amentos Familiares (POF). For the other urban and 
rural areas, conversion factors were borrowed from an earlier work by Fava (1984), which 
were based on the most recent available data for these areas, the 1975 Estudo Nacional 
da Despesa Familiar (ENDEF).
21 The poor' amongst whom she computes non food expenditures are those who, 
according to information recorded by POF, were unable to meet minimum caloric 
requirements as specified by FAO. It is interesting to note that if the criterion had been 
recommended caloric requirements, which were used to derive the food basket component 
of the poverty lines, some areas would have had over half of the population counted as 
'poor' for the purpose of studying non-food expenditure.
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gives her regional poverty lines. These were updated for 1990 from the 1987 current 
prices by use of the INPC price index. This makes it particularly compatible with our data 
set, where conversion to real values also used the INPC to derive constant 1990 cruzeiros 
(and then dollars). The values of the regionally specific poverty lines, in 1990 US dollars, 
for the relevant PNAD regions are reported in Table 9 below, which is converted from 
table X in in Rocha (1993). For greater detail on the construction of these lines, such as 
the specific food baskets in each metropolitan area, the exact non-food expenditures by 
category, or the conversion factors from metropolitan lines to other urban and rural areas, 
please see Rocha (1993).
Before presenting the aggregation results, it should be noted that there is one potentially 
serious problem with the Rocha methodology. By using regionally specific food and non­
food bundles, as well as prices, to cost basic needs, it is possible that the resulting poverty 
lines are not equivalent to a constant level of utility or well-being across the regions. If, 
for instance, the price of food relative to non-food is higher in urban than in rural areas, 
triggering a substitution effect, it could be the case that utility amongst urban households 
consuming a bundle that includes the recommended FAO caloric intake is higher than 
amongst rural households consuming a (different) bundle that yields the same calories.
This situation is illustrated in Figure 4 below. Let us abstract for the moment from the
different compositions of consumption expenditures within the food and the non-food 
bundles, and thus from relative prices within them, and consider a schematic example with 
only two commodities (food F and non-food N) and two regions (urban U and rural R). 
Let D be the quantity of food that yields the FAO recommended caloric intake. Let the 
slope of R denote the relative prices Pf/Pn in the rural region, and U in the urban region. 
The diagram illustrates that consumers with identical (homothetic) preferences will reach 
consumption of D at different levels of utility, with the urban households having a higher 
real income.
But given Rocha's method, the poverty lines would be given by:
Rural poverty line = PF (OD) + PN (OB)
Urban Poverty line = PF (OD) + PN (OA).
These would classify urban households with utility levels below Uc as poor, whereas rural 
households would only be counted as poor when their utility levels were lower than UE.
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For those who take a utilitarian view of poverty, rather than one based lexicographically 
on food consumption, this is a shortcoming of this identification methodology.
Figure 4
O D
Figure 4: Different utility levels for urban and rural households consuming the same 
amount of food.
This problem is common to a number of other approaches, such as the Food Energy 
Intake (FEI) method used, inter alia, by Indonesia's Central Bureau of Statistics, as noted 
by Ravallion and Bidani (1994). They suggest an alternative method, which is essentially 
a variant of the cost of basic needs (CBN) approach, where prices are allowed to vary 
regionally, but the composition of the food bundle is fixed as the (appropriately scaled up) 
average consumption level of each commodity in some reference group (e.g. those who 
fail to reach the FAO recommended caloric intake). See Ravallion and Bidani (1994) for 
further details.
Despite this difficulty, Rocha's poverty lines are still the best available for the analysis 
below. There are three reasons for this. First, re-estimating a poverty line for each region 
using the Ravallion and Bidani method would have required access to the detailed ENDEF 
and POF data sets, which I did not have. Amongst the available absolute poverty
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identification approaches, the Rocha lines are preferable to its competitors, such as the 
minimum wage, whose real value has varied widely over time.
Second, the Ravallion and Bidani approach is itself vulnerable to criticism, albeit for 
different reasons. One trade-off with the Rocha method is that by fixing the consumption 
bundle used to calculate the poverty threshold (which does eliminate the substitution effect 
problem of relative price variations), their approach ignores differences in regional 
availability. The 'average bundle' amongst all consumers will inevitably bias weights 
towards foodstuffs consumed in the more populous areas, so that the final poverty line in 
Brazil would weigh the prices of rice and agai (a tropical fruit) identically across the 
country, and most probably very differently from the shares of those two commodities in 
the diet of a family in rural Acre. While Ravallion and Bidani have highlighted an 
important issue in poverty identification, it is not clear a priori that the gains from 
eliminating the substitution effect necessarily outweigh the losses from regional specificity 
in food availability.
Third, as with the difficulties associated with income reporting discussed in Section 3, it 
is likely that the problems with Rocha's poverty lines are less severe if one uses them 
principally to establish trends, i.e. if one pays less attention to the absolute values of the 
poverty measures described below than to how they changed during the decade.
5.21 Aggregation: poverty measures and mixed dominance: 1981-1990.
Three measures were chosen to describe poverty in each year, and changes in poverty 
during the decade: the headcount index, the normalised poverty deficit and the Foster- 
Greer-Thorbecke index (with oc=2). These indices and their properties are widely known, 
dispensing further discussion here. They can all be expressed as members of the 
parametric FGT class, the formula for which is given in Appendix B. The values are 
shown in Table 10, and together they take into account the three Is of poverty - incidence, 
intensity and inequality amongst the poor. Not surprisingly, the poverty picture reflects 
the behaviour of the mean incomes for the bottom deciles, reported in Table 6. Between 
1981 and 1990, we observe a rise in poverty according to all measures. The rise in the 
headcount index indicates that there were marginally more poor people by the end of the 
decade than there had been in the beginning. In addition, the fact that the normalized
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poverty deficit grew by proportionately more than the headcount index (6% versus 1%) 
is evidence that the poor were, on average, further away from the poverty line.22 Finally, 
the 10% rise in FGT(2) suggests that incomes among the poor were also distributed more 
unequally.
Table 10: Brazil 1981-1990. Poverty measures.
1981 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990
Headcount 0.445 0.553 0.520 0.457 0.296 0.417 0.439 0.403 0.450
NPD 0.187 0.235 0.232 0.195 0.109 0.178 0.194 0.177 0.199
FGT2 0.104 0.135 0.132 0.109 0.056 0.099 0.112 0.101 0.114
Nevertheless, as in the case of the inequality measures, this increase was not monotonic. 
In fact, poverty appears to have behaved more (anti-)cyclically than inequality, with sharp 
increases during recessionary periods and substantial declines when growth resumed23 All 
three measures indicate a sharp increase in poverty from 1981 to 1983, due to the 
recession. Indeed, all of the measures have 1983 as their peak year for the decade. All 
measures then decline monotonically until 1986, although until 1985 each was still above 
its 1981 level. The really sharp reduction in poverty came in 1986, as was to be expected 
from the previous welfare dominance results for that year. The underlying story seems to 
reflect the positive impact of growth in 1984-86 on poverty reduction, but the magnitude 
of the shift in 1986 is compatible with the hypothesis that the abrupt lowering in inflation 
brought about by the Cruzado Plan had an additional impact.
All three measures are at their minimum in 1986 and then rise until 1990, except for a 
temporary decline in 1989. Overall, the sharp increases in poverty during the early
22 Using the poverty measure definitions contained in Appendix B, it is immediate that 
the average normalized distance between individual incomes of the poor and the poverty 
line equals the ratio NPD / H.
23 I return to this proposition in Chapter 8, where relations with macroeconomic 
variables are investigated explicitly.
223
recession years, reinforced by the increases in the post-1986 inflationary period, more than 
offset the gains made in 1984-86. Poverty is shown to have increased according to all 
three measures from 1981 to 1990, which is fully compatible with the losses in mean 
decile income for the first three deciles reported in Section 3.
Nevertheless, while inequality rose persistently and unambiguously during the 1980s, as 
revealed by the Lorenz dominance results of Table 8, the picture is less clear for poverty. 
This is brought out by Table 11 below, which is analogous to Table 8, but where D in cell 
(i, j) indicates that year i displays poverty mixed dominance over year j. Let z denote the 
value of a poverty line. Formally a distribution F displays poverty mixed dominance over 
distribution F* (FDmF*) iff G(yk) < G*(yk), Vyk < z*, and F(y) < F(y*), Vy e (z\ z+), and 
either G(yk) < G*(yk), 3yk < z\ or F(y) < F(y*), 3y e (z\ z+). In this definition, G(yk) is 
the deficit curve derived from distribution F(y), as defined by equation (5); z' is the lower 
bound on the set of poverty lines one might wish to consider, and z+ is the upper bound 
on that set. Naturally, if one wishes to consider dominance with respect to a single 
poverty line, then z* = z+, but allowing for a range of poverty lines tests the sensitivity of 
poverty comparisons to variations in the poverty line itself.
In deriving the dominance comparisons presented below, z  was set equal to the lowest 
of the set of Rocha's lines, presented in Table 9 above (US$ 35.34), and z+ as the highest 
(US$ 117.49), as these appeared to be natural bounds for a nationwide poverty study. 
Whereas in deriving the scalar measures reported in Table 10, regional household income 
per capita vectors were compared with their specific poverty line; in the dominance 
analysis, the national distribution is analyzed as a whole, with the set of pertinent poverty 
lines ranging from z* to z+. The interval between the two is a large one, so that poverty 
mixed dominance in our analysis involves a stringent requirement of first order dominance 
over a large percentile range of the distributions. From the definition above, and the 
discussion in Section 2, it is clear that mixed dominance consists essentially of second 
order dominance from zero to the lowest poverty line, and first order dominance between 
the lowest and the highest poverty lines. The concept was developed by Howes (1993a), 
as an extension of the application of second order dominance to poverty analysis by 
Atkinson (1987).
Howes (1993b) argues that while:
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"Poverty first-order stochastic dominance can legitimately be viewed as too 
demanding a criterion..., poverty second-order stochastic dominance may... be 
regarded as too lenient a criterion, since it covers only functions which satisfy the 
transfer principle everywhere." (p. 12).
First order dominance covers a very wide class of opulence functions24, requiring only that 
they be increasing in income and respect the focus axiom, but it is a very stringent 
requirement, seldom met in practice. Second order dominance, used in Atkinson's (1987) 
paper which launched dominance analysis of poverty, is less demanding, but has one 
shortcoming. The class of functions it covers is much smaller, and it requires that welfare 
or opulence functions satisfy the transfer axiom throughout the distribution. This excludes 
the commonest of all poverty measures, (or rather, its negative, the opulence function 
corresponding to) the headcount index.
Howes (1993b) demonstrates that mixed dominance covers an intermediate class of 
functions, requiring that they be increasing with income, that they satisfy the focus axiom 
and the transfer axiom, except for situations in which crossings of the poverty line arise. 
Poverty mixed dominance would then imply that all poverty measures (opulence 
functions) in this class rank poverty in the two distributions in the same way. Poverty 
mixed dominance of year i (e.g.1981) over year j (e.g. 1983) signifies that poverty is 
higher in j than in i for all measures in the class, and for all poverty lines in (z\ z+). This 
class now includes all poverty measures in the Foster-Greer-Thorbecke parametric family, 
including the headcount (see Appendix B to Chapter 7).25
Before presenting the results, a word is required on the use of Pen parades and 
Generalized Lorenz curves instead of distribution functions and deficit curves for checking 
poverty mixed dominance. As mentioned in Section 2, it has been shown that while 
second order dominance and (Generalized) Lorenz dominance are not perfect substitutes 
in general, the relationship FD2F*(y) iff FDLF*(p) does hold if p = F(y) < F*(y). This
24 'Opulence functions', in Howes's terminology, are negatives of poverty measures.
25 Mixed stochastic dominance of year i over year j, with the set of poverty lines 
given by (z\ z+), implies second (but not first) order stochastic dominance of i over j until 
z+. First order stochastic dominance of i over j until z+ implies mixed (and second order) 
stochastic dominance. See the definitions in Section 2, and the discussion in Howes 
(1993a).
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allowed me to use them interchangeably for comparing complete (uncensored) 
distributions, since in that case p = 1 = F(y) = F*(y). Howes (1993b) shows that they can 
also be used interchangeably for poverty mixed dominance, since satisfying first order 
dominance over (z\ z+) necessarily satisfies the required condition. The results below have 
thus been obtained by comparing Generalized Lorenz curves up to p = F(z'), and Pen 
parades between p and p+ := max (F(z+), F*(z+)).
Table 11: Poverty Mixed Dominance Results










This Table confirms the thrust of the results inferred from the scalar measures. Its first 
striking feature is the dominance of 1986 over every other year in the sample, indicating 
that poverty was unambiguously lower in that year, for any choice of poverty line between 
US$ 35.34 and US$ 117.49 monthly gross income per capita. This is of course consistent 
with the much lower values for all three reported measures in that year, as well as with 
the welfare dominance results of Table 8. In fact, since 1986 displayed both G and P 
dominance over every other year, except 1989, the result above had to follow for those 
years. It does add new information to a poverty comparison with 1989, over which 1986 
displayed second but not first order welfare dominance. The mixed dominance result 
reported above indicates that the P crossing between the two years did not occur over the 
interval (z\ z+). The overall picture clearly confirms that the rapid growth in the years
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leading to and including 1986, combined to the dramatic reduction in the inflation tax 
burden, had a substantial poverty reducing effect.
Another way to look at the Table is to look for the years most often dominated, i.e those 
with most entries in their columns. These are years when poverty was most often 
unambiguously greater than at other times. The worst periods were the end of the decade 
(again except for 1989) and the 1983 recession, with a lagged effect lasting into 1984. 
Despite the stringent requirements embodied in the mixed dominance comparisons, both 
1988 and 1990 were dominated by 1986,1987 and 1989. 1983 and 1984 were dominated 
by 1981 and 1986.
The natural conclusion is that poverty behaved anticyclically, as one might expect: it rose 
in the recession of 1983, fell following the resumption of growth in the mid-80s, and 
reached a pronounced minimum in 1986. Then it rose again, with 1988 and 1990 being 
the most often dominated years in the period. While all three measures in Table 10 
suggest that poverty was higher in 1981 than in 1990, the fact that there was no 
dominance of the latter over the former suggests, as mentioned earlier, that the poverty 
increase over the decade was less clear and unambiguous than the increase in inequality.
61 Robustness of the Analysis with Respect to the Choice of Equivalence Scales.
As noted in Section 3, the analysis so far has been based on per capita household 
incomes, with each individual as the income recipient. This has been common practice in 
works on Brazilian income distribution, and the same income variable is used by Barros, 
Mendon?a and Rocha (1993), Datt and Ravallion (1992) and Rocha (1993), to mention 
but a few. Nevertheless, if the objective is a comparison of interpersonal levels of welfare, 
this approach clearly represents a strong assumption on intra-household scale economies, 
namely that they do not exist.
This is at odds with best practice in distributional analysis for many other countries, and 
a substantial literature has evolved on means to take into account differences in needs and 
characteristics across households, when comparing the welfare levels of individuals in 
them. This is most commonly done through the adoption of an equivalence scale. It is not 
my intention to survey this literature here, as this was done by Coulter, Cowell and
Jenkins (1992b).
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In that survey, the authors review that 'personal well-being' - or equivalised income - Y 
can be seen conceptually as a function Yj = /  (Xj, pi5 a^, where X denotes household 
money income, p is the relevant price vector, and a is a vector of household 
characteristics. Households are indexed i = 1,..., H. Equivalence scales, usually denoted 
Mis help map money incomes X into equivalised incomes Y, as follows: Yj = X/Mj, for
each i = 1,..., H, where Mi is given as follows:
M. = --------- —  (13)
Equation (12) is the ratio of two 'cost functions', where u is some common level of well­
being or utility, the prices faced by different household types is assumed constant, and the 
household characteristics vary. The subscript r is for a reference household type.
Historically, there have been a number of different approaches to estimate Mi, as discussed 
by Coulter, Cowell and Jenkins (1992b). These have included econometric estimation of 
cost functions, based on demand functions (e.g. the Engel and the Rothbarth methods); 
subjective scales based on responses to questionnaires about how people regard their 
(monetary) income levels, given their family characteristics (e.g the Leyden approach); 
budget scales based on the judgements of experts as to what consumption bundles are 
necessary for different family compositions (particularly used in connection with attaining 
a given nutritional level); and so on.
Much as in the case of scalar inequality measures discussed in Section 2, the wide variety 
of equivalence scales that have been suggested may seem bewildering. Fortunately, it has 
been suggested that a simple parametric class of equivalence scales, due to Buhmann et 
al (1988) can, by appropriate choice of the parameter 0, proxy for most of the more 
complex scales. The Buhmann et al scale is given by Mj = s®, where Sj is the size of 
household i. This chapter follows Coulter, Cowell and Jenkins (1992a, b) in using this 
scale to achieve a tractable discussion of the sensitivity of the poverty and inequality 
measures presented above to changes in equivalence scale. Like them, I am not suggesting 
that household size is the only conceptually important family attribute to help determine
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differences in needs. I simply take advantage of the fact that varying the parameter 0 
allows a researcher to investigate the behaviour of scalar measures under very different 
assumptions about household scale economies.
Following Coulter et al (1992a), the empirical results below take the form of values for 
a number of scalar poverty and inequality measures for five different values of 0 (= 0.00; 
0.25; 0.50; 0.75; 1.00). Results are presented for the three inequality measures discussed 
above, namely the Gini coefficient, the Theil Index (G(l)), and the coefficient of variation, 
as well as for G(0), which is used extensively in the decompositions of Chapter 8. The 
poverty measures are the Headcount index, the normalized poverty deficit and the Foster- 
Greer-Thorbecke (a  = 2), as in Section 5. For reasons which will become apparent below, 
we investigate the variation of these poverty measures with 0 for two different poverty 
lines: the absolute, regionally-specific Rocha lines listed in Table 9, and a relative poverty 
line equal to 84% of median income.26 The exercise was also performed for a relative line 
defined in terms of the mean, but the results are essentially the same as for the median, 
and are not reported below.27 The variation of these measures with the parameter 0 are 
presented in Table 12 and Figures 5 and 6 below.
The Table and figures reveal that, for Brazil as for the United Kingdom, scalar measures 
of inequality and poverty are reasonably sensitive to the choice of equivalence scale. Four 
points deserve special mention. First, Figure 5 reveals that the trend of increasing 
inequality during the 1980s, which I have emphasized throughout this chapter, is robust 
to the choice of equivalence scale and, furthermore, that this robustness does not depend 
on the choice of particular scalar measure. For all four measures investigated, inequality 
was higher in 1990 than in 1985 and in 1985 than in 1981, for all values of theta. This 
suggests that the Lorenz dominance of 1981 over both 1985 and 1990, and that of 1985
26 In choosing a relative poverty line, the choice of proportion of the median is often 
arbitrary. In this instance, faithful to the absolutist core of poverty discussed in Section 
5.1, a value (of 84%) was chosen to give the income earned by the percentile equal to the 
1981 headcount, i.e the implied 'national average' poverty line.
The discrepancy between the two headcount values for 1981 is due to 
approximation in the choice of income level.
27 The choice of presenting the line relative to median income, rather than to the 
mean, is due to its greater robustness (see Cowell and Victoria-Feser, forthcoming). The 
results for the line defined w.r.t. the mean are available from the author on request.
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over 1990 are also robust to the choice of equivalence scale. In this respect, it seems that 
the choice of per capita income (0 = 1) as unit of analysis, in this and most other works 
on Brazil, does not affect conclusions regarding inequality trends over time.
Second, the analysis shows that for Brazil in the 1980s, all four inequality measures rose 
monotonically with theta. This suggests that if one is concerned with levels rather trends 
of inequality, the choice of per capita income implies a choice for the upper bound of 
inequality values. In this respect, the choice of per capita income, assuming away all 
economies of scale within the household, seems to exaggerate the level of inequality. 
Since most researchers would probably agree that the marginal cost of an extra person in 
the household does decline, however moderately, within a normal range, future analysis 
of inequality levels in Brazil should perhaps take a less cavalier attitude to equivalence 




































Figure 5: Inequality Measures and the Equivalence Scale: 1981, 1985 and 1990.
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Table 12: Sensitivity of Inequality and Poverty Measures to Choice of Equivalence Scale.
Theta 0.00 0.25 0.50 0,75 1.00
1981
Gini 0.534 0.536 0.543 0.556 0.574
G(0) 0.523 0.524 0.539 0.568 0.614
G(l) 0.536 0.543 0.563 0.597 0.647
CV 1.383 1.399 1.441 1.517 1.635
Fixed Poverty Line
Headcount 0.018 0.047 0.122 0.258 0.445
NPD 0.006 0.014 0.037 0.092 0.187
FGT(a = 2) 0.003 0.006 0.017 0.049 0.104
Relative Poverty Line (84% of median)
Headcount 0.430 0.430 0.430 0.431 0.437
NPD 0.191 0.188 0.188 0.191 0.197
FGT(a = 2) 0.110 0.107 0.107 0.110 0.116
1985
Gini 0.549 0.552 0.560 0.572 0.589
G(0) 0.554 0.557 0.574 0.604 0.649
G(l) 0.584 0.594 0.614 0.648 0.697
CV 1.542 1.558 1.602 1.680 1.804
Fixed Poverty Line
Headcount 0.027 0.060 0.138 0.280 0.457
NPD 0.008 0.018 0.041 0.100 0.195
FGT(a = 2) 0.004 0.008 0.020 0.050 0.109
Relative Poverty Line (84% of median)
Headcount 0.433 0.431 0.431 0.433 0.435
NPD 0.193 0.189 0.189 0.193 0.197
FGT(a = 2) 0.111 0.108 0.108 0.111 0.116
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1990
Gini 0.569 0.572 0.579 0.590 0.606
G(0) 0.611 0.615 0.631 0.661 0.705
G(l) 0.631 0.640 0.661 0.695 0.745
CV 1.637 1.670 1.739 1.849 2.009
Fixed Poverty Line
Headcount 0.036 0.078 0.159 0.287 0.450
NPD 0.011 0.024 0.053 0.110 0.199
FGT(a = 2) 0.005 0.011 0.026 0.057 0.114
Relative Poverty Line (84% of median)
Headcount 0.432 0.439 0.439 0.440 0.446
NPD 0.206 0.205 0.205 0.209 0214
FGT(a = 2) 0.125 0.123 0.123 0.127 0.132










































Figure 6: Relative Poverty Measures and the Equivalence Scale: 1981,1985 and 1990.
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In addition, it is noteworthy that the monotonicity with which the indices vary with theta 
is at odds with the stylised U-shaped curve found by Coulter et al (1992a) for the UK and 
by Rodrigues (1993) for Portugal. Coulter et al (1992a) propose that the U-shaped curve 
observed in their data set is likely to be the result of the varying relative strengths of two 
effects: a concentration effect which should cause the index I to fall with 0 when the 
correlation between household income and size is positive, and a re-ranking effect which 
could cause I to rise with 0. The Brazilian pictures suggest that the re-ranking effect of 
varying 0 might be outweighing the concentration effect. One plausible reason for this is 
that the correlation between household size and income in Brazil28 is likely to be much 
lower than in Europe, given the concentration of very large families amongst poorer 
households.
The third point relates to the Figure 6, and the fact that trends in poverty are less clear 
than those for inequality, as discussed in Section 5.2. This is particularly true between 
1981 and 1985.1990 does appear to have greater poverty than the other two years. In fact, 
poverty is greater for 1990 than for 1981 for all three measures, for all values of theta, 
which strengthens the conclusion of §5.2 that poverty worsened from the beginning to the 
end of the decade, despite behaving more cyclically than inequality. Poverty is also greater 
in 1990 than in 1985 for all measures for all values of theta, except for the headcount with 
0 = 0 29 But despite the relatively clear results for 1990, the choice of equivalence scale, 
which did not affect the picture of inequality trends at all, does appear to matter for the 
study of poverty trends. In particular, 0 = 1  ranks 1981 and 1985 in the opposite way to 
the other four values of theta both for the headcount and the normalised poverty deficit, 
and fails to rank them in the case of FGT (a = 2). This is cause for some concern, since 
0 = 1 is equivalent to per capita income, the commonest choice of equivalence scale in 
works on Brazil.
Fourth, these poverty findings confirm the general conclusions of Coulter et al (1992a) 
as regards the widely different effects of varying the equivalence scale on poverty analysis
28 The correlation coefficient between household size and household income in our 
sample was 0.033 in 1981, 0.004 in 1985 and 0.007 in 1990.
29 Given the pattern of all poverty measures with respect to theta revealed by Figure 
6, the value of the 1990 headcount for 0 = 0 appears slightly suspect. The computations 
were rechecked, and it seems to be correct.
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for absolute poverty lines vis-a-vis relative poverty lines. For fixed, absolute poverty lines 
defined, as by Rocha (1993), in terms of per capita income, a move to take account of 
household scale economies (i.e. lowering theta) is bound to lower any measure of poverty 
substantially. It is only when the poverty line itself is allowed to change in response to 
the change in the vector of equivalised incomes, that the U-curve obtained both by the 
aforementioned authors and in this chapter may arise. Indeed, as Figure 6 illustrates, when 
measuring poverty relative to a line defined as 84% of the median income in the relevant 
vector, I obtain U-curves for the behaviour of all poverty measures with respect to 
changes in theta, except for the headcount in 1981 and 1990.
In conclusion, examining the sensitivity of the poverty and inequality measures used in 
this chapter to the choice of equivalence scales yields a number of interesting insights. 
The reassuring news is that the inequality trends, which were quite marked both in terms 
of scalar measures for per capita income and in terms of Lorenz dominance, are robust 
to the choice of equivalence scales. The cautionary news is that using per capita income 
can lead to re-rankings for some poverty measures, if their values are not substantially 
different. And the intriguing news, begging further thought and research, is that although 
Brazilian data conforms to the stylized U-shaped curve of relative poverty measures when 
plotted against theta, this is not the case for any of the four inequality measures studied. 
A tentative suggestion was that this may be due to a much lower correlation between 
household income and size in Brazil than in other countries for which studies are 
available.
71 Conclusions.
This chapter presented the results of the analysis of the evolution of the distribution of 
income in Brazil during the 1980s, based on the PNAD data set. I argued that despite a 
number of likely income reporting problems, not entirely unusual but perhaps exacerbated 
by questionnaire design, this data set provided the best available source for insights into 
the behaviour of income distribution in that turbulent decade. This is due principally to 
its very large sample size, national representativeness and annual periodicity. The main 
findings relate to inequality, poverty and welfare.
Inequality increased unambiguously, although not monotonically, in Brazil during the
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1980s. This trend was evident from the evolution of scalar measures, whether they were 
more sensitive to the bottom (e.g. the Theil index), the middle (e.g. the Gini coefficient) 
or the top of the distribution (e.g. the coefficient of variation). It was confirmed by an 
examination of decile shares, whence it was observed that the two richest deciles gained 
income share at the expense of the poorest eight. And it was sharply brought out by the 
Lorenz dominance analysis, which revealed that all years from 1981 to 1987 displayed 
mean-normalized second order stochastic dominance over 1988, 1989 and 1990. This 
implies that any inequality measure satisfying the anonymity axiom and the Pigou-Dalton 
transfer principle would indicate a rise in inequality in Brazil from the beginning to the 
end of the decade. Furthermore, this trend appears to be robust to the choice of 
equivalence scale used.
Poverty also increased in the period, although its behaviour was characterized by wider 
fluctuations, and these appeared to be driven by the level of economic activity to a greater 
degree than in the case of inequality. All three measures of poverty rose substantially with 
the recession of the early eighties, falling with subsequent growth and plummeting to 
much lower levels during the low-inflation boom of 1986. That year displayed poverty 
mixed dominance over every other year in the period. Poverty grew again with the return 
of inflation and the deceleration of growth after 1986, reaching ’twin peaks' in 1988 and 
1990. Although 1981 does not dominate 1990 according to the demanding criterion used, 
1988 and 1990 were the years most often dominated by other years in the sample. Mean 
decile incomes were lower in 1990 than in 1981 for the bottom three deciles, and 1990 
had greater poverty than either 1981 or 1985, according to all measures for all tested 
values of the equivalence scale parameter theta, with only one exception.
Whilst I focused on inequality and poverty comparisons, some of the analysis lends itself 
to interpretation in terms of general social welfare. Relying on the Saposnik and Shorrocks 
theorems mentioned in Section 2, it can be stated that most social welfare functions would 
rank social welfare in Brazil as unambiguously lower in 1983 and 1984 than in 1981, or 
in 1988 and 1990 than in 1989, or indeed in every other year in the decade than in 1986. 
The social welfare dominance of 1986 over every other year is a remarkable result, 
particularly as that year combined strong growth with a stabilization plan that temporarily 
reduced inflation to levels unprecedented in the decade. I return to possible links in the 
next chapter.
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Welfare comparisons between the beginning and the end of the period of study are 
ambiguous. This ambiguity is due to the fact that growth in the overall mean reported 
income was offset by greater inequality, causing welfare to fall for the poorest quarter (or 
so) and to rise for the richest two-thirds (or so) of the population. If the growth implied 
by the household survey data is exaggerated - as suggested by the picture of stagnation 
revealed by the national accounts data reported in Chapter 6 - then these welfare results 
are upper bound, and losses are likely to extend further up than the 26th percentile of the 
distribution.30 The poverty results would be similarly affected, with the trend just 
described possibly underestimating the increases in poverty during the decade.
Even in the absence of a downward revision in the growth rates implicit in the PNAD 
data, the 1980s were a bad decade for equity in Brazil, with rises in both poverty and 
inequality. Since this analysis relied on data in which there was growth in average income, 
it is increased dispersion that lies behind welfare losses for the most vulnerable 
households in society, and is of particular concern. Policy omission of the type modelled 
earlier in this thesis might account for some of this increase but, as suggested earlier, the 
available data is not suitable for testing this hypothesis. The next chapter relies instead on 
a combination of decomposition analysis and some simple regressions to investigate a 
number of factors possibly associated with the observed increase in inequality.
30 See discussion in Section 3.
236
CHAPTER 8
GROWING APART: MICRO AND MACROECONOMIC FACTORS
BEHIND THE TRENDS.
Abstract: This chapter investigates a number of possible explanations for the inequality 
and poverty trends identified for Brazil in the 1980s by the previous chapter. While the 
static decompositions of inequality by household characteristics reveal that education, race 
and geographic location can account for a substantial proportion of inequality levels, a 
dynamic decomposition suggests that changes in inequality are not explained by income 
or allocation effects across these groupings. The analysis then turns to the role of 
macroeconomic instability, and finds some significant correlation and regression 
coefficients, which suggest that there appears to be a link between inflation and inequality, 
while poverty appears to be more strongly driven by real wages, growth and employment.
11 Introduction.
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Chapter 7 provided a detailed description of what was happening to the distribution of 
income and to poverty in Brazil in the 1980s. It presented a picture of significant 
increases in inequality throughout the decade. Apart from being important in their own 
right, these increases more than offset whatever growth there was in the period, causing 
poverty to rise as well, albeit with sharp cyclical fluctuations. This chapter seeks to 
suggest some possible explanations for the secular increase in inequality, by means of 
some standard decomposition analyses and of a simple investigation into links between 
the behaviour of some key macroeconomic variables, on the one hand, and inequality and 
poverty on the other.
Section 2 reports on the static inequality decompositions carried out with three inequality 
measures, for the years 1981, 1985 and 1990. These decompositions follow the method 
developed by Cowell and Jenkins (1995), and aim to separate total inequality levels into 
its components within and between groups, where the groups are defined by specific 
household attributes, such as regional location, urban-rural status, or age, gender, race or 
education of the head. It is hoped that this sheds light on the structure of inequality in the 
population. Section 3 discusses a dynamic decomposition methodology due to Mookheijee 
and Shorrocks (1982), which separates changes in inequality into components due to 
changes in the mean incomes of different groups, changes in the composition of these 
groups, and unexplained changes.
While the results of those two sections provide some insights into the nature of Brazilian 
inequality, its increase during the 1980s remains mostly unexplained by these conventional 
techniques. Section 4 then investigates the potential role of changes in macroeconomic 
aggregates, such as the growth rate, the rate of inflation, the average real wage rate and 
the rate of unemployment. This is done by means of diagrams, correlation coefficients and 
OLS regressions which, despite the reduced time-series sample size, reveal some 
significant correlation and regression coefficients. They suggest that there may be an 
important link between high and accelerating inflation, and the growth of inequality. 
Section 5 concludes.
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21 Static Decompositions of Brazilian Inequality.1
A standard approach to examining the nature of inequality is to analyze the role played 
by certain individual characteristics, such as age, gender, education and geographic 
location2. Several theories of the distribution of income provide a rationale for 
investigating personal characteristics like these. Human capital theories stress the role of 
education, age and experience, in models where individuals maximise utility over the life­
cycle by the optimal choice of investments in human capital (Becker, 1965; Mincer, 
1958). Other theories incorporate market imperfections. Labour market segmentation and 
dual-economy models use personal characteristics such as education, gender or geographic 
location, either as examples of signals which lead to discrimination, or as institutional 
barriers that prevent access to or mobility between different labour market segments (e.g. 
Lewis, 1954; Spence, 1973).
There is also empirical support for such partitions, from studies using regression analysis, 
inequality decomposition or analysis of variance techniques, although income inequality 
can never be fully explained by such characteristics. A survey of inequality 
decompositions in developing countries does show that personal attributes can account for 
large proportions of the dispersion in the distribution of income (Fields, 1980).
The analysis in this chapter concentrates on five attributes of the household: its regional 
location; its urban/rural status; age of household head3; gender of household head; and his 
or her educational attainment. Decompositions are carried out for three years: 1981, 1985 
and 1990. A sixth factor, ethnicity or race, is another important source of inequality. 
Unfortunately very little data is available on it: in 1981 the race question did not appear 
on the questionnaire and in 1985 less than 5% of the sample responded to it. Only for the 
last two or three years of the decade was there a significant response rate to the question,
1 Sections 2 and 3 draw heavily on Litchfield (1995).
2 Whilst it is possible to draw some inferences about the direction of causality 
between fixed attributes, such as gender or race, and incomes, it is difficult to do so 
between variable attributes, such as education, and incomes.
3 PNAD interviewers were instructed to register as household head the person 
"responsible for the household or so perceived by the remaining members" (E3GE, 1993,
p.16).
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so that it is only included in the decomposition analysis for 1990.
The point of the static decompositions of this section is to separate total inequality in the 
distribution into a component of inequality between the chosen groups (IB) - the explained 
component - and the remaining within-group inequality (Iw) - the unexplained component. 
These groups are defined by each of the attributes listed above; at first each characteristic 
is considered individually, and then a finer partition is created by incorporating all 
attributes together, to give a measure of total inequality explained by all household 
characteristics.
The first partition of the overall distribution by individual attribute was carried out for age. 
Households were grouped into six categories by age of head: 1) under 25, 2) 25-34, 3) 35- 
44, 4) 45-54, 5) 55-64 and 6) 65+ years, using an extension of the categorisation in 
Bonelli and Ramos (1993).4 The second partition was by educational attainment of 
household head, based on last completed year of formal schooling. Education was broken 
into five groups, again borrowing the Bonelli and Ramos (1993) categories, of 1) 
illiterates - less than one year of schooling, 2) elementary school - 1 to 4 years of 
schooling, 3) intermediate school - 5 to 8 years of schooling, 4) high school - 9 to 11 
years of schooling and 5) college education - 12 or more years of schooling. The third 
partition was by regional location of the household. States were grouped into the five 
official, standard geographical regions of Brazil: North, Northeast, Southeast, South and 
Centre-West. The fourth partition was by whether the household was located in a rural or 
urban area. The fifth partition was by gender of household head. The last individual 
partition was for ethnicity, and only applies to 1990. Households were divided into three 
groups by the declared ethnicity of the household head: 1) whites, 2) black and mixed 
race, 3) Asian origin.
Unfortunately, many widely used inequality measures are not decomposable, in the sense 
that overall inequality can not be related consistently to the constituent parts of the 
distribution. In particular, we are interested in measures where IB + Iw = /. This is not
4 Bonelli and Ramos (1993) carry out a similar set of decompositions, but only for 
economically active urban males between the ages of 18 and 65, working for more than 
20 hours a week. Their concern is with labour earnings, rather than household incomes.
generally true, for instance, of the Gini coefficient, but it is true of all members of the 
Generalised Entropy class.5 A general formula for the class is repeated below:
1 i *
a
-1 , aeR (l)
a2-a n
Because of its decomposability property, which is not shared by the Gini coefficient or 
by the coefficient of variation in its pure form, members of this class are clearly the most 
indicated for the analysis in this chapter. I therefore use three measures in the 
decompositions below: G(0), G(l) and G(2). If a=0 then, using l'Hopital's rule, G(a) can 
be written as:





Similarly, if <x=l, G(a) can be expressed as:




If a=2, equation (1) can be manipulated to be expressed in terms of the coefficient of 
variation, cv, as Vi cv2:
a c n - j nty) N-  E(y, - nCv))2ft i*l
(4)
In fact, G(l) is simply the Theil index, and G(2) is a transformation of the coefficient of
5 See the discussion of the five axioms satisfied by this parametric class, in Chapter
7-2.
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variation, both of which were used in Chapter 7. G(0), which has not been introduced 
before, is also known as the mean log deviation. Table 1 below gives the values for each 
of these measures for each of the three years analyzed in this chapter.
Table 1: Sum m ary statistics, 1981-1990.
1981 1985 1990
Mean Income 143 150 164
Median Income 75 74 79
G(0): mean log deviation 0.614 0.649 0.705
G(l): Theil Index 0.647 0.697 0.745
G(2): Vi squared coefficient 1.337 1.627 2.018
of variation
Note: all incomes in 1990 US dollars
Source: own calculations from PNAD, 1981-1990.
Some of this information was contained in Chapter 7, and again the upward trend in 
inequality during the decade is confirmed by all three measures. The values of G(a), a  
= 1, 2, 3, for the entire distribution, are included also for comparison with their values for 
different subgroups in the partitions below. Tables 2 and 3 present mean incomes, 
population shares, income shares and values for each of the inequality measures defined 
above, for each of the subgroups in each partition discussed earlier.
While these tables contain plenty of information, some basic features deserve special 
mention. The partition by age does not appear to be a very promising candidate for 
explaining much of the total inequality. The mean incomes per subgroup are fairly close 
to each other, varying little around the overall mean. Although households headed by the 
youngest do earn the least, there is no pronounced support for a life-cycle pattern of 
incomes. This is brought out by the mean incomes of households headed by 35-44 year- 
olds, in 1981 and 1985 in particular. While one might have expected these heads to be 
in some of their prime earning years, their household incomes per capita are lower than 
those of the age-groups immediately next to them. Though newborn children might 
explain part of this effect, it is doubtful that they account for the whole effect, particularly 
as most children in Brazil are bom to younger household heads. Finally, the values of
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Table 2: Sum m ary statistics: by age, education and race of household head, 1981-1990.
1981 1985 1990
Mj VJ G(2) G(l) G(0) Pj VJ G(2) G(l) G(0) Pj VJ G(2) G(l) G(0)
Age
1 124 0.04 0.03 0.81 0.45 0.43 120 0.04 0.03 0.96 0.51 0.48 126 0.04 0.03 1.36 0.61 0.56
2 148 0.22 0.23 1.17 0.63 0.62 153 0.23 0.23 1.32 0.65 0.64 156 0.22 0.21 1.54 0.69 0.68
3 127 0.28 0.25 1.38 0.67 0.64 145 0.28 0.27 1.61 0.73 0.70 163 0.29 0.28 1.67 0.74 0.73
4 146 0.24 0.24 1.32 0.63 0.60 150 0.23 0.22 1.63 0.70 0.65 169 0.22 0.23 1.67 0.72 0.70
5 161 0.13 0.15 1.38 0.65 0.61 168 0.14 0.15 1.93 0.71 0.63 182 0.14 0.15 1.71 0.74 0.70
6 151 0.08 0.09 1.65 0.70 0.61 151 0.09 0.09 2.01 0.75 0.63 165 0.10 0.10 5.41 0.94 0.73
Education
1 59 0.30 0.13 0.71 0.39 0.38 56 0.29 0.11 0.65 0.38 0.37 57 0.25 0.09 1.33 0.45 0.42
2 109 0.46 0.35 0.71 0.41 0.41 110 0.43 0.31 1.05 0.46 0.43 114 0.40 0.28 1.08 0.50 0.47
3 185 0.14 0.18 0.80 0.43 0.40 176 0.16 0.18 0.84 0.44 0.41 168 0.18 0.18 2.26 0.52 0.45
4 327 0.06 0.14 0.53 0.35 0.36 310 0.08 0.16 0.65 0.38 0.37 298 0.10 0.19 0.79 0.44 0.43
5 622 0.05 0.21 0.39 0.28 0.29 649 0.06 0.24 0.53 0.33 0.32 665 0.07 0.27 0.62 0.36 0.35
Race
1 220 0.54 0.73 1.73 0.68 0.66
2 93 0.45 0.26 1.46 0.60 0.56
3 421 0.01 0.02 0.71 0.44 0.47
Notes: |ij=mean income, fj=population share, Vj=income share.
all incomes in 1990 US dollars 
Source: own calculations from PNAD, 1981-1990.
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Table 3: Sum m ary statistics: by geographic location and gender of household head, 1981-1990.
1981 1985 1990
vj G(2) G(l) G(0) «i vj G(2) G(l) G(0) Mj vj G(2) G(l) G(0)
Region
SE 190 0.44 0.59 1.06 0.56 0.53 192 0.45 0.57 1.27 0.61 0.57 211 0.45 0.57 1.74 0.64 0.59
S 146 0.16 0.17 1.09 0.55 0.51 164 0.16 0.17 1.49 0.62 0.55 171 0.16 0.16 1.38 0.64 0.60
NE 74 0.30 0.16 1.84 0.68 0.57 78 0.29 0.15 2.29 0.76 0.62 83 0.29 0.15 2.55 0.84 0.70
CW 135 0.07 0.06 1.47 0.65 0.58 159 0.07 0.07 1.80 0.68 0.60 189 0.07 0.08 1.83 0.74 0.68
N 127 0.03 0.02 1.09 0.51 0.44 155 0.03 0.03 1.61 0.60 0.52 175 0.03 0.04 2.48 0.72 0.62
U rban/Rural
U 177 0.71 0.88 1.09 0.57 0.54 183 0.73 0.88 1.35 0.62 0.58 200 0.74 0.90 1.71 0.67 0.62
R 59 0.29 0.12 1.64 0.53 0.44 64 0.27 0.12 2.28 0.61 0.50 62 0.26 0.10 1.83 0.59 0.53
G ender
M 144 0.89 0.90 1.35 0.65 0.62 153 0.88 0.89 1.61 0.70 0.66 167 0.86 0.87 2.07 0.75 0.71
F 133 0.11 0.10 1.24 0.59 0.55 136 0.12 0.11 1.72 0.67 0.60 149 0.14 0.13 1.59 0.71 0.65
Notes: n=m ean income, fj=population share, Vj=income share.
all incomes in 1990 US dollars 
Source: own calculations from PNAD, 1981-1990.
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G(a) are fairly close to the overall inequalities reported in Table 1, for all three values of 
a , suggesting that the between-group component is not likely to be substantial.
The same is true for gender, where values for the three inequality measures for each 
subgroup were again quite close to - and in some cases greater than - the total inequality 
values. It should be noted that this result - which will be confirmed by the actual 
decompositions in Table 4 - is not about earnings inequality between men and women in 
the labour market. It is based on per capita household incomes, and on a definition of 
household head which is open to widely different interpretations (see footnote 3). Neither 
does it contain any information on intra-household allocation of income or resources, so 
that the fact that gender of household head is unimportant in accounting for inequality 
should not be interpreted as a statement about either labour market or intra-household 
discrimination.
The partitions by geographic region and by rural/urban status reveal a grater dispersion 
of subgroup means around the overall mean, for all years, and generally smaller values 
for the subgroup inequality measures than for the overall measure. There were exceptions, 
however, particularly for G(2) in a number of cases, and for the Northeastern region, 
which had higher values than the whole of Brazil for G(l) and G(2) in all three years.
But it is education that emerges as the attribute most likely to 'explain' some of total 
inequality. Here we see subgroup means rising monotonically with education, and 
displaying substantial variation around the overall mean. We also observe subgroup values 
for all three inequality measures well below those for the whole distribution. While this 
leads to the expectation that the static decomposition will reveal education as an important 
'explanatory' variable, the caution raised in footnote 2 should be borne in mind: education 
is a variable attribute, and causation can not be inferred to run exclusively from it to the 
distribution of incomes. It is probably reasonable to expect that the two are determined 
endogenously and simultaneously, and many models do exist with prominent links 
between one generation's income and the level of education of the next. Since income is 
likely to be serially correlated - although the absence of panel data prevents me from 
testing that hypothesis - caution is certainly warranted in interpreting the importance of 
education in 'explaining' income inequality.
But while observing subgroup means and inequality measures can be informative, there 
is a more formal way to appraise the contributions of each of these household attributes 
to overall inequality. This is through the static decompositions suggested by Cowell and 
Jenkins (1995), which is described below. When total inequality /, as measured by any 
of the three indices reported in the foregoing tables, is decomposed by population 
subgroups, the Generalised Entropy class of measures can be expressed as the sum of 
within-group inequality, Iw, and between-group inequality, IB . Within-group inequality, 
, is calculated and weighted as follows:
where fi is the population share and v. the income share of each subgroup j, 
Between-group inequality, is measured by assigning the mean income of group j ,  n(yj) 
to each member of the group and calculating:
Cowell and Jenkins (1995) show that the within- and between-group components of 
inequality, defined as above, can be related to overall inequality in the simplest possible 
way: IB + Iw = I. They then suggest an intuitive summary measure, RB , of the amount of 
inequality explained by a particular characteristic or set of characteristics (i.e. by a 
partition fi):
This statistic can be interpreted as the share of total inequality which can be 'accounted 
for' or 'explained' by the attributes defining partition IT. Table 4 below presents values of 
Rb for partitions by each characteristic discussed earlier, as well as for a finer partition, 
incorporating all of them together. This is done for each of the three inequality indices
k
/„  = 5 > y G (« ) ,
- A - r
(5)
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used in this chapter, and for 1981, 1985 and 1990. Clearly, the share of inequality 
explained by any or all of the household attributes varies according to the measure being 
decomposed. Just as we focused on the Theil and Gini in Chapter 7, we choose here to 
focus on G(0) and G(l). The explanatory power of the decompositions is smaller for G(2), 
which is more sensitive to higher incomes. In discussing the results in Table 4, the range 
of explanatory powers of each characteristic will be given for G(0) and G(l).
There are five main results from these decompositions: first, the explanatory power of age 
and gender of the household head is negligible in both cases. Second, inequality between 
rural and urban areas across the country explains somewhere between 10-17% of total 
inequality, while inter-regional differences account for 8-12%. Both of these partitions 
seemed to lose explanatory power with time. Third, the education level of the household 
head is by far the most important explanatory variable, accounting for up to 42% of total 
inequality in Brazil on its own. Its importance was relatively stable during the decade. 
Fourth, race is another important factor, accounting for between 11-13% of total 
inequality. The difference between the two bottom rows for 1990 shows, however, that 
although race is not negligible when taken alone, it must be closely correlated as an 
explanatory factor with some of the other attributes, since the explanatory power of the 
fine partition hardly changes as a result of its introduction.
Finally, when the five main variables are taken together, so that the distribution is finely 
partitioned, they jointly account for about half of total observed inequality. This is quite 
a high proportion, in comparison with many other countries. For the United States, for 
instance, Cowell and Jenkins (1995) find that gender, age, race and employment status can 
account for 25% - 33% of total inequality, by the same method as that used here.6 A 
similar range is obtained for Portugal, by Rodrigues (1993). Subject to the proviso made 
above that for variable factors these results can not be used to infer the direction of 
causation - which is particularly relevant in the case of years of schooling - this is an 
informative exercise.
6 There is a small difference: they use Atkinson indices, rather than members of the 
Generalized Entropy class. Higher values for RB are obtained when equivalent - rather 
than mean - incomes are used to compute between-group inequality. In that case, though, 
IB + lw *  I, so that Rb is no longer the only measure of explanatory power of a partition. 
Indeed, Rw = 1 - Iw/I ^  RB.





Age 0.01 0.01 0.00
Education 0.37 0.42 0.30
Region 0.12 0.10 0.04
Urban/rural 0.17 0.13 0.05
Gender 0.00 0.00 0.00
Race





G(0) G(l) G(2) G(0) G(l) G(2)
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
0.39 0.42 0.26 0.37 0.40 0.21
0.10 0.08 0.03 0.10 0.08 0.03
0.14 0.11 0.04 0.10 0.11 0.03
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
0.13 0.11 0.04
0.51 0.50 0.30 0.50 0.49 0.25
0.52 0.51 0.26
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3  ^ The Dynamic Decomposition of Brazilian Inequality.
However, while we may now feel that we know some of the factors behind the high levels 
of inequality in Brazil, such as educational attainment, geographic location, rural/urban 
status and race, they do not tell us anything about the reasons behind the changes during 
the 1980s, with which we were concerned in Chapter 7. To investigate whether these 
household characteristics can help explain those changes, I briefly report results from a 
dynamic decomposition of G(0), due to Mookherjee and Shorrocks (1982).
Accounting for changes in an overall measure of inequality - such as G(0) - by means of 
a partition of the distribution into subgroups defined by some household attribute must 
entail at least two components to the change: one caused by a change in inequality 
between the groups, and one by a change in inequality within the groups. The first one 
is naturally the part of the total change 'explained' by the partition, whereas the second 
is a "pure inequality” or unexplained effect. But the explained component can be further 
disaggregated into an effect due to changes in relative mean incomes between the 
subgroups - an "income effect” - and one due to changes in the size or membership of the 
subgroups - an "allocation effect". The Mookheijee and Shorrocks (1982) procedure 
captures these three effects in an intuitive way. It allows the change in overall inequality 
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where A is the difference operator, fj is the population share of group j, Aj is the mean 
income of group j  relative to the overall mean, ie p(yj)/p(y), and the overbar indicates a
7 This is actually an approximation to the true decomposition, but both Mookheijee 
and Shorrocks (1982) and, later, Jenkins (1995) argue that for computational purposes this 
approximation is sufficient.
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simple average. The first term (a) in equation (8) captures the unexplained, or pure 
inequality effect. The second and third terms (b and c) capture the allocation effect, 
holding within-group inequality and relative mean incomes constant in turns. The final 
term (d) corresponds to the income effect.
By dividing both sides through by G(0)t, proportional changes in overall inequality can 
be compared to proportional changes in the individual effects (Jenkins, 1995). It is then 
straightforward to draw conclusions about the importance of each effect in explaining 
changes in the total. Changes in terms b, c or d indicate the extent to which changes in 
mean incomes for the different groups, or in their composition, explain the observed 
changes in total G(0). Changes in the first component - the pure inequality effect - are the 
unexplained changes, due to greater inequality within the groups. Results for changes 
between 1981 and 1990 are reported in Table 5 below.
Table 5: The amount of inequality explained: dynamic results
% change in G(0) 1981-1990 14..8
% accounted for by: a b c d
Age 14.9 0.1 0.0 -0.2
Education 10.0 -0.5 4.5 0.9
Region 15.2 -0.1 -0.2 -0.1
Urban/rural 14.2 0.5 -1.5 1.7
Gender 15.0 -0.3 0.0 0.1
Notes: a shows the pure within-group inequality effect 
b and c show the allocation effect 
d shows the income effect
Some 5% of the total rise in inequality can be jointly accounted for by increases in mean 
income differences between urban and rural areas, and by offsetting migration. A more 
significant 33% is 'explained' by reallocation and income effects across education groups. 
The striking feature of the table, nevertheless, is the dominance of component 'a' over all 
others. With the exception of education and urban/rural status, the within-group, 'pure 
inequality' effect was actually larger for the partitions than the observed proportional
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change in G(0) for the complete distribution. This suggests that changes in composition 
or relative incomes of groups defined by age, region or gender did not contribute towards 
the increase in overall income inequality observed in Brazil from the beginning to the end 
of the 1980s.
Even in the cases of education and urban/rural status, the unexplained component is still 
larger than the combination of the income and allocation effects. It therefore appears that 
most of the growth in inequality observed in the 1980s can not be explained by changes 
in inequality between the groups partitioned according to the attributes in the above table.
Since ten years is a relatively short time in terms of a structural transformation of earnings 
behaviour, this is perhaps not surprising. But the question remains as to what lies behind 
the significant increases in inequality that were registered both in terms of Lorenz 
dominance and in terms of all scalar measures reported, which we now know to consist 
mostly of unexplained within-group effects. Standard approaches to explaining changes 
in the income distribution often stop at this point, and pursue the question no further. The 
task is not made easier for this chapter by the small number of observations in our time- 
series. Nevertheless, the next section presents the results of a tentative investigation into 
possible links between elements of the macroeconomic instability described in Chapter 6, 
and the behaviour of inequality and poverty.
41 The Im pact of M acroeconomic Perform ance.
The theory put forward earlier in this thesis focused on the effects of government 
investment on long-term inequality trends, rather than on the impacts of government 
macroeconomic management on short-term inequality trends. Because our data set was not 
suitable to an investigation of long term trends, with special reference to partitions by use 
of public or private services, it was used instead to produce a description of the basic 
pictures of inequality and poverty, focusing on short-term trends. Whereas Chapter 7 
presented these pictures, this chapter has tried to explain them.
While the static decomposition analysis of Section 2 shed some light on the structure of 
inequality by household attributes, the dynamic decompositions were incapable of 
explaining much of the change in inequality. This section changes the line of approach
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somewhat, and seeks to investigate whether there are any suggestive relationships between 
macroeconomic variables and inequality (and poverty). It does so without proposing a 
formal theoretical framework to underlie them, but the alternative at this stage was to 
leave the trends detected and described in Chapter 7 unexplained. This section therefore 
presents some diagrams and correlation coefficients, as well as some time-series OLS 
regression coefficients. In the absence of a proper theoretical model, and given the 
limitations of the time-series data, I make no claim that these establish causation.
The discussion below is intended as a first step in coming to grips with suggestive 
evidence that at least some of the (hitherto unexplained) increase in inequality in the 
decade was linked to macroeconomic instability, particularly inflation. A slightly different 
picture emerges for poverty, which is in line with its more cyclical behaviour. Most of the 
discussion in this last section can be seen as motivating the need for further research into 
the interplay between macroeconomics and inequality in Brazil.
Figure 1 plots inflation and unemployment alongside the Theil index over time. Figures 
2 and 3 do the same for real wages in manufacturing and annual growth in GDP. Figures 
4,5 and 6 repeat the previous three, replacing inequality (the Theil) with poverty (FGT2). 
In each of these figures, the macroeconomic variables are measured along the left-hand 
scale and the inequality or poverty indices are measured along the right-hand scale. Table 
6 below reports Rank-Spearman Correlation coefficients between the Theil index and the 
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Figure 6: (Minus) GDP growth and poverty (FGT2), 1981-1990
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Table 6: Correlation coefficients
Theil index FGT(2)
Log inflation 0.8455* 0.1038
Unemployment -0.7986* 0.5432
Real Wage in Manufacturing 0.1592 -0.7484*
GDP growth 0.0123 -0.4349
Notes: Macroeconomic variables time-series from table 1.
* denotes coefficients statistically significantly different from zero at the 5% 
level.
It would appear from this initial visualization of the data that, while both poverty and 
inequality grew over the decade, the changes in poverty and inequality were driven by 
different forces. It is striking, for instance, that the signs on the correlation coefficients 
between the Theil and both unemployment and real wages have the ’wrong’ sign. Higher 
unemployment was associated, in Brazil in the 1980s, with lower inequality and, despite 
the reduced number of observations, this negative correlation was significant. Lower real 
wages were also associated with lower inequality, although not significantly. Interestingly, 
the correlation coefficient between growth and inequality was very close to zero. The real 
macroeconomic force behind growth in inequality would appear to be inflation, as Figure 
1 and Table 7 suggest. A reason for this has been suggested before, namely the fact that 
ability to hedge against inflation - i.e to protect the value of one's earnings and assets - 
is widely thought to be positively related to income. Or in other words, that the inflation 
tax is a highly regressive means of financing a public deficit.
Since this dispersionary effect of high inflation is also felt within all partition groupings 
in Table 5 above, it may provide a candidate explanation for the large unexplained 
component in changes in inequality. Given the results of the dynamic decomposition 
reported in Section 3, it is clear that structural changes in incomes accruing to groups
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partitioned by age, gender, geographic location and even education, or in their 
composition, do not account for much of the increase in inequality documented in Chapter 
7. In that light, a correlation coefficient of 0.85 between the Theil index and inflation, 
significant despite the very few observations, appears to warrant some consideration. As 
the brief historical discussion in Chapter 6 highlighted, high and unstable inflation was 
perhaps the single most notable feature of the Brazilian macroeconomic scenario 
throughout the 1980s. Its growth and fluctuations are closely matched by those of 
inequality, as can be seen by Figure 1. Whatever future empirical findings on the role of 
government investment in influencing long-term distributional trends might be, it would 
seem that some attention might productively be paid to monitoring the impact of short­
term macroeconomic mismanagement on short-term equity.
These tentative results are starkly at odds with the traditional view that unemployment has 
an inequality augmenting effect, while inflation has an (insignificant) equalizing effect, 
as reported for the cases of the US by Blinder and Esaki (1978) and of the UK by Nolan 
(1987). It may be the case that whereas in low inflation economies, an increase in 
inflation merely proxies for an increase in aggregate demand, leading to higher (expected) 
wages for the bottom of the distribution, in high inflation economies such as Brazil, the 
regressive effect of the inflation tax dominates.
The relation between poverty and the macroeconomic aggregates is rather different. The 
effect of inflation is still positive, but not large, while unemployment and real wages now 
have the expected signs. Falls in unemployment, rises in real wages and rises in GDP 
growth are all correlated with reductions in poverty. Indeed, the real wages index was the 
only variable to be significantly (negatively) correlated with the FGT(2) poverty measure.
This preliminary evidence seemed to justify further investigation, by means of a set of 
OLS regressions, run with the time series data used to compute the correlation coefficients 
above. Unfortunately, since 1982 was excluded from the PNAD sample8, the time-series 
sample is very small, with only 9 observations. This adds to the list of reasons for caution 
in interpreting the results in this section. It also restricts the number of explanatory 
variables to be included in each regression. To retain enough degrees of freedom (and
8 See Chapter 7-3.
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reduce multicollinearity) to allow for any results to be significant, I restricted the models 
to be estimated to the two specifications below. Both focus on the effects of 
unemployment and inflation - the two variables significantly correlated with inequality - 
and exclude other potential regressors.
The first model is given by:
y, = a + p ,l® , + p2IF, * u, (9)
where the dependent variable yt is either the Theil Index or the Foster-Greer-Thorbecke 
(ot=2) at time t, UE is the rate of unemployment (percent) and IF is the logarithm of the 
rate of inflation (percent). The second model was designed to replicate the Blinder and 
Esaki (1978) approach9, which was also applied to UK data by Nolan (1987). It is given 
by:
«* = « ,+  PUUE, * Pa/ f ,  + u„ (10)
where su denotes the income share of the i* decile in year t, and the regressors are the 
same as in (9). The subscript i associated with the intercept and the coefficients indicates 
that these are being estimated separately for each decile. The ten decile share regressions 
are in fact a set of 'seemingly unrelated regressions' (Zellner, 1962), but since the right- 
hand-side variables are the same in each equation, the SURE estimation technique 
suggested by Zellner is equivalent to the OLS procedure, which is used to estimate the 
equations. See Nolan (1987) for details of the approach. Table 7 below presents the basic 
OLS estimation results for (9) and (10).
9 There are two small differences between their formulation and mine. First, their 
dependent variables are quintile shares, whereas I use decile shares, for the sake of 
consistency with the presentation of results in Chapter 7. Second, they include a time 
trend as a regressor. This was done for our data, and the results were similar in nature to 
those presented below, but there was considerable cost, in terms of significance, from 
losing a precious degree of freedom and introducing some multicollinearity.
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Table 7: OLS Regression Results






Theil Index -0.0144149** 0.0232029** 0.8782ff 2.228a
FGT(2) 0.0117573** 0.0123453 0.5492 2.211*






1 0.0286084 -0.0632042** 0.7872ff 1.547b
2 0.0338672* -0.0885136** 0.8684ff 2.024a
3 0.0280904 -0.1120901** 0.8363ff 2.189a
4 0.0319507 -0.1291567** 0.8362ff 2.208a
5 0.0279158 -0.1263449** 0.7515f 2.249a
6 0.0164597 -0.1365249** 0.7338f 2.2951
7 0.0234257 -0.1207190** 0.7349f 2.145*
8 0.0389421 -0.0539906 0.6900f 2.265a
9 0.0772234* 0.0484333 0.4873 2.908b
10 -0.3046318 0.7792771** 0.8297ff 1.971*
Notes: * denotes statistically significantly different from zero at the 10% level.
** denotes statistically significantly different from zero at the 5% level, 
a: The Durbin-Watson test (5%level) fails to reject the no autocorrelation 
hypothesis.
b: The Durbin-Watson test statistic is in the inconclusive range. (For n=9, 
k=2, dL=0.629, d ^ 1.699)
f: The F test for the joint significance fails to reject the null of the no joint 
significance at the 5% level.
ff: The F test fails to reject the null at the 1% level.
These regressions add strength to the suggestion that macroeconomic instability was an 
important factor behind the increase in Brazilian inequality in the 1980s. The Durbin- 
Watson test for residual autocorrelation generally fails to reject the null hypothesis that 
the problem is not present, which eliminates the most likely cause of bias in the 
coefficients. The R2 values are sufficiently large that the F-test for joint significance 
rejects the null hypothesis of no relation at the 5% level for nine out of the ten decile
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regressions. For the bottom four deciles and the top one, the F-test rejects the null at the 
1 % level, as it does for the inequality version of model (9). There are also a number of 
individual coefficients which are significantly different from zero at the 5% level 
(Student's t test).
More specifically, there is substantial backing for the hypothesis that high inflation may 
have contributed to the rise in inequality - through the regressivity of the inflation tax. 
The first equation of model (9), whose joint explanatory power is significant at the 1% 
level, confirms the positive coefficient of inflation, which is significant at the 5% level. 
(So is the counter-intuitive negative coefficient of unemployment, to which I turn next.) 
The Blinder-Esaki equations in model (10) are even more revealing. The coefficients in 
these ten regressions suggest that the impact of inflation, ceteris paribus, would have been 
to reduce the shares of the bottom eight deciles of the distribution, and to raise the shares 
of the top two. But as we know from Table 7-7, this is precisely what happened to the 
Brazilian distribution from 1981 to 1990: the richest two deciles gained income share at 
the expense of the bottom eight. And, despite the small sample size, the inflation 
coefficients are significant (at the 5% level) for the bottom seven and the top one deciles.
By contributing to a reduction in the income shares of the poor, inflation should clearly 
have a positive impact on any measure of poverty as well. This is confirmed by the sign 
of its coefficient in the second version of model (9). There is also confirmation, however, 
of the hypothesis that inflation and unemployment are less closely related to poverty than 
to inequality: the F-test for this regression fails to reject the null hypothesis of no relation 
at the 5% level. This might have been expected, since the real wage index, which had the 
only significant correlation coefficient with FGT(2), was not included in this regression.10
What about the effects of unemployment? The conventional wisdom has been to expect 
unemployment to be positively related to inequality and to poverty. This is the case in 
most countries. As Nolan (1987) states:
"These results [for the US, the UK and Canada] are in line with the a priori 
expectation that unemployment reduces the share of the bottom groups." (p.21).
10 This exclusion was motivated by the small sample size and for comparability across 
the models.
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In the case of Brazil, however, the opposite result is obtained on two counts: although 
unemployment is positively (and significantly) related with poverty, it is negatively related 
with inequality. And it seems to increase the shares of the bottom nine deciles, at the 
expense of the richest one.11
There are two possible explanations for this counter-intuitive phenomenon. The first is that 
the macroeconomic history of the decade was such that unemployment and inflation were 
negatively correlated between themselves (as inflation rose during the decade, 
unemployment fell), and that the apparent positive effect of unemployment on the shares 
of the poor is capturing some of the real (negative) effect of inflation. This argument is 
reinforced by the fact that when unemployment and inflation are included together in the 
decile regressions, the inflation coefficients are generally significant (eight of them at the 
5% level), whereas the unemployment coefficients are not. This suggests that the real 
macroeconomic culprit for increasing inequality is inflation, and that the positive 
coefficient of unemployment on the FGT(2) regression of model (9) - which is significant 
- is a better guide to the effects of unemployment on the poor than the (insignificant) 
positive coefficients in the decile share regressions.
The second candidate explanation is that unemployment in Brazil - and possibly in other 
developing countries with large informal sectors and undeveloped social safety nets - is 
not a labour status likely to be reported by the very poorest. They may respond to 
negative labour demand shocks by retreating to an informal sector characterised by self- 
employment with low productivity rates, or by employment at flexible wages. This is the 
view of unemployment as a 'luxury* which the very poor in a developing country can not 
afford. Further empirical investigation of this possibility is outside the scope of this 
section, but if it were found to contain some truth, this may also help explain the 
correlation between reductions in unemployment and income share losses by the poor. It 
may even be that the direction of causation is reversed, with greater poverty meaning that 
some people can no longer afford to remain unemployed - in which state the expected 
present discounted value of their future search prospects may be higher - and must move
11 Note the apparent contradiction between this result and the positive coefficient of 
unemployment in the regression of FGT(2), model (9): unemployment significantly 
increases poverty, whilst appearing to make the poor relatively better off!
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to a (lower utility) informal sector employment.
While this section has raised some new questions, it has also pointed to at least one 
important candidate answer. The results presented in Section 3 indicate that the structural 
or microeconomic factors usually included in dynamic inequality decompositions can not 
account for much of the changes in this period. This section has presented some evidence 
that macroeconomic factors, and inflation in particular, may be behind the increase in 
dispersion in Brazil. Poverty, on the other hand, appears to be more closely related to real 
wages, unemployment and growth. There appears to be scope for future work, both 
theoretical and empirical, on the effects of inflation and unemployment on the distribution 
of household equivalised income.
51 Conclusions.
This chapter has sought to explain the Brazilian inequality and poverty trends identified 
in Chapter 7. To do so, it relied on a mixture of conventional decomposition techniques, 
which focus on more microeconomic or structural factors, and a simple econometric 
analysis of the role of macroeconomic variables. Whereas the decompositions partition the 
distribution according to various characteristics of the household, such as geographic 
location and head's age, gender, race or education, the econometric estimations look for 
relationships between inequality and poverty measures on the one hand, and 
macroeconomic indicators such as inflation and unemployment on the other.
The static decomposition method, due to Cowell and Jenkins (1995), revealed that the set 
of household attributes described above, taken together, was capable of 'explaining' about 
half of overall inequality as 'between groups'. Taken individually, education was the most 
important explanatory factor, accounting for 37-42% of overall dispersion on its own. 
Causality can not be inferred, but the finding is descriptively significant. Race, regional 
location and urban/rural status also accounted for some 10% of total inequality, but age 
and gender of head were unimportant as sources of inequality.
While some light was thereby shed on the structure of Brazilian inequality, partitions by 
household characteristics were less successful in explaining changes in the distribution. 
The dynamic decomposition due to Mookheijee and Shorrocks (1982) found that changes
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in the composition of education groupings - notably an increase in the numbers of 
intermediate and high-school graduates - had some impact on the overall increase in 
inequality. But its main result was that most of the increase in overall inequality between 
1981 and 1990 was due to an unexplained, 'pure inequality' effect.
This result prompted consideration of a different set of possible factors influencing the 
income distribution: macroeconomic fluctuations. Although these factors had been 
considered before, the case of Brazil is an interesting one because of the extent of the 
macroeconomic instability it experienced in the 1980s. This part of the analysis was more 
tentative, due both to the absence of an underlying theoretical framework and to the 
reduced time-series sample size. Nevertheless, there was some significant evidence that 
increases in (an already high) level of inflation are correlated with, and may be partly 
responsible for, increases in inequality.
The analysis in this chapter is more ambiguous about the effects of unemployment on 
income dispersion, although it appears to be significantly related to increases in absolute 
poverty. Poverty also appears to increase with inflation, albeit less markedly and less 
significantly. Bivariate correlation coefficients suggest that real wage cuts and reductions 
in economic growth also appear to have an impact on poverty. While the analysis of 
macroeconomic factors behind inequality and poverty trends in this chapter was tentative, 





This thesis has been about the effects of structural adjustment on income distribution, with 
a particular focus on the role of government. The eight preceding chapters fall into three 
parts: the introductory 'institutional' part comprised Chapters 1 and 2; Chapters 3, 4 and 
5 formed the theoretical part; and the empirical part consisted of the last three chapters. 
Each of the main chapters had its own concluding section, where the principal findings 
and results were reviewed, eliminating the need for a lengthy final chapter. The purpose 
of this section is to bring together the main conclusions from the different parts of the 
thesis.
In the first part, Chapter 1 reviewed the general background to structural adjustment. It 
stressed the importance of the oil price shocks of the 1970s as a medium-term cause, 
because of the sharp realignment of the international terms of trade they brought about. 
It was this original shock that many developing countries did not adjust to. Borrowing in 
the international financial markets allowed them to maintain a gap between domestic 
expenditure and income, which translated into large current account deficits. The debt 
crisis of the early 1980s was the collapse of that system of financing, and led to the need 
for sharp domestic macroeconomic responses. These consisted essentially of expenditure 
reduction policies, generally through cuts in public sector expenditure and borrowing, and 
expenditure switching policies, generally through a real devaluation.
The chapter discussed the nature of these policies, and the difference between them and 
the more complex set of structural, institutional and microeconomic reforms which soon 
came to accompany them, as the process of adjustment focused on laying the foundations
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for sound future growth, by improving the basis of resource allocation. In principle, the 
combination of stabilization and structural adjustment policies constituted a process of 
pervasive economic reform, with substantial potential for impact on (both the average 
level and the distribution o f) the incomes accruing to individuals in the adjusting country. 
Five conceptually distinct channels for this impact were mentioned: relative (goods) price 
effects, labour market effects, asset price effects, public expenditure effects on 
entitlements, and long-term effects on capital accumulation. The theoretical analysis in the 
thesis focused principally on the effects of sustained government expenditure reduction, 
through the last two channels.
Before that, however, Chapter 2 provided a lengthier discussion of the issues involved in 
the international debt crisis and the subsequent process of adjustment, by means of a 
review of the contributions of the World Bank to the study of those topics. It found that 
the Bank seemed to endorse the high-borrowing strategy of the late 1970s, and did not 
publicly reveal much concern with mounting debt until after 1982. It also found that the 
Bank was very hesitant to acknowledge the need for any element of debt forgiveness in 
its approach to resolving the crisis, until after it was obvious to the informed public. As 
regards structural adjustment, its more important contributions were to the application of 
good price and trade theory to the design of structural reforms and post-reform targets, 
rather than to the macroeconomic aspects associated with the design of stabilization. 
Despite important data contributions, through LSMS, the Bank was not very original in 
its approach to understanding the impacts of reform on equity. During most of the decade, 
its public statements on the issue seemed too reliant on the prospect of future growth as 
the answer to poverty concerns.
But future growth did not do much for the living standards of the most vulnerable during 
what turned out to be a considerable medium-term. Many authors, mentioned earlier in 
the thesis, reported on the seriousness of some impacts from case studies, or modelled the 
effects through the goods, labour and assets markets. Chapters 3, 4 and 5 in this thesis 
turned to an investigation of some non-price effects of expenditure reduction, in a context 
where adjustment redraws the boundaries between the public and private sectors, and 
reduces government investment in the provision of private goods, which it may have 
previously supplied to private agents as transfers in kind.
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The main idea was that in a developing society - as indeed in most others - the degree of 
a person's dependence on the government varies with her position in the wealth 
distribution. If capital markets are imperfect, so that credit ceilings depend on initial 
wealth, and if there are production set non-convexities, so that projects must have a 
minimum size, then the poorest people may not even have access to the entrepreneurial 
production possibilities at all. And if, by obtaining even larger loans, people can buy 
private substitutes to public capital inputs, then richer groups will not depend on the 
government as much as poorer entrepreneurs do.
Chapter 3 found that, over a certain range, reductions in government investment in the 
production of these services - such as basic infrastructure, health care and education - 
which it supplies in a non-targeted way, will cause an increase in inequality of 
opportunity. The expected rates of return facing poorer people will fall further below those 
facing their richer counterparts, despite their being identical in every respect except initial 
wealth. Furthermore, it is possible that very low rates of public investment will lead to 
highly polarized societies, in which the middle-class (consisting of entrepreneurs able to 
buy private capital but dependent on the government for their complement of public 
capital) disappears. The high-return entrepreneurial activity is then restricted to a small 
group of very wealthy agents, able to provide their own infrastructure, health and 
education, while the bulk of society is restricted to some subsistence activity or, in 
alternative set-ups, supplying their labour to other entrepreneurs. In those cases, increases 
in government investment may have substantial positive effects on both equality of 
opportunity and on income per capita.
Chapter 4 looked at the role of government in such a framework in greater detail. It 
established the condition required for a positive optimal proportional tax rate to exist, and 
suggested reasons why the condition should be met under most reasonable parametric 
assumptions. This tax rate was found to depend positively on the relative importance of 
public capital in the private entrepreneurial production function, which in some sense can 
also represent society's view on the range of inputs which ought to be produced by the 
government. It depended negatively on the ratio of foreign transfers to GDP, reflecting a 
shift in the optimal allocation of domestic savings in response to exogenous changes in 
the level of foreign savings made available specifically to the production of public capital 
by the government. Naturally, it also depended positively on the population share of the
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credit-constrained (and hence more government dependent) group.
Interestingly, in light of the World Bank's early position regarding future growth as the 
answer to current costs of adjustment, Chapter 5 finds that public investment cuts may not 
lead only to greater (but stable) inequality of opportunity at steady state. It may actually 
lead to ever-increasing income divergence, with group growth rates increasing with their 
access to private substitutes to a technology that depends on public capital. The chapter 
suggests that if a lower propensity to save (or to invest in education) is observed amongst 
the poor, this may reflect perfectly rational behaviour in the face of different opportunities, 
rather than any skill, talent or effort difference. Because they face barriers to accessing 
the most productive technologies, they face lower marginal rates of intertemporal 
transformation. They therefore optimally choose lower marginal rates of intertemporal 
substitution, and have lower savings and investment ratios. Poorer groups hence have a 
lower growth rate, further reinforcing the inequalities of opportunity and generating a 
situation of polarizing growth. The role of public expenditure - even in the production and 
untargeted distribution of physical and social infrastructure - as a 'social cement', capable 
of halting persistent increases in inequality, is emphasized.
The empirical part of the thesis suggests a different, but complementary, policy 
implication. While governments that care about equity - or at least equality of opportunity 
- should avoid excessive cuts in their investment in services useful as inputs for private 
agents, they should do so with due respect to proper fiscal and monetary discipline. 
Macroeconomic mismanagement appears to do the poor and vulnerable no good at all, 
even in the short run.
This conclusion arises from the end of a section which delved into nine years of a large, 
repeated cross-section household survey data set for Brazil, the main objectives of which 
were to describe and explain the trends in inequality and poverty during the 1980s. This 
was a turbulent decade, characterized by unprecedented macroeconomic instability, which 
was discussed in Chapter 6.
Chapter 7 revealed that inequality had been rising unambiguously through the decade. 
Although this was not a completely monotonic process, according to any of the scalar 
inequality measures, the trend was unmistakeable, both in terms of those measures and in
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terms of Lorenz dominance. A surprisingly large number of Lorenz dominance results 
were found, and most proved to be statistically significant, confirming that inequality was 
generally rising throughout the period. Welfare results are more ambiguous, because the 
increase in inequality coexisted with an increase in mean (reported) income. The most 
remarkable welfare finding was the dominance of 1986 - the year of the Cruzado plan - 
over all other years in second order stochastic terms, and all but one in first order 
stochastic terms.
Poverty also rose during the decade, but less unequivocally. Its behaviour was more 
cyclical, with large increases in the recession of the early 1980s, improvements during the 
recovery, and new rises as the economy stagnated again towards the end of the decade. 
These results were generally found to be robust to the choice of equivalence scale used 
for comparing across households, although one would not be so sanguine if the primary 
interest were on poverty levels.
Chapter 8 sought explanations for these inequality trends. A static decomposition of 
Generalized Entropy inequality measures found that about half of the overall inequality 
could be 'explained1 by a fine partition, according to regional location, urban-rural status, 
education, age, gender and race. The most important single explanatory attribute was 
education of the head of household - although the direction of causation can not be 
inferred. Race, regional location and urban-rural status also have some explanatory power. 
Although this was quite informative about the static structure of Brazilian inequality, the 
dynamic decomposition of G(0) was not able to shed much light on the causes of changes 
in inequality.
Continuing to search for factors behind the large increase in dispersion in the 1980s, the 
analysis turned to the role of macroeconomic variables, and hence to the picture of 
instability described earlier. Though these results are more tentative in nature, there was 
substantial support for the hypothesis that a high and accelerating rate of inflation is 
associated with increasing inequality. In particular, OLS regressions found that (generally 
significant) coefficients on inflation perfectly predicted the direction of changes in decile 
shares observed from the beginning to the end of the 1980s. The regressions and 
correlations confirmed that poverty behaved more cyclically. Although inflation also 
seemed to be positively associated with poverty, its role was secondary to those of real
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wages, unemployment and growth.
Albeit through different approaches, both the theoretical and the empirical parts of this 
thesis emphasize the importance of the role of good and active governance for the 
protection of the living standards of the poor and of equality of opportunity during the 
economic reform process of structural adjustment. The fact that capital markets are not 
perfect, and that the poor are very often credit constrained, implies that governments that 
care about the welfare of the most vulnerable members of their societies should be careful 
with the extent of their transfer of activity to the private sector, or indeed with charging 
market prices for all of its services. There is a 'social cement' aspect to transfers in kind, 
which may play an important role in preventing growth from leading to ever greater 
inequity. Nevertheless, in keeping with tried and tested macroeconomic theory and advice, 
they should not finance these expenditures irresponsibly, risking macroeconomic 
instability. High inflation will cripple the income shares of the very people a government 
may be spending to help. Sound public finances and sound public investment have an 





Appendix to Chapter 2: TABLE A2-1 : World Development Reports (1980 - 1990)
Year Main Themes Key Figures
(i) President (ii) Direction 
(iii) Team Leader
Comment
1980 Human Development/ Poverty Robert McNamara 
Bevan Waide/Hollis Chenery 
Paul Isenman
Emphasises importance of education, training, nutrition and health in promoting growth and 
relieving poverty. Rural development theme recurs. Cautious on link from growth to poverty 
reduction. Promoting cause of poor both an end in itself and means to faster growth. Raises 
problems of policy falling victim to vested interests.





Returns to worries of the 1978 report on international economic environment. Need to expand 
financial flows to LDCs with little apparent concern for debt problems. Useful country studies 
on adjustment but macro in orientation* Some repetition of 1980 discussion on human 
development.
1982 Agricultural development A.W. Clausen 
David Turnham
A rosy view of growth and adjustment of LDCs in 1970s is offered - "good use of additional 
borrowing". Published three months before the Mexican debt crisis broke. Saw China and 
India's self-sufficiency as providing insulation from international economic changes. Some 
mention of problems of debt burdens and higher interest rates. Emphasises link between rapid 
growth and rapid agricultural growth but short on evidence. Advocates reform of agricultural 
policy and reiterates support for small farmers. Agricultural and rural development seen as key 
to alleviation of rural poverty.
1983 Management in development A.W. Clausen
Anne Krueger/Peter Wright
Pierre Landell-Mills
First mention of debt crisis; association with high interest rates. Speaks of 'illiquidity' and need 
for more capital inflows. Again mention of China and India's resilience being associated with 
low trade involvements. Warnings on protectionism. Beginning of emphasis on markets and 
outward orientation. Associates price distortions with poor performance. Working guide to 
issues in the management of the macroeconomy, state-owned enterprises, projects and 
programmes, and the public service.




Some pessimism about longer-term world growth appears. Links earlier 'benign' recycling of 
the 1970s with debt crisis. Importance of adjustment and co-ordinated international action. 
Externality and information arguments for population policy are advanced. Consequences of 
high population growth are argued to be damaging but empirical and theoretical support fairly 
weak.
Year Main Themes Key Figures
(i) President (ii) Direction 
(iii) Team Leader
Comment




Those who avoided debt crisis had growth before world market entry, expanded traded sector 
and diversified exports. Looks like 'ex post wisdom' given earlier 'recycling' emphasis. 
Emphasis on costs of protection and price distortions. Useful guide to international financial 
system and some interesting simulations. Less strong on analysis.






Lower interest rates and success at bringing down inflation seen as positive developments. 
Importance of growth in agriculture both to combat poverty and to lead economic growth. 
Optimistic about potential for technological advance. Need for better pricing, infrastructure, 
trading regimes and research. Progress noted in dealing with famines outside Africa. 
Distortions in trade lead to food exports being mostly from industrialised countries.
1987 Industrialisation and foreign 
trade
Barber Conable
Ben King/Costas Michalopoulos 
Sarath Rajapatirana
External payments imbalances of industrial countries are a threat to stability. Continued 
worrying on protectionism. Advantages of outward orientation are argued strongly. Much 
made of experience of East Asian countries. Conclusions from empirical work incautious.
1988 Public Finance Barber Conable 
W. David Hopper/Stanley 
Fischer 
Johannes Linn
Emphasis continued on reducing external imbalances for industrial countries, restructuring for 
developing countries, reducing resource transfers from developing countries. For public finance 
in developing countries, recommendations are: prudent macro, simplified tax systems to increase 
revenue and reduce distortions, more control and quality in spending. Association between 
fiscal deficits and debtors. Useful guide to public finance for developing countries.
1989 Financial systems Barber Conable 
Stanley Fischer 
Millard Long
Problems of financial institutions seen as arising from excessive government intervention and 
external shocks. Main policy recommendation is liberalisation of financial institutions. As with 
WDR 1988 an unambitious but useful manual on its subject.
1990 Poverty Barber Conable 
Stanley Fischer 
Lyn Squire
Two-part strategy recommended - labour intensive growth plus provision of social services, 
particularly primary education, primary health care and family planning. Cross-country 
comparison (of limited usefulness) of poverty using universal poverty line. Little support found 
for Kuznets inverted U-curve. Some discussion of safety nets. Also of 'adjustment' and 
poverty. Presents coherent assimilation of various themes around poverty reduction.
Notes:
1. This table is adapted from Stern with Ferreira (forthcoming).
2. From 1983-85 the WDRs had as Principal Editor' Rupert Pennant Rea, and from 1987 Clive Crook. In 1986 John Parker was editorial adviser.
272
Appendix to Chapter 3
Proof of Proposition 3
Definitions:
Let W c R+ be the set of all possible values for the wealth variable w, its state space. 
Let SI be the Borel algebra of W.
Let <3>(W, Si) be the set of all signed measures on (W, £2); and let A(W, Si) be the set of 
all probability measures in that measurable space.
Lemma Al: 0(W, £2) is a vector space.
Proof: see chapter 11.3 in Stokey and Lucas (1989).
Let the total variation norm on this space be given by:
k
I A. | = limsup (A1)
i=l
where the supremum is over all finite partitions of W into disjoint measurable sets.
Following Stokey and Lucas (1989), we say that a sequence of probability measures {A*} 
converges in the total variation norm to the probability measure X if
linv^ft- M = o.
Let P(w, A) = Pr[<]) (wt, 0J e A], where P: W x £2 —> [0,1] and <|> (w, 0) = (l-a)(l-T) f(w, 
0) is defined by equation (33) above, be a candidate transition function.
Plan:
The proof is in four steps. Step I proves that P(w, A) is a transition function. Step II 
defines condition M and proves that the transition function satisfies it. Step m  proves that 
the function thus satisfies the Strong Convergence Theorem for Markov Processes in 
infinite state spaces (Theorem 11.12 in Stokey and Lucas (1989)). Step IV applies a Law 
of Large Numbers to reinterpret the expected probability measure for a lineage as the 
long-run cross-section distribution at period t.
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Step I:
P(w, A) is a transition function iff:
a) P(w, A) is a probability measure on (W, £2), for each w e W; and
b) P(w, A) is a £2-measurable function for each A e  £2.
(a) is true because:
P(w, 0 )  = Pr [<|>(w, 0) e 0 ]  = 0, by the definition of the probability operator.
P(w, W) = Pr [<j)(w, 0) e W] = 1, since W is the state space for all w.
P(w, A) = Pr [<|>(w, 0) € A] > 0 for all A e £2, by the definition of the probability 
operator.
And for all disjoint B e  £2, P(w, u^Bj) = 'LT P(w» ®i)» because:
Pr [<(>(w, 0) e  u°°BJ = Xj~Pr [<|>(w, 0) € BJ, by the definition of the probability operator.
(b) is true because: P(w, A) = Pr [<|>(w, 0) e  A], which can be expressed as follows:
PO M ) = Ja <t)(w,0)dPr(Q)= j A lA l ] (w,0)dPrifi) (A2)
where 1A is an indicator function, and <])A denotes the value of <|) when in A. But both of 
these functions are £2-measurable for any A e £2, because indicator functions are always 
measurable, and <|>A is piecewise continuous, with a finite number of discontinuities 
(maximum of 2) in A. Piecewise continuous real-valued functions defined on bounded 
intervals of real numbers (such as A), are known to be measurable in the relevant Borel 
algebra (see Ash, 1972, p.34). That the product of two £2-measurable functions is itself £2- 
measurable follows from Theorem 1.5.6 in Ash (1972, p.39).
Hence P(w, A) is a transition function on (W, £2), as this step set out to prove.
Step II:
Condition M is discussed in Onicescu (1969), and proved originally by Stokey and Lucas 
(1989), Chapter 11.4. It states that, in the complete metric space defined by A(W, £2) and 
the total variation norm, there exist an integer N > 1, and a real number e > 0, such that 
for any A e £2, either PN (w, A) > £, for all w e W; or PN (w, Ac) > £, for all w e W.1
1 Ac = W\A, the complement of set A in the relevant state space.
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In this case, let A = [0, w]. Then,
a) all w > 0, as W c  R+.
b) if w > w, P(w, {0}) = 1-q, and {0} c  A. This establishes that P^w, A) > 8, for w 
such that q(w) <1-8 (with N = 1). But there may be w such that q(w) > 1-e. In that case, 
P (wt, {w: w < wt}) = 1. Hence, 3 M, 1 < M < » , such that PM(wt, A) = 1 > 8. This 
establishes for all w > w, that there exist N e {1, M} and 8 > 0 such that PN(w, A) > 8.
c) if w* < w < w, P(w, {0}) = 1-q, and {0} c  A.
For w such that q(w) > 1-e, P(wt, {w: w > wt}) = q. Therefore, 3 J > 1 such that 
P^Wp A) > e. This is because either wt+j e A or it belongs to {w: w > w}, in which case 
item (b) above applies.
d) if 0 < w < w*, P(w, A) = 1 > e.
Hence, for all w e  W, 3 N> 1, e > 0, such that for A = [0, w], P** (w, A) > e.
P (w, A) satisfies condition M, as this step set out to prove.
Step III:
Theorem 11.12 in Stokey and Lucas (1989) establishes sufficient conditions for Strong 
Convergence of Markov Processes in infinite state spaces. Applied to this example, it 
states that: if (a) P is a transition function on (W, £2); (b) T* is the adjoint operator
associated with P; and (c) P satisfies condition M for N > 1, e > 0; then there exists a
unique probability measure X* e A(W, £2) such that:
i r * X o  -  n  * a  -  e)*ix0 -  n  (A3>
for all A*, g A(W, ft), k = 1, 2,...
Clearly, step I establishes (a) and step II establishes (c). For the definition of the adjoint
operator in (b), see Stokey and Lucas (1989, Ch 8).
To see that (A3) indeed establishes that any Xq converges to X* in the total distribution 
norm, note that it implies that limk )nn |T*Nk - X*l = 0. This establishes the existence, 
uniqueness and stability of an invariant probability measure in the set of all probability 
measures in the measurable space of the state space W, to which any initial measure will 
converge in time through the transition function P, as this step set out to prove.
Step IV:
Because the problem was defined for a continuum of agents, X* can be reinterpreted as 
the limiting long run cross section distribution G*(w), by the law of large numbers, as this 
step sets out to show.
Let T be the earliest date at which every lineage in the population has converged to X*. 
At each t > T, there is then a continuum of agents indexed by i in [0, w], each drawing 
wit from a distribution X*, such draws being independent. Let I = [0, w]. Using the 
Kolmogorov construction, let H = R1 be the probability space in which all possible 
sequences of draws may be simultaneously represented, and T  be its Borel algebra, derived 
as in Judd (1985). Finally, let Gh(c) = /({i\h(i) < c}), for an arbitrary c € R, be a sample 
distribution at a fixed time t > T. / simply denotes a Lebesgue measure.
For any Lebesgue measurable subset A of R, and A* = {h e  H\ h(t) € A}, t e  I, define the 
probability measure p satisfying:
(i): p(Al) = X*(A), and
(ii): p(Au n  A*2 n  ... n  A*0) = p(A11) x p(Ae ) x ... x p(Am);  ^e  I, t* *   ^for i *  j, n = 1, 
2, ...
Then the law of large numbers which allows us to state that the cross-section distribution 
of realized draws on the support [0, w] is X*, is given as follows: 
p ( { h \G h(.) = A*(.)})=l.
Theorem (1) in Judd (1985) proves that N = {h € H \ Gh fails to exist} is not p- 
measurable, but for any r e [0,1], there exists an extension of p, pr, such that pr (N) = r. 
We choose r = 0, so N is a set of measure zero. Therefore Gh exists a.e. in H. We call p0 
= Ho-
Theorem (2) in Judd (1985) proves that L = {h \  Gh exists and Gh = A,*} is not p0- 
measurable, but there are extensions of p0 for which Gh exists almost surely and Gh = X* 
holds with probability %, any % e  [0, 1]. We choose p* = p0 (%) when % = 1.
Hence G* = Gh(w) = X* with probability 1. The law of large numbers can be stated, and 
it is true. This allows us to reinterpret the lineage probability measure X* as the long run
cross-section distribution G*(w), as this step set out to show.
Therefore, Gt(w) converges to a unique invariant distribution G* from any initial G0(w).
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Appendix to Chapter 4
This appendix proves that the individually preferred tax rate for upper class agents (i.e. 
those able to purchase private public capital, since their wealth w > w**) is zero for 
w > p.
We know that:
* .(„ )  = -  (1- a)(* +*P (Al)
“ 0) p
where, at the optimal input ratio, gp(co) = a© - (l-a)gg.
We are looking for co0, so that tu*(g>0) = 0.
But in that case, gg = Tp + X = X.
Setting (Al) equal to zero and substiuting for gp, we have:
q[(o ~oo) +(l-g)X] = (l-g)[X +gfa)-(l-g)X]
© p
ap[(l-a)(<o+X)] = (l-a)co[ao> +aX] 
a(l-a)(cD+X)p = a(l-a)(<o+X)<o 
<o = p
This proves that Ti*(p) = 0. But Tj*(w > p) = 0 because of inequality (16) and the 
constraint that 0 < v*  < 1. QED.
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Appendix to Chapter 5
This appendix states the proof of proposition 1, that in the two period version of the 
model presented above, type 2 households invest more than type 1 households: kj2 > kj1.
The constrained optimization problem facing type 2 households, as stated in (4), can be 
rewritten as:
M a x  -  f t 1"  * w b l -°  -  2  (A1)
l~o
The FOC wrt kj2 is given by:
- ( i - u P W  -  + a - o M f r - A  _ n  (K2)
(l-o)
2 , T l1 (A3)® (Vfo> -  K = A 0 K
And therefore:
j2  ®(^ osSq)
----------------------------------------------------- (A4)
1 + A °
The equivalent problem for type 1 households is to
Max -  * it-  * w * .1* x'fi1-9 - 2 {A5)
l - o
The FOC wrt k,1 is:
-d -o )[* (M o) -  *i‘r ° + (i-q )[*» i‘ig1)]~,’» 1(feiW _ {A6)
l - o
To solve explicitly for k^, it becomes necessary at this stage to introduce a specific 
functional form for d>(k,g). The Cobb Douglas form (with parameter p, 0 < p < 1) is 
consistent with the assumptions made in Al, compatible with the assumptions of Chapter 












'k l  '
(A9)
Therefore:
(A10)o-i .1  (l-pxi-o)ki > * / iff A '  < g l '^ g l^ )  'k l '
This necessary and sufficient condition can be restated as:
A > g l ' W 1^  (A11>
But:
a  >  pg i - h r  -  w u o  >  p  - - g i - ^ r  (A12)
where the first inequality follows from assumption A5, and second from the fact that
i
P > p 1-0 since 0 < p , o < 1i-0 . . . . _______  . . (A13)
Therefore,
*? > k l  (A14)
as we set out to prove. ■
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Appendix A to C hapter 7
Table Al: Description of variables in the basic PNAD household questionnaire. 1981-1990.
V ariable and Short definition
vlOl Household identifier
vlO State
v3 urban or rural
v5 type of area
v9991 frequency wgt (ind)
v9981 frequency wgt (hh)
v9971 frequency wgt (family)
vlOO type of observation
Household level data
vl07 total household size
vl08 no of inds aged 10+
v201 type of household (a)









v211 no of rooms







1990 1989 1988 1987 1986
vlOl vlOl vlOl vlOl vlOl
vlO vlO vlO vlO vlO
v3 v3 v3 v3 v3
v5 v5 v5 v5 v5
v9991 v9991 v9991 v9991 v9991
v9981 v9981 v9981 v9981 v9981
v9971 v9971 v9971 v9971 v9971
vlOO vlOO vlOO vlOO vlOO
vl07 vl07 vl07 vl07 vl07
vl08 vl08 vl08 vl08 vl08
v201 v201 v201 v201 v201
v202 v202 v202 v202 v202
v203 v203 v203 v203 v203
v204 v204 v204 v204 v204
v205 v205 v205 v205 v205
v206 v206 v206 v206 v206
v207 v207 v207 v207 v207
v208 v208 v208 v208 v208
v209 v209 v209 v209 v209
v210 v210 v210 v210 v210
v211 v211 v211 v211 v211
v231 v231 v231 v231 v231
v212 v212 v212 v212 v212
v213 v213 v213 v213 v213
v214 v214 v214 v214 v214
v215 v215 v215 v215 v215
v216 v216 v216 v216 v216
1985 1984 1983 1982 1981
vlOl vlOl vlOl vlOl vlOl
vlO vlO vlO vlO vlO
v3 v3 v3 v3 v3
v5 v5 v5 v5 v5
v9991 v9991 v9991 v9991 v9991
v9981 v9981 v9981 v9981 v9981
v9971 v9971 v9971 v9971 v9971
vlOO vlOO vlOO vlOO vlOO
vl07 vl07 vl07 vl07 vl07
vl08 vl08 vl08 vl08 vl08
v201 v201 v201 v201 v201
v202 v202 v202 v202 v202
v203 v203 v203 v203 v203
v204 v204 v204 v204 v204
v205 v205 v205 v205 v205
v206 v206 v206 v206 v206
v207 v207 v207 v207 v207
v208 v208 v208 v208 v208
v209 v209 v209 v209 , v209
v210 v210 v210 v210 v210
v211 v211 v211 v211 v211
v231 v231 v231 v231 v231
v212 v212 v212 v212 v212
v213 v213 v213 v213 v213
v214 v214 v214 v214 v214
v215 v215 v215 v215 v215
v216 v216 v216 v216 v216
v217 radio v217 v217
v218 tv v218 v218
v409 type of construction v409 v409
v410 total monthly income v410 v410
v411 household income -class v411 v411
v412 persons/ room v412 v412
v413 persons/ room - class v413 v413
v414 persons/ bedroom v414 v414
v41S persons/ bedroom- class 
Individual level data
v415 v415
v303 sex v303 v303
v304 colour v304 v304
v304 absent/present - -
v305 position in household v305 v305
v306 position in family v306 v306
v307 number of families v307 v307
v308 day of birth v308 v308
v309 month of birth v309 v309
v310 year of birth v310 v310
v805 age v805 v805
v311 literacy - yes/no v311 v311
v312 year of schooling (in attendance) v312 v312
v314 level of schooling (in attendance) v314 v314
v315 year of schooling (last achieved) v315 v315
v317 level of schooling (last achieved) v317 v317
v501 activity v501 v501
v502 other job - yes/no v502 v502
v503 occupation v503 v503
v504 job sector - narrow def v504 v504
v505 position in occupation v505 v505
v506 labour ID card - yes/no v506 v506
v5070 money income - yes/no v5070 V5070
v537 money income - amount v537 v537
v547 money income - class v547 v547
v5071 income in kind - yes/no v5071 v5071
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v217 v217 v217 v217
v218 v218 v218 v218
v409 v409 v409 v409
v410 v410 v410 v410
v411 v411 v411 v411
v412 v412 v412 v412
v413 v413 v413 v413
v414 v414 v414 v414
v415 v415 v415 v415
v303 v303 v303 v303
v304 v304 v304 v2301
- - - v304
v305 v305 v305 v305
v306 v306 v306 v306
v307 v307 v307 v307
v308 v308 v308 v308
v309 v309 v309 v309
v310 v310 v310 v310
v805 v805 v805 v805
v311 v311 v311 v311
v312 v312 v312 v312
v314 v314 v314 v314
v315 v315 v315 v315
v317 v317 v317 v317
v501 v501 v501 v501
v502 v502 v502 v502
v503 v503 v503 v503
v504 v504 v504 v504
v505 v505 v505 v505
v506 v506 v506 v506
V5070 V5070 V5070 v5070
v537 v537 v537 v537
v547 v547 v547 v547
v5071 v5071 v5071 V5071
v217 v217 v217 v217
v218 v218 v218 v218
v409 v409 v409 v409
v410 v410 v410 v410
v411 v411 v411 v411
v412 v412 v412 v412
v413 v413 v413 v413
v414 v414 v414 v414
v415 v415 v415 v415
v303 v303 v303 v303
v2301 - v6302 -
v304 v304 v304 v304
v305 v305 v305 v305
v306 v306 v306 v306
v307 v307 v307 v307
v308 v308 v308 v308
v309 v309 v309 v309
v3l0 v310 v310 v310
v805 v805 v805 v805
v311 v311 v311 v311
v312 v312 v312 v312
v314 v314 v314 v314
v315 v315 v315 v315
v317 v317 v317 v317
v501 v501 v501 v501
v502 v502 v502 v502
v503 v503 v503 v503
v504 v504 v504 v504
v505 v505 v505 v505
v506 v506 v506 v506
V5070 V5070 v5070 V5070
v537 v537 v537 v537
v547 v547 v547 v547
v5071 v5071 v5071 v5071
v538 income in kind - value v538 v538
v548 income in kind - class v548 v548
v5072 payment only in kind - y/n v5072 v5072
v508 hours normally worked v508 v508
v5090 money income (2nd job) - y/n v5090 v5090
v549 money income (2nd job) - amount v549 v549
v559 money income (2nd job) - class v559 v559
v5091 income in kind (2nd job) - y/n v5091 v5091
vSSO income in kind (2nd job) - amount v550 v550
v560 income in kind (2nd job) - class v560 v560
v5092 payment only in kind - y/n v5092 v5092
v5093 paid at all v5093 v5093
v510 hours normally worked (2nd job) v510 v510
v511 pay social security - y/n v511 v511
v512 which social security v512 v512
v513 were job seeker (ref month) v513 v513
v514 were job seeker (2 months) v514 v514
v515 job seeking method v515 v515
v516 length of unemployment (months) - v516
v566 length of unemployment (weeks) - v566
v517 previously worked - paid - v517
v518 previously worked - unpaid - v518
v519 how long out of labour force - years - v519
v569 how long out of labour force - months - v569
v520 previous occupation - v520
v521 sector - narrow def - v521
v522 position in previous job - v522
v523 duration of previous job (years) - v523
v573 duration of previous job (months) - v573
v524 reason for leaving - v524
v525 labour ID card - prev. job - v525
v526 occupational pension - prev. job - v526
v527 receipt of other income - v527
v5280 receive retirement pension - v5280
v578 retirement pension - amount - v578
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v538 v538 v538 v538
v548 v548 v548 v548
v5072 v5072 v5072 v5072
v508 v508 v508 v508
v5090 v5090 v5090 v5090
v549 v549 v549 v549
v559 v559 v559 v559
v5091 v5091 v5091 v5091
v550 v550 v550 v550
v560 v560 v560 v560
v5092 v5092 v5092 v5092
v5093 v5093 v5093 v5093
v510 v510 v510 v510
v511 v511 v511 v511
v512 v512 v512 v512
v513 v513 v513 v513
v514 v514 v514 v514
v515 v515 v515 v515
v516 v516 v516 v516
v566 v566 v566 v566
v517 v517 v517 v517
v518 v518 v518 v518
v519 v519 v519 v519
v569 v569 v569 v569
v520 v520 v520 v520
v521 v521 v521 v521
v522 v522 v522 v522
v523 v523 v523 v523
v573 v573 v573 v573
v524 v524 v524 v524
v525 v525 v525 v525
v526 v526 v526 v526
v527 v527 v527 v527
v5280 v5280 v5280 v5280
v578 v578 v578 v578
v538 v538 v538 v538
v548 v548 v548 v548
v5072 v5072 v5072 v5072
v508 v508 v508 v508
v5090 V5090 v5090 v5090
v549 v549 v549 v549
v559 v559 v559 v559
v5091 v5091 v5091 v5091
v550 v550 v550 v550
v560 v560 v560 v560
v5092 v5092 v5092 v5092
v5093 v5093 v5093 v5093
v510 v510 v510 v510
v511 v511 v511 v511
v512 v512 v512 v512
v513 v513 v513 v513
v514 v514 v514 v514
v515 v515 v515 v515
v516 v516 v516 v516
v566 v566 v566 v566
v517 v517 v517 v517
v518 v518 v518 v518
v519 v519 v519 v519
v569 v569 v569 v569
v520 v520 v520 v520
v521 v521 v521 v521
v522 v522 v522 v522
v523 v523 v523 v523
v573 v573 v573 v573
v524 v524 v524 v524
v525 v525 v525 v525
v526 v526 v526 v526
v527 v527 v527 v527
v5280 v5280 v5280 v5280
v578 v578 v578 v578
v588 retirement pension - class 
v5281 receive occupational pension 
v579 amount 
v589 class






v5284 receive other income 
v582 amount 
v592 class 
v806 age group (a) 
v807 age group (b) 
v808 age group (c) 
v318 years of education 
v319 education - level 
v600 monthly income, main job 
v601 monthly income, all jobs 
v602 monthly income, all sources 
v603 income, all sources, class (a) 
v604 income, all sources, class (b) 
v605 income, all jobs, class 
v606 income, main job, class 
v607 total family income, class 
v5080 hours worked - class 
v5040 occupational sector 
v5100 total hours worked 
v3101 total hours worked, class 
v5050 position in occupation 
v5030 occupational group 
v9329 no of people in family 




























































v588 v588 v588 v588
v5281 v5281 v5281 v5281
v579 v579 v579 v579
v589 v589 v589 v589
v5282 v5282 v5282 v5282
v580 v580 v580 v580
v590 v590 v590 v590
v5283 v5283 v5283 v5283
v581 v581 v581 v581
v591 v591 v591 v591
v5284 v5284 v5284 v5284
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Appendix B to Chapter 7
This appendix lists the formulae for the inequality and poverty measures used in this 
chapter. The notation is standard:
n: number of individuals in the sample;
yji gross per capita household income for individual i, i e (1, 2,...,n);
ji(y) = (1/n) Xyj arithmetic mean income;
z: poverty line for the relevant region.
Inequality measures:
The Gini coefficient is given by:
n n
G = T ± 7 - , ' L ' L \ y r y J \ <A1>
2 n zp(y) i=1 jm 1
The Theil index is given by:
r = (A2)
i»(y) i*(y)





- E  Cyr^Cy))2n i=1
(A3)






P is the Headcount Index when a  = 0, the Normalized Poverty Deficit when a  = 1, and 
the Foster-Greer-Thorbecke (2) index when a  = 2.
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